(Redirected from Algerian War of Independence)
The 'Algerian War' (
French: ''Guerre d'Algérie''), also known as 'Algerian War of Independence', took place between 1954 and 1962 and led to
Algerian independence from
France. One of the most important
decolonization wars, it was a complex conflict characterized by
guerrilla warfare, maquis fighting,
terrorism against civilians, use of torture on both sides and
counter-terrorism operations by the
French Army. Effectively started in November 1954 during the ''
Toussaint Rouge'', the conflict shook the
French Fourth Republic's (1946â58) foundations. Under orders from
Guy Mollet's (
SFIO) government, the French Army initiated a campaign of "pacification" of what was still considered at the time to be fully part of France. This "public order operation" quickly turned into a full-scale war. Algerians, who at first were mostly in favor of peace and tranquillity, turned increasingly toward the goal of independence, while French divided themselves on the issues of "French Algeria" (''l'Algérie Française''), of the conservation of the ''status quo'', the acceptance of negotiations and of an intermediate status between independence and complete integration in the French Republic, and independence.
Affected by parliamentary instability, the Fourth Republic was dissolved with
Charles de Gaulle's return to power during the
May 1958 crisis and his subsequent founding of the
Fifth Republic and the establishment of a new Constitution tailored by himself and his
Gaullist followers. De Gaulle's return to power was supposed, according to the Army, to ensure Algeria's continued integration with the
French Community, which had replaced the
French Union which gathered
France's colonies. However, De Gaulle progressively shifted in favor of Algerian independence, seeing it as inevitable. He thus engaged in negotiations with the FLN, leading to the March 1962
Evian Accords which organized the independence of Algeria. After the failed April 1961
Algiers putsch organized by Generals hostile to the negotiations headed by
Michel Debré's Gaullist government, the
OAS (''Organisation de l'armée secrÚte''), which grouped far-right radicals, initiated a campaign of bombings in Algeria in order to block the implementation of the Evian Accords and the exile of the colons.
Ahmed Ben Bella, who had been arrested in 1956 along with other FLN leaders, became the first
President of Algeria. To this day, the war has provided an important
strategy frame for
counter-insurgency thinkers, while the use of
torture by the French Army has provoked a moral and political debate on the legitimacy and effectiveness of such methods. This debate is far from being settled as torture was used by both sides.
The Algerian war is a founding event of Algerian history. It left long-standing scars in French society, and still affects present-day France. After the
1997 legislative elections, won by the
Socialist Party (PS), the
National Assembly officially acknowledged in June 1999, a full 37 years after the
Evian agreements, that a "war" had taken place (official terminology was a "
public order operation");
[2] while the
Paris massacre of 1961 was recognized by the French state only in October 2001; on the other hand the
Oran massacre of 1962 by the FLN has not been recognized yet by the Algerian state.
French Algeria
Main articles: French rule in Algeria ,
Nationalism and resistance in Algeria
The conquest of Algeria
Paris initiated the
colonization of Algeria in 1830, under the
July Monarchy. Directed by
Marshall Bugeaud, who became the first
Governor-General of Algeria, the conquest was violent, marked by the "
scorched earth" policy and the use of torture. Applauding Bugeaud's method,
liberal thinker
Alexis de Tocqueville could declare: "war in Africa is a science. Everyone is familiar with its rules and everyone can apply those rules with almost complete certainty of success. One of the greatest services that Field Marshal Bugeaud has rendered his country is to have spread, perfected and made everyone aware of this new science."
[3] Officially annexed in 1834, Algeria was divided the same year into three
French departments, Alger,
Oran and Constantine. Under the
Second Empire (1852-1871), the ''
Code de l'indigénat'' (Indigenous Code) was implemented by the ''
senatus consulte'' of
July 14,
1865. Its first article stipulated that
"The Muslim indigen is French; however, he will continue to be subjected to Muslim law. He may be admitted to serve in the terrestrial and marine Army. He may be called to functions and civil employment in Algeria. He may, on his demand, be admitted to enjoyed the rights of a French citizen; in this case, he is subjected to the political and civil laws of France."[4]
However, until 1870, fewer than 200 demands were registered by Muslims, and 152 by Jewish Algerians settlers.
[5] The 1865 decree was then modified by the 1870
Crémieux decrees, which granted
French nationality to Jews living in one of the three Algerian departments. In 1881, the ''Code de l'Indigénat'' officialized the
discrimination, by creating specific penalities for indigenes and organizing the seizure or appropriation of their lands.
[5]
Algerian nationalism
Algerians took part in
World War I, fighting for France as ''
tirailleurs'' (such regiments were created as early as 1856.
[7] With
Wilson's 1918 proclamation of the
Fourteen Points, whose fifth point proclaimed that "A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of
sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined," some Algerian intellectuals — dubbed ''
oulĂ©mas'' — began to nurture the desire for, if not independence, at least
autonomy and
self-rule. It is in this context that
Hadj Abd el-Kadir (grand-son of
Abd el-Kadir, who had spearheaded the resistance against the French in the first half of the 19th century, and a member of the directing committee of the
French Communist Party (PCF)), founded in 1926 the
North-African Star (''Etoile nord-africaine'') party, to which
Messali Hadj, also member of the PCF and of its affiliated trade-union, the
CGTU, joined the following year. The North-African Party cut away from the PCF in 1928, before being dissolved in 1929 at Paris' demand. Amid growing discontent from the Algerian population, the
Third Republic (1871-1940) acknowledged some legitimate demands, and the
Popular Front initiated in 1936 the
Blum-Viollette proposal which was supposed to enlighten the Indigenous Code by giving French citizenship to a small minority of Muslims. The European-descended Algerian however violently demonstrated against it, while the clandestine North-African Party opposed it, leading to the project's abandonment. The independent party was dissolved in 1937 and its leaders were charged with illegal reconstitution of a dissolved league, leading to Messali Hadj's 1937 foundation of the ''
Parti du peuple algérien'' (Algerian People's Party, PPA), which this time no longer espoused full independence, but only an extensive autonomy. This new party was again dissolved in 1939. Under
Vichy, the French state attempts to abrogate the Crémieux decree in order to suppress the Jews' French citizenship, but the measure was never implemented.
On the other hand, independent leader
Ferhat Abbas founded the
Algerian Popular Union(''Union populaire algérienne'') in 1938, while writing in 1943 the Algerian People's Manifest (''Manifeste du peuple algérien''). Arrested after the
May 8,
1945 SĂ©tif massacre, during which the French army killed between 20,000 and 45,000 Algerians, Abbas founded in 1946 the
Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA) and was elected as a deputy. Founded in 1954, the
National Liberation Front (FLN) succeeded Messali Hadj's Algerian People's Party (PPA), while its leaders created an armed wing, the ''
Armée de Libération Nationale'' (National Liberation Army) to engage in
armed struggle against the colonial power.
Beginning of hostilities
In the early morning hours of
November 1,
1954, FLN ''maquisards'' â (guerillas), or "terrorists" as they were called by the French â launched attacks in various parts of Algeria against military installations, police posts, warehouses, communications facilities, and public utilities, in what became known as the ''
Toussaint Rouge''. They also attacked French civilians, killing several. From
Cairo, the FLN broadcast a proclamation calling on Muslims in Algeria to join in a national struggle for the "restoration of the Algerian state - sovereign, democratic and social - within the framework of the principles of Islam." It was the reaction of Premier
Pierre MendĂšs-France (
Radical-Socialist Party), who only a few months before had completed the liquidation of France's empire in
Indochina, that set the tone of French policy for the next five years. On
November 12, he declared in the National Assembly: "One does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the nation, the unity and integrity of the Republic. The Algerian departments are part of the French Republic. They have been French for a long time, and they are irrevocably French [...] Between them and metropolitan France there can be no conceivable secession." At first, and despite the May 8, 1945
SĂ©tif massacre and pro-Independence struggle before WWII, most Algerians were in favour of a relative status-quo. While Messali Hadj had radicalized by forming the FLN, Ferhat Abbas maintained a more moderate, electoral strategy. Less than 500 ''
fellaghas'' (pro-Independence) fighters) could be counted at the beginning of the conflict
[8] The Algerian population radicalized itself in particular because of the ''
Main Rouge'' (Red Hand) terrorist attacks.
This terrorist group engaged in anti-colonialist actions in all of the
Maghreb region (
Morocco,
Tunisia and Algeria), killing for example Tunisian activist
Farhat Hached in 1952.
The FLN
ALN R.A. propaganda poster in Algiers, "The Algerian Revolution, a people at war against colonialist barbarity". (June 29, 1962, Rocher Noir)
"The FLN uprising presented nationalist groups with the question of whether to adopt armed revolt as the main course of action. During the first year of the war,
Ferhat Abbas's UDMA, the
ulema, and the
PCA maintained a friendly neutrality toward the FLN. The
communists, who had made no move to cooperate in the uprising at the start, later tried to infiltrate the FLN, but FLN leaders publicly repudiated the support of the party. In April
1956, Abbas flew to Cairo, where he formally joined the FLN. This action brought in many ''évolués'' who had supported the UDMA in the past. The
AUMA also threw the full weight of its prestige behind the FLN. Bendjelloul and the pro-integrationist moderates had already abandoned their efforts to mediate between the French and the rebels.
After the collapse of the
MTLD,
Messali Hadj formed the
leftist Mouvement National Algérien (MNA), which advocated a policy of violent
revolution and total independence similar to that of the FLN. The
ALN, the military wing of the FLN, subsequently wiped out the MNA
guerrilla operation, and Messali Hadj's movement lost what little influence it had had in Algeria. However, the MNA gained the support of a majority of Algerian workers in France through the
Union Syndicale des Travailleurs Algériens (
Union of Algerian Workers). The FLN also established a strong organization in France to oppose the MNA. Merciless "
café wars," resulting in nearly 5,000 deaths, were waged in France between the two rebel groups throughout the years of the War of Independence.
On the political front, the FLN worked to persuade — and to coerce — the Algerian masses to support the aims of the Independence movement. FLN-oriented labour unions, professional associations, and students' and women's organizations were created to rally diverse segments of the population.
Frantz Fanon, a psychiatrist from
Martinique who became the FLN's leading political theorist, provided a sophisticated intellectual justification for the use of violence in achieving national liberation. He stated that only through violence could an oppressed people attain human status. From
Cairo,
Ahmed Ben Bella ordered the liquidation of potential ''interlocuteurs valables'', those independent representatives of the
Muslim community acceptable to the French through whom a compromise or reforms within the system might be achieved.
As the FLN campaign spread through the countryside, many european farmers in the interior (called ''
Pieds-Noirs'') sold their holdings and sought refuge in
Algiers and other Algerian cities. After a series of bloody, random massacres and bombings by Muslim Algerians in several towns and cities, the French ''Pieds-Noirs'' and urban French population began to demand that the French government engage in sterner countermeasures, including the proclamation of a
state of emergency,
capital punishment for
political crimes, denunciation of all
separatists, and most ominously, a call for 'tit-for-tat' reprisal operations by police, military, and para-military forces. ''
Colon''
vigilante units, whose unauthorized activities were conducted with the passive cooperation of police authorities, carried out ''ratonnades'' (literally,
rat-hunts; synonymous with
Arab-killings) against suspected FLN members of the
Muslim community.
By 1955 effective political action groups within the Algerian colonial community succeeded in intimidating the governors general sent by Paris to resolve the conflict. A major success was the conversion of
Jacques Soustelle, who went to Algeria as governor general in January 1955 determined to restore peace. Soustelle, a one-time leftist and by 1955 an ardent Gaullist, began an ambitious reform program (the
Soustelle Plan) aimed at improving economic conditions among the Muslim population" (Library of Congress).
The Philippeville massacre
ALN guerrillas using mortar across the Algerian-Tunisian border protected by the electrified Morice Line. (1958)
The FLN adopted tactics similar to those of nationalist liberal groups in Asia, and the French did not realize the seriousness of the challenge they faced until 1955, when the FLN moved into urbanized areas. "An important watershed in the War of Independence was the massacre of Pieds-Noirs civilians by the FLN near the town of
Philippeville (now known as
Skikda) in August
1955. Before this operation, FLN policy was to attack only military and government-related targets. The ''wilaya'' commander for the
Constantine region, however, decided a drastic escalation was needed. The killing by the FLN and its supporters of 123 people, including 71 French,
[9] and old women and babies, shocked Soustelle into calling for more repressive measures against the rebels. The government claimed it killed 1,273 guerrillas in retaliation; according to the FLN and to ''
The Times'' magazine, 12,000 Algerians were massacred by the armed forces and police, as well as ''Pieds-Noirs'' gangs.
[10] Soustelle's repression was a major cause of the Algerian population's rallying to the FLN.
After Philippeville, Soustelle declared sterner measures and an all-out war began" (Library of Congress). In 1956 demonstrations of French Algerians forced the French government to abolish an idea of reform.
"Soustelle's successor, Governor General
Lacoste, a socialist, abolished the
Algerian Assembly. Lacoste saw the assembly, which was dominated by ''
pieds-noirs'', as hindering the work of his administration, and he undertook to rule Algeria by decree. He favored stepping up French military operations and granted the army exceptional police powers — a concession of dubious legality under French law — to deal with the mounting political violence. At the same time, Lacoste proposed a new administrative structure that would give Algeria a degree of autonomy and a decentralized government. Whilst remaining an integral part of France, Algeria was to be divided into five districts, each of which would have a territorial assembly elected from a single slate of candidates. Deputies representing Algerian ridings were able to delay until 1958 passage of the measure by the
National Assembly of France.
In August/September 1956, the internal leadership of the FLN met to organize a formal policy-making body to synchronize the movement's political and military activities. The highest authority of the FLN was vested in the thirty-four-member
National Council of the Algerian Revolution (''Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne'', CNRA), within which the five-man Committee of Coordination and Enforcement (''Comité de Coordination et d'Exécution'', CCE) formed the executive. The externals, including Ben Bella, knew the conference was taking place but by chance or design on the part of the internals were unable to attend.
Meanwhile, in October 1956, the
French Air Force illegally intercepted a Moroccan
DC-3 that was flying to
Tunis, carrying
Ahmed Ben Bella,
Mohammed Boudiaf,
Mohamed Khider and
Hocine AĂŻt Ahmed, and forced it to land in Algiers. Lacoste had the FLN external political leaders arrested and imprisoned for the duration of the war. This action caused the remaining rebel leaders to harden their stance.
France took a more openly hostile view of President
Gamal Nasser's material and political assistance to the FLN, which some French analysts believed was the most important element in sustaining continued rebel activity in Algeria. This attitude was a factor in persuading France to participate in the November 1956 British attempt to seize the
Suez Canal during the
Suez Crisis.
During 1957 support for the FLN weakened as the breach between the internals and externals widened. To halt the drift, the FLN expanded its executive committee to include Abbas, as well as imprisoned political leaders such as Ben Bella. It also convinced communist and Arab members of the
United Nations (UN) to put diplomatic pressure on the French government to negotiate a cease-fire" (Library of Congress).
Writer
Albert Camus, a Pied-Noir and philosopher, often associated with
existentialism, tried unsuccessfully to persuade both sides to at least leave civilians alone, writing editorials against the use of torture in ''
Combat'' newspaper. The FLN considered him a fool, and most ''Pieds-Noirs'' considered him a traitor.
French Counterinsurgency Operations
French army paratroopers heading to a transport helicopter. (1958)
From its origins in
1954 as ragtag maquisards numbering in the hundreds and armed with a motley assortment of hunting rifles and discarded French, German, and American light weapons, the FLN had evolved by 1957 into a disciplined fighting force of nearly 40,000 . More than 30,000 were organized along conventional lines in external units that were stationed in Moroccan and Tunisian sanctuaries near the Algerian border , where they served primarily to divert some French manpower from the main theaters of guerrilla activity to guard against infiltration. The brunt of the fighting was borne by the internals in the ''
wilayat''; estimates of the numbers of internals range from 6,000 to more than 25,000, with thousands of part-time irregulars.
During 1956 and 1957, the FLN successfully applied
hit-and-run tactics in accordance with
guerrilla warfare theory, which was at the time being formalized, (in particular by
Mao) as "
people's war". Specializing in ambushes and night raids and avoiding direct contact with superior French firepower, the internal forces targeted army patrols, military encampments, police posts, and colonial farms, mines, and factories, as well as transportation and communications facilities. Once an engagement was broken off, the guerrillas merged with the population in the countryside, in accordance with Mao's theories. Kidnapping was commonplace, as were the ritual murder and mutilation of captured French military, colons of both genders and every age, suspected collaborators or traitors . At first, the FLN targeted only Muslim officials of the colonial regime; later, they coerced, maimed (cutting off ears and nose with a ''
douk-douk'' was a favored torture) or killed village elders, government employees, and even simple peasants who simply refused to support them. Moreover, during the first two years of the conflict, the guerrillas killed about 6,000 Muslims and 1,000 non-Muslims according to a former
paratrooper.
[11]
Although successful in engendering an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty within both communities in Algeria, the revolutionaries' coercive tactics suggested that they had not yet inspired the bulk of the Muslim people to revolt against French colonial rule. Gradually, however, the FLN gained control in certain sectors of the
AurĂšs, the
Kabylie, and other mountainous areas around Constantine and south of Algiers and
Oran. In these places, the FLN established a simple but effective— although frequently temporary — military administration that was able to collect taxes and food and to recruit manpower. But it was never able to hold large fixed positions. Algerians all over the country also initiated underground social, judicial, and civil organizations, gradually building their own state.
The loss of competent field commanders both on the battlefield and through defections and political purges created difficulties for the FLN. Moreover, power struggles in the early years of the war split leadership in the wilayat, particularly in the AurĂšs. Some officers created their own fiefdoms, using units under their command to settle old scores and engage in private wars against military rivals within the FLN. Although identified and exploited by French intelligence, factionalism did not materially impair the overall effectiveness of FLN military operations.
The Battle of Algiers and counter-insurgency tactics
Main articles: Battle of Algiers
To increase international and domestic French attention to their struggle, the FLN decided to bring the conflict to the cities and to call a nationwide
general strike. The most notable manifestation of the new urban campaign was the
Battle of Algiers, which began on
September 30,
1956, when three women placed bombs at three sites including the downtown office of
Air France. The ALN carried out an average of 800 shootings and bombings per month through the spring of 1957 , resulting in many civilian casualties and inviting a crushing response from the authorities. The 1957 general strike, timed to coincide with the UN debate on Algeria, was imposed on Muslim workers and businesses .
General
Jacques Massu, who was instructed to use whatever methods were necessary to restore order in the city, frequently fought terrorism with acts of terrorism, dubbed
counter-terrorism. Using paratroopers, he broke the strike and systematically destroyed the FLN infrastructure there. But the FLN had succeeded in showing its ability to strike at the heart of French Algeria and in rallying a mass response to its appeals among urban Muslims. Massu's troops punished villages that were suspected of harboring rebels by attacking them with mobile troops or aerial bombardment and gathered 2 million of the rural Muslim population into fortified villages under French military control. The publicity given to the brutal methods used by the army to win the Battle of Algiers, including the systematic use of torture and ''quadrillage'' which divided the city according to military zones, with all the authority given to the military, created doubt in France about its role in Algeria. What had been originally thought of as a simple "
Pacification" or "public order operation" had turned into a fully fledged
colonial war, to block them from joining the guerrillas and massively introduced the use of torture.
Despite complaints from the military command in Algiers, the French government was reluctant for many months to admit that the Algerian situation was out of control and that what was viewed officially as a pacification operation had developed into a major war. By 1956 France had committed more than 400,000 troops to Algeria. Although the elite colonial infantry airborne units and the
Foreign Legion bore the brunt of offensive counterinsurgency combat operations, approximately 170,000 Muslim Algerians also served in the regular French army, most of them volunteers. France also sent air force and naval units to the Algerian theater, including rotary-winged craft (helicopters). In addition to service as a flying ambulances and cargo carrier, French forces utilized the
helicopter for the first time in a ground attack role in order to pursue and destroy fleeing FLN guerrilla units. The American military would later use the same helicopter combat methods in Vietnam.
The French army resumed an important role in local Algerian administration through the Special Administration Section (''
Section Administrative SpĂ©cialisĂ©e'', SAS), created in 1955. The SAS's mission was to establish contact with the Muslim population and weaken nationalist influence in the rural areas by asserting the "French presence" there. SAS officers — called ''kĂ©pis bleus'' (blue caps) — also recruited and trained bands of loyal Muslim irregulars, known as ''
harkis''. Armed with shotguns and using guerrilla tactics similar to those of the FLN, the ''harkis'', who eventually numbered about 180,000 volunteers, more than the FLN effectives
[12] were an ideal instrument of counterinsurgency warfare.
''Harkis'' were mostly used in conventional formations, either in all-Algerian units commanded by French officers or in mixed units. Other uses included
platoon or smaller size units, attached to French battalions, in a similar way as the
Kit Carson Scouts by the US in Vietnam. A third use was an
intelligence gathering role, with some reported minor
pseudo-operations in support of their intelligence collection.
[13] According to US military
Lawrence E. Cline, however, "the extent of these pseudo-operations appears to have been very limited both in time and scope... The most widespread use of pseudo type operations was during the 'Battle of Algiers' in 1957. The principal French employer of
covert agents in Algiers was the
Fifth Bureau, the
psychological warfare branch." The Fifth Bureau "made extensive use of "turned" FLN members", one such network being run by Captain Paul-Alain Leger of the 10th Paras. "
Persuaded" to work for the French forces, including by the use of torture and threats against their family, these agents "mingled with FLN cadres. They planted incriminating forged documents, spread false rumours of treachery and fomented distrust... As a frenzy of throat-cutting and disemboweling broke out among confused and suspicious FLN cadres, nationalist slaughtered nationalist from April to September 1957 and did France's work for her".
[14] But this type of operation involved individual operatives rather than organized covert units.
One organized pseudo-guerrilla unit however was created in December 1956 by the French
DST intelligence agency. The
Organization of the French Algerian Resistance (ORAF), a group of counter-terrorists had as mission to carry out
false flag terrorist attacks with the aim of quashing any hopes of political compromise.
[15]
But it seemed that, as in Indochina, "the French focused on developing native guerrilla groups that would fight against the FLN," one of whom fought in the Southern Atlas Mountains, equipped by the French Army.
[16]
The FLN also used pseudo-guerrilla strategies against the French Army on one occasion, with the "Force K," a group of 1,000 Algerians who volunteered to serve in Force K as guerrillas for the French. But most of these members were either already FLN members, or were turned by the FLN, once enlisted. Corpses of purported FLN members displayed by the unit were in fact those of dissidents and members of other Algerian groups killed by the FLN. The French Army finally discovered the war ruse, and tried to hunt down Force K members. However, some 600 managed to escape and join the FLN with weapons and equipment
[17]
Late in
1957, General
Raoul Salan, commanding the French army in Algeria, instituted a system of quadrillage, or block warden system, dividing the country into sectors, each permanently garrisoned by troops responsible for suppressing rebel operations in their assigned territory. Salan's methods sharply reduced the instances of FLN terrorism but tied down a large number of troops in static defense. Salan also constructed a heavily patrolled system of barriers to limit infiltration from Tunisia and Morocco. The best known of these was the
Morice Line (named for the French defense minister,
André Morice), which consisted of an electrified fence, barbed wire, and mines over a 320-kilometer stretch of the Tunisian border.
The French military command ruthlessly applied the principle of collective responsibility to villages suspected of sheltering, supplying, or in any way cooperating with the guerrillas. Villages that could not be reached by mobile units were subject to aerial bombardment. FLN Guerrillas that fled to caves or other remote hiding places were tracked and hunted down. In one episode, FLN guerrillas who refused to surrender and withdraw from a cave complex were dealt with by French Foreign Legion Pioneer troops, who, lacking flamethrowers or explosives, simply bricked up each cave, leaving the residents to die of suffocation.
[11]
Finding it impossible to protect all of Algeria's remote farms and villages, the French government also initiated a program of concentrating large segments of the rural population, including whole villages, in camps under military supervision to prevent them from voluntarily aiding the rebels — or to protect them from FLN extortion. In the three years (
1957–
60) during which the ''regroupement'' program was followed, more than 2 million Algerians were removed from their villages, mostly in the mountainous areas, and resettled in the plains, where many found it impossible to re-establish their accustomed economic or social situations. Living conditions in the fortified villages were poor. Hundreds of empty villages were devastated , and in hundreds of others, orchards and croplands not previously burned by French troops went to seed for lack of care. These
population transfers were effective in denying the use of remote villages to FLN guerrillas who had used them as a source of rations and manpower, but also caused significant resentment on the part of the displaced villagers. The disruptive social and economic effects of this massive relocation continued to be felt a generation later.
The French army shifted its tactics at the end of
1958 from dependence on ''quadrillage'' (
block warden system) to the use of mobile forces deployed on massive
search-and-destroy missions against FLN strongholds. Within the next year, Salan's successor, General
Maurice Challe, appeared to have suppressed major rebel resistance. But political developments had already overtaken the French army's successes.
Committee of Public Safety
Recurrent cabinet crises focused attention on the inherent instability of the
French Fourth Republic and increased the misgivings of the army and of the colons that the security of Algeria was being undermined by party politics. Army commanders chafed at what they took to be inadequate and incompetent government support of military efforts to end the rebellion. The feeling was widespread that another debacle like that of Indochina in 1954 was in the offing and that the government would order another precipitate pullout and sacrifice French honor to political expediency. Many saw in de Gaulle, who had not held office since 1946, the only public figure capable of rallying the nation and giving direction to the French government.
After his tour as governor general, Soustelle had returned to France to organize support for de Gaulle's return to power, while retaining close ties to the army and the ''colons''. By early 1958, he had organized a
coup d'Ă©tat, bringing together dissident army officers and colons with sympathetic Gaullists. An army junta under General Massu seized power in Algiers on the night of
May 13, thereafter known as the
May 1958 crisis. General Salan assumed leadership of a Committee of Public Safety formed to replace the civil authority and pressed the junta's demands that de Gaulle be named by French president
René Coty to head a government of national union invested with extraordinary powers to prevent the "abandonment of Algeria."
On
May 24, French paratroopers from the Algerian corps landed on
Corsica, taking the French island in a bloodless action called "Operation Corse." Subsequently, preparations were made in Algeria for "Operation Resurrection," which had as objectives the seizure of Paris and the removal of the French government. Resurrection was to be implemented if one of three scenarios occurred: if de Gaulle was not approved as leader of France by Parliament; if de Gaulle asked for military assistance to take power, or if it seemed that communist forces were making any move to take power in France. De Gaulle was approved by the French Parliament on
May 29, by 329 votes against 224, fifteen hours before the projected launch of Resurrection. This indicated that the French Fourth Republic by 1958 no longer had any support from the French army in Algeria, and was at its mercy even in civilian political matters. This decisive shift in the balance of power in civil-military relations in France in 1958 and the threat of force was the main immediate factor in the return of de Gaulle to power in France.
De Gaulle
President Charles de Gaulle
A lot of people, French citizens or not, greeted
Charles de Gaulle's return to power as the breakthrough needed to end the hostilities. On his
June 4 trip to Algeria, de Gaulle calculatedly made an ambiguous and broad emotional appeal to all the inhabitants, declaring ''"Je vous ai compris"'' ("I have understood you"). De Gaulle raised the hopes of colons and the professional military, disaffected by the indecisiveness of previous governments, with his exclamation of ''"Vive l'
AlgĂ©rie française"'' ("Long live French Algeria") to cheering crowds in Mostaganem. At the same time, he proposed economic, social, and political reforms to improve the situation of the Muslims. Nonetheless, de Gaulle later admitted to having harbored deep pessimism about the outcome of the Algerian situation even then. Meanwhile, he looked for a "third force" among the population of Algeria, uncontaminated by the FLN or the ''"ultras"'' — ''colon'' extremists — through whom a solution might be found.
De Gaulle immediately appointed a committee to draft a new constitution for France's Fifth Republic, which would be declared early the next year, with which Algeria would be associated but of which it would not form an integral part. All Muslims, including women, were registered for the first time on electoral rolls to participate in a referendum to be held on the new constitution in September 1958.
De Gaulle's initiative threatened the FLN with the prospect of losing the support of the growing numbers of Muslims who were tired of the war and had never been more than lukewarm in their commitment to a totally independent Algeria[citation needed]. In reaction, the FLN set up the
Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (''
Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne'',
GPRA), a government-in-exile headed by Abbas and based in Tunis. Before the referendum, Abbas lobbied for international support for the GPRA, which was quickly recognized by
Morocco,
Tunisia, and several other Arab countries, by a number of Asian and African states, and by the
Soviet Union and other Eastern European states.
ALN commandos committed numerous acts of sabotage in France in August, and the FLN mounted a desperate campaign of terror in Algeria to intimidate Muslims into
boycotting the referendum. Despite threats of reprisal, however, 80 percent of the Muslim electorate turned out to vote in September, and of these 96 percent approved the constitution. In February 1959, de Gaulle was elected president of the new Fifth Republic. He visited Constantine in October to announce a program to end the war and create an Algeria closely linked to France. De Gaulle's call on the rebel leaders to end hostilities and to participate in elections was met with adamant refusal. "The problem of a cease-fire in Algeria is not simply a military problem," said the GPRA's Abbas. "It is essentially political, and negotiation must cover the whole question of Algeria." Secret discussions that had been underway were broken off.
In
1958–
59 the French army had won military control in Algeria and was the closest it would be to victory. In late July 1959, during
Operation Jumelles Colonel Bigeard â whose elite paratrooper unit fought at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 â told journalist
Jean Lartéguy (
source):
During that period in France, however, opposition to the conflict was growing among many segments of the population, notably the
leftists, with the pro-USSR
French Communist Party â then one of the country's strongest political forces â supporting the Algerian Revolution. Thousands of relatives of conscripts and reserve soldiers suffered loss and pain; revelations of torture and the indiscriminate brutality the army visited on the Muslim population prompted widespread revulsion; and a significant constituency supported the principle of national liberation. International pressure was also building on France to grant Algeria independence. Annually since 1955 the
UN General Assembly had considered the Algerian question, and the FLN position was gaining support. France's seeming intransigence in settling a colonial war that tied down half the manpower of its armed forces was also a source of concern to its
NATO allies. In a September 1959 statement, de Gaulle dramatically reversed his stand and uttered the words "self-determination," which he envisioned as leading to majority rule in an Algeria formally associated with France. In Tunis, Abbas acknowledged that de Gaulle's statement might be accepted as a basis for settlement, but the French government refused to recognize the GPRA as the representative of Algeria's Muslim community.
The barricades week
Barricades in Algiers. "Long live Massu" (''Vive Massu'') is written on the banner. (January 1960)
Claiming that de Gaulle had betrayed them, some units of the French army corps in Algiers led by Pied-Noir student leader
Pierre Lagaillarde, cafe owner
Joseph Ortiz,
Jean-Baptiste Biaggi and
Jean-Jacques Susini staged an insurrection in the Algerian capital starting on January 24 1960 and known in France as ''La semaine des barricades'' ("the barricades week"). The ultras incorrectly believed that they would be supported by
General Massu. The insurrection order was given by Colonel Jean Garde of the Ve Bureau militaire. As the army, police and supporters stood by, civilians ''pied-noirs'' threw up barricades in the streets and seized government buildings. General
Maurice Challe, responsible of the Army in Algeria, declared Algiers under
siege, but forbade the troops to open up fire on the insurgees. Twenty rioters were killed during a firing in LaferriĂšre Boulevard. Eight
arrest warrants were issued in Paris against the initiators of the insurrection. MP
Jean-Marie Le Pen, who called for the barricades to be extended to Paris, and theorician
Georges Sauge were then placed under
custody.
[19]
In Paris, de Gaulle called on the evening of
January 29,
1960 on the army to remain loyal and rallied popular support for his Algerian policy in a televised address:
''I took, in the name of France, the following decision: the Algerians will have the free choice of their destiny. When, in one way or another - by ceasefire or by complete crushing of the rebels - we will have put an end to the fighting, when, after a prolonged period of appeasement, the populations will have taken consciousness of the stakes and, thanks to us, realised the necessary progress in political, economic, social, educational, etc., domains, then it will be the Algerians who will tell us what they want to be... French of Algeria (''Français d'Algérie''), how can you listen to the liars and the conspirators who tell you that by granting free choice to the Algerians, France and de Gaulle want to abandon you, retreat from Algeria and deliver you to the rebellion?... I say to all of our soldiers: your mission comprises neither equivocation, nor interpretation. You have to liquidate the rebellious force which want to oust France out of Algeria and impose on this country its dictatorship of misery and sterility... Finally, I address myself to France. ''Eh bien!'' my dear and old country, here we face together, once again, a serious ordeal. In virtu of the mandate that the people has given me and of the national legitimacy which I incarn since twenty years, I ask to everyone to support me whatever happens.''[20]
Most of the army heeded his call, and the siege of Algiers ended on
February 1 with Lagaillarde surrendering to General Challe commanding the French army in Algeria corps. The loss of many ''ultra'' leaders who were imprisoned or transferred to other areas did not deter the French Algeria militants. Sent to prison in Paris, Lagaillarde evaded to Spain while left on parole. There with another French army officer,
Raoul Salan, who had entered
clandestinity, and Jean-Jacques Susini, he created the
O.A.S. (''Organisation Armée SecrÚte'', lit. Secret Army Organization) on
December 3,
1960 with the purpose to follow-up the fight for the French Algeria. Highly organized and well-armed the OAS stepped up its terrorist activities, which were directed against both Algerians and pro-government French citizens, as the move toward negotiated settlement of the war and self-determination gained momentum. To the FLN rebellion against France were added civil wars between extremists in the two communities and between the ''ultras'' and the French government in Algeria.
Beside Pierre Lagaillarde, Jean-Baptiste Biaggi was also imprisoned, while
Alain de SĂ©rigny got arrested, and
Joseph Ortiz's
FNF dissolved, as well as General
Lionel Chassin's
MP13. De Gaulle also modified the government, excluding
Jacques Soustelle, believed to be too pro-French Algeria, and granting the Minister of Information to
Louis Terrenoire, who quit the
RTF (French broadcasting TV).
Pierre Messmer, who had been member of the
Foreign Legion, is named Minister of Defense, and dissolved the
Fifth Bureau, the
psychological warfare branch which had ordered the rebellion. These units had theorized the principles of "
counter-revolutionary war", including the use of torture. During the
Indochina War (1947-54), officers such as
Roger Trinquier and
Lionel-Max Chassin inspired themselves from
Mao's strategic doctrine, and considered that to
convince the population to support the fight, bodies had to be modeled in order to affect the mind. The 5e Bureaux were organized by
Jean Ousset, French representant of the
Opus Dei, under the order of Permanent Secretary General of the National Defense (SGPDN)
Geoffroy Chodron de Courcel.
The officers were initially formed in the ''
Centre d'instruction et de préparation à la contre-guérilla'' (Arzew).
Jacques Chaban-Delmas added to that the ''
Centre d'entraĂźnement Ă la guerre subversive Jeanne-d'Arc'' (Center of Training to Subversive War Jeanne-d'Arc) in
Philippeville, Algeria, directed by Colonel
Marcel Bigeard. According to the
Voltaire Network, the Catholic
stay-behind Georges Sauge animated conferences there, and one could read on the walls of the center the following maxim: "This Army must be fanatic, despising luxury, animated by the spirit of the
Crusades"
[21] Pierre Messmer hence dissolved structures which had turned themselves against de Gaulle, leaving the "revolutionary war" to the exclusive responsibility of Gaullist General
André Beauffre.
The French army officers uprising can be understood as following, some officers, most notably from the paratroopers corps, felt betrayed by the government for the second time after
Indochina (1947-1954). In some aspects the
Dien Bien Phu garrison was sacrificed with no metropolitan support, order was given to commanding officer
General de Castries to "let the affair die of its own, in serenity" ("''laissez mourrir l'affaire d'elle mĂȘme en sĂ©rĂ©nitĂ©''"
[22]).
The opposition of the
MNEF student trade-union to the participation of the conscripts to the war led to a scission in May 1960, with the creation of the ''
Fédération des étudiants nationalistes'' (FEN, Federation of Nationalist Students) around
Dominique Venner, a former member of ''
Jeune Nation'' and of
MP-13,
François d'Orcival and
Alain de Benoist, who would theorize in the 1980s the "
New Right" movement. The FEN then published the ''Manifeste de la classe 60''.
A ''
Front national pour l'Algérie française'' (FNAF, National Front for French Algeria) was created in June 1960 in Paris, gathering around General
Jacques Soustelle Claude Dumont,
Georges Sauge,
Yvon Chautard,
Jean-Louis Tixier Vignancourt (who would present himself as far-right candidate in the
1965 presidential election),
Jacques Isorni,
Victor Barthélémy,
François Brigneau and Jean-Marie Le Pen. Another ultra rebellion occurred in December 1960, which led de Gaulle to dissolve the FNAF.
After the publication of the ''
Manifeste des 121'' against the use of torture and the war,
[23] the opponents to the war created the ''
Rassemblement de la gauche démocratique'', which included the
SFIO socialist party, the
Radical-Socialist Party,
FO trade union,
CFTC trade-union,
FEN trade-union, etc., which supported de Gaulle against the ultras. De Gaulle then convoked a
referendum on the independence of Algeria on
January 8,
1961, which gave 75% of "yes" in metropolitan France, but only 40% in Algeria.
The Evian Accords
Main articles: Evian Accords ,
Alger putsch
Civil war situation, French army in Algiers. (March 26, 1962)
The "
generals' putsch" in April 1961, aimed at cancelling
Michel Debré's government's secret peace negotiations with the FLN, marked the turning point in the official attitude toward the Algerian war.
De Gaulle was now prepared to abandon the ''colons'', the group that no previous French government could have written off. The army had been discredited by the putsch and kept a low profile politically throughout the rest of France's involvement with Algeria. Talks with the
FLN reopened at
Evian in May 1961; after several false starts, the French government decreed that a ceasefire would take effect on
March 19,
1962. In their final form, the
Evian Accords allowed the ''colons'' equal legal protection with Algerians over a three year period. These rights included respect for property, participation in public affairs, and a full range of civil and cultural rights. At the end of that period, however, all Algerian residents would be obliged to become Algerian citizens or be classified as aliens with the attendant loss of rights. The French electorate approved the Evian Accords by an overwhelming 91 percent vote in a referendum held in June 1962.
During the three months between the cease-fire and the French referendum on Algeria, the
OAS (Organisation armée secrÚte) unleashed a new terrorist campaign. The OAS sought to provoke a major breach in the ceasefire by the FLN but the terrorism now was aimed also against the French army and police enforcing the accords as well as against Muslims. It was the most wanton carnage that Algeria had witnessed in eight years of savage warfare. OAS operatives set off an average of 120 bombs per day in March, with targets including hospitals and schools. Ultimately, the terrorism failed in its objectives, and the OAS and the FLN concluded a truce on
June 17,
1962. In the same month, more than 350,000
colons left Algeria.
On
July 1,
1962, some 6 million of a total Algerian electorate of 6.5 million cast their ballots in the referendum on independence. The vote was nearly unanimous. De Gaulle pronounced Algeria an independent country on
July 3. The Provisional Executive, however, proclaimed
July 5, the 132nd anniversary of the French entry into Algeria, as the day of national independence.
Despite the Evian Accords guarantees towards the French citizens, after the end of June civilians became the target of systematic FLN attacks. It quickly became apparent to Europeans that the new government would not ensure their safety or enforce their rights. The
Oran massacre of 1962, four days after the vote, is the main example of deliberate strategy of killing to terrorize former colons and push them to leave. These tactics proved efficient. Summer 1962 saw a rush to France. Within a year, 1.4 million refugees, including almost the entire
Jewish community and some pro-French Muslims, had joined the exodus to France. The vast majority left, as detailed below.
Pieds-Noirs' and Harkis' exodus
''
Pieds-Noirs'' (including
Sephardi Jews) and ''
Harkis'' accounted for 13% of the total population of Algeria in 1962. For the sake of clarity, each group's exodus is described separately here, although their fate shared many common elements.
Pieds-noirs
Hated "colons" for the FLN, "slavagists" and "assassins" for the metropolitan French, the ''Français d'Algérie'' were expropriated and exiled from their native land. (Algiers, Jan. 1960)
''Pied-noir'' (literally "black foot") is a term used to name the European-descended population (mostly
Catholic) that had been in Algeria for generations; it is sometimes used to include the Sephardi Jewish population as well, which likewise emigrated after 1962. The Europeans had arrived as colonists from all over the Mediterranean (particularly France,
Spain, and
Malta), starting in
1830. The Jews had arrived in several waves, some coming in Roman times while most had arrived as refugees from the
Spanish Inquisition, and had largely embraced French citizenship after the
decret Crémieux in 1871. In 1959, the ''pieds-noirs'' numbered 1,025,000 (85% of European descent, and 15% of Sephardi Jewish descent), and accounted for 10.4% of the total population of Algeria. In just a few months in 1962, 900,000 of them fled or left the country, the first third prior to the referendum, in the most massive relocation of population to
Europe since the
Second World War. A motto used in the FLN propaganda designating the Pied-noirs community was "Suitcase or coffin" ("''La valise ou le cercueil''").
The French government had not anticipated that such a massive number would leave; at the most it estimated that perhaps 200-300,000 might choose to go to metropolitan France temporarily. Consequently, nothing was planned for their return, and many had to sleep in streets or abandoned farms on their arrival. A minority of departing ''pieds-noirs'', including soldiers, destroyed their possessions before departure, applying
scorched earth policy in a sign of protestation and as a desperate symbolic try to leave no trace of centuries of European presence, but the vast majority of their goods and houses were left intact and abandoned to Algerians. Scenes of thousands of panicked people camping for weeks on the docks of Algerian harbors waiting for a space on a boat to France were common from April to August 1962. About 100,000 ''pieds-noirs'' chose to remain, but most of those gradually left over the 1960s and 1970s, primarily due to residual hostility against them, including machine-gunning of public places in
Oran (
source).
Harkis
Harkis veterans and Pied-Noirs joint protest in support to the French Algeria during the barricades week in Algiers. (January 27, 1960)
The so-called ''
Harkis'', from the Arabic word ''haraka'' (movement), were the Muslim indigenous Algerians (as opposed to European-descended or Sephardi Jews) who fought as auxiliaries on the side of the French army. Some of these were veterans of the
Free French Forces who participated in the liberation of France during
World War II or in the
Indochina War. The term also came to include civilian indigenous Algerians who supported a French Algeria. According to French government figures, there were 236,000 Algerian Muslims serving in the French Army in 1962, either in regular units (
Spahis and
Tirailleurs) or as irregulars (harkis and moghaznis). Some estimates suggest that, with their families, the indigenous Muslim loyalists may have numbered as many as 1 million, but 400,000 is more commonly cited.
In 1962, around 91,000 ''Harkis'' fled or sailed to France, despite French policy against this. The ''Harkis'' were seen as traitors by many Algerians, and many of those who stayed behind suffered severe reprisals after independence. French historians estimate that somewhere between 50,000 and 150,000 ''Harkis'' and members of their families were killed by the
FLN or by lynch mobs in Algeria, often in atrocious circumstances or after torture, a climax being reached at the
Oran massacre of 1962. The abandonment of the "Harkis" both in terms of non-recognition of those who died defending a French Algeria and the neglect of those who escaped to France, remains an issue that France has not fully resolved â although the government of
Jacques Chirac made efforts to give recognition to the suffering of these former allies.
Death toll
The FLN estimated in 1962 that nearly eight years of revolution had cost 1.5 million dead from war-related causes. Some other Algerian sources later put the figure at approximately 1 million dead, while French officials estimated it at 350,000. French military authorities listed their losses at nearly 18,000 dead (6,000 from non-combat-related causes) and 65,000 wounded. European descended civilian casualties exceeded 10,000 (including 3,000 dead) in 42,000 recorded terrorist incidents. According to French figures, security forces killed 141,000 rebel combatants, and more than 12,000 Algerians died in internal FLN purges during the war. An additional 5,000 died in the "café wars" in France between the FLN and rival Algerian groups. French sources also estimated that 70,000 Muslim civilians were killed, or abducted and presumed killed, by the FLN.
Historians, like
Alistair Horne and
Raymond Aron, consider the actual figure of war dead to be far higher than the original FLN and official French estimates, but below the 1 million adopted by the Algerian government. Horne has estimated Algerian casualties during the span of eight years to be around 700,000. Uncounted thousands of Muslim civilians lost their lives in French army ratissages, bombing raids, and vigilante reprisals. The war uprooted more than 2 million Algerians, who were forced to relocate in French camps or to flee to Morocco, Tunisia, and into the Algerian hinterland, where many thousands died of starvation, disease, and exposure. In addition large numbers of pro-French Muslims were murdered when the FLN settled accounts after independence.
Lasting effects in Algerian politics
Main articles: History of Algeria since 1962
After Algeria's independence was recognised,
Ahmed Ben Bella quickly became more popular, and thereby more powerful. In June 1962, he challenged the leadership of Premier
Benyoucef Ben Khedda; this led to several disputes among his rivals in the FLN, which were quickly suppressed by Ben Bella's rapidly growing support, most notably within the armed forces. By September, Bella was in control of Algeria by all but name, and was elected as premier in a one-sided election on
20 September, and was recognised by the
United States on
September 29. Algeria was admitted as the 109th member of the
United Nations on
8 October 1962. Afterwards, Ben Bella declared that Algeria would follow a neutral course in world politics; within a week he met with
U.S. President John F. Kennedy requesting more aid for Algeria, with
Fidel Castro, expressing approval of Castro's demands for the abandonment of
Guantanamo Bay and returned to Algeria requesting that France withdraw from its bases there. In November, Ben Bella's government banned the party, providing that the only party allowed to overtly function was the FLN. Shortly thereafter in 1965 Bella was deposed and placed under house arrest (and later exiled) by
Houari BoumédiÚnne, who served as president until his death in
1978. Algeria remained stable, though in a
one-party state, until violent civil war broke out in the
1990s.
For Algerians of many political factions, the legacy of their War of Independence acted to legitimise and virtually sanctify the unrestricted use of force in achieving a goal deemed to be justified. Once invoked against foreign colonialists, the same principle could be turned with relative ease also against fellow Algerians. The determination of the French to hold on to Algeria and of the FLN to overthrow that colonial rule, and the ruthlessness exhibited by both sides in that struggle, were to be mirrored thirty years later by the determination of the FLN government to hold on to power and of the Islamist opposition to overthrow that rule, and the brutal struggle which ensued.
The question of torture
Main articles: Torture during the Algerian War
Torture was a frequent process in use since the beginning of the
colonization of Algeria, which started in 1830.
Claude Bourdet had denounced these acts on December 6, 1951 in ''
L'Observateur'': "Is there a
Gestapo in Algeria?" Torture had also been used -on both sides- during the
Indochina War (1947-54) and in all the
French colonies[24][25][26]
General
Paul Aussaresses admitted in 2000 the use of
torture during the war and justified it. He also recognized the assassination of lawyer
Ali Boumendjel and head of FLN in Algiers,
Larbi Ben M'Hidi, which had been disguised as "suicides".
[27]
General
Marcel Bigeard, who had denied it during forty years, finally also admitted that it had been used, although he claimed he personally had not engaged in torture. Bigeard, who qualified FLN activists as "savages", claimed torture was a "necessary evil".
[28][29] To the contrary, General
Jacques Massu denounced it, following Aussaresses' revelations, and before his death pronounced himself in favor of an official condemnation of the use of torture during the war.
[30]
Bigeard's justification of torture has been criticized by various persons, among whom
Joseph Doré, archbishop of Strasbourg, and
Marc Lienhard, president of the Lutherian Church of Augsbourg confession in Alsace-Lorraine.
[31]
In June 2000, Bigeard declared that he was based in
Sidi Ferruch, known as a torture center and from where many Algerians never left alive. Bigeard qualified
Louisette Ighilahriz's revelations, published in ''Le Monde'' on June 20, 2000, as "lies". An
ALN activist, Louisette Ighilahriz had been tortured by General Massu. She herself called Bigeard a "liar", and criticized him for continuing to deny the use of torture 40 years later.
[32][33] However, since General Massu's revelations, Bigeard has now admitted the use of torture, although he denies having personally used it. He then declared: "You are striking the heart of an 84 years-old man." Bigeard also recognized that
Larbi Ben MâHidi had been assassinated, and his death disguised as a "suicide".
Paul Teitgen, prefect of Algiers, also revealed that Bigeard's troop threw Algerians in the sea from helicopters, a tactic later theorized in Argentina by Admiral
Luis Maria Mendia, as the infamous "death flights."
[34]
Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the far-right
National Front party and lieutenant during the war, attacked ''
Le Monde'' and former Prime minister
Michel Rocard on charges of
defamation after that the newspaper accused him of having engaged in torture.
[35] However, he lost his trial, with the French justice declaring ''Le Monde'' 's investigations as legitimate and true. Le Pen still denies the use of torture, claiming there was only "interrogation sessions". ''Le Monde'' produced in May 2003 the
dagger he allegedly used to commit war crimes as court evidence.
[36] This affair ended in
2000 when the "
Cour de cassation" (French supreme jurisdiction) concluded that it was legitimate to publish these assertions. However, because of the amnesty and the
statute of limitations, there can be no criminal proceedings against Le Pen for the crimes he is alleged to have committed in Algeria. In 1995, Le Pen unsuccessfully sued Jean Dufour, regional counselor of the
Provence-Alpes-CĂŽte d'Azur French Communist Party for the same reason.
[37][38][39][40][41][42][43][44]
The "French school"
Counter-insurgency tactics developed during the war were used afterward in other contexts, including the Argentine "
Dirty War" in the 1970s. Journalist
Marie-Monique Robin wrote a book alleging that
French secret agents had taught
Argentine intelligence agents counter-insurgency tactics, including the systemic use of torture, block warden system, etc, all techniques employed during the 1957
Battle of Algiers. The film itself on ''
The Battle of Algiers'' has been screened and seen by many militaries from different nations afterwards. She found in the
Quai d'Orsay, head of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the document proving that a secret military agreement tied France to Argentina from 1959 until 1981, date of the election of President
François Mitterrand. General Bigeard's troops threw Algerians from helicopters into the sea: this form of "
disappearance" by
death flights (their victims were named "Bigeard's shrimps", or ''crevettes Bigeard'') was later theorized by Argentine Admiral
Luis Maria Mendia in the infamous "death flights".
Historiography of the war and of colonialism
Although the opening of the archives after a 30 years lock-up has enabled some new
historical research on the war, including
Jean-Charles Jauffret's book titled ''La Guerre d'Algérie par les documents'', many remains unaccessible.
This contrary to the engagement of Prime minister
Lionel Jospin's (
Socialist Party, PS) engagement on July 27, 1997. The recognition in 1999 by the
National Assembly, in which the PS had obtained a majority during the
1997 legislative elections, permitted the Algerian War to, at last, enter the syllabus of French school. The
October 17, 1961 massacre in Paris has only began to emerge in the nation's memory, although access to the archives remains strongly restricted (as, for that matter, access to the archives regarding the
French police's collaboration with
Nazi Germany). The French state, who finally recognized 40 deaths, is a far way from giving free access to the archives (there is no such law as the US
Freedom of Information Act in France). However, it has been proved, including with David Assouline's limited access to the Paris archives (granted by Socialist
Minister of Culture Catherine Trautmann) that at least 70 Algerians died during these events — and 90 persons by the second half of October 1961.
[45]
The Algerian War remains a conflictual event today. According to historian
Benjamin Stora, doctor in history and sociology and teacher at , and one of the leading historian of the Algerian war, memories concerning the war remain fragmented with no common ground to speak on:
"''There is no such thing as a History of the Algerian War, there is just a multitude of histories and personal paths through it. Everyone involved considers that they lived through it in their own way, and any attempt to take in the Algerian War globally is immediately thrown out by the protagonists.''"[46]
Not to speak about Franco-Algerian history: although Benjamin Stora has counted 3,000 works in French on the Algerian war, there still is not one single work made in cooperation between a French and an Algerian citizen. Although we can "no longer talk about a 'War without a name'... a number of problems remain, especially the absence of sites in France to commemorate" the war.
Furthermore, conflicts arise on the commemoration date to end the war. Although most place it in the
March 19,
1962 Evian agreements, which is the French state's official version, others point out that massacres of harkis and kidnapping of pied-noirs took place afterwards.
Stora further points out that "The phase of memorial reconciliation between the two sides of the sea is still a long way off."
This was recently illustrated by the
UMP's vote of the
February 23,
2005 law on colonialism, which asserted that colonialism had globally been "positive." Thus, a teacher in one of the elite's high school of Paris can declare:
"''Yes, colonisation has had positive effects. After all, we did give to Algeria modern infrastructures, a system of education, libraries, social centers... There were only 10% Algerian students in 1962? This is not much, of course, but it is not nothing either!''"[47]
Beside a heated debate in France, the
February 23,
2005 law had the effect of jeopardizing the treaty of friendship that President
Jacques Chirac was supposed to sign with President
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, a treaty which is not any more in the agenda. Following this controversial law, Bouteflika has talked about a "cultural
genocide", in particular in reference to the 1945
SĂ©tif massacre. Chirac finally had the law repealed through a complex institutional mechanism.
Another matter concerns the teaching of the war, as well as of colonialism and decolonization, in particular in
French secondary schools[48] Hence, there is no reference to
racism in any textbook, excepting one published by
Bréal editing house and for Terminales students (those passing their
baccalauréat). This, despite an
institutional racism still pregnant in French society, as demonstrated by
SOS Racisme's various tests concerning
racial discrimination. Textbooks still refers to "them" as "Muslims" and "us" as "French," despite the fact that Algerians were, ''de jure'', French citizens (albeit half-class citizens), and that many French citizens today come from a Muslim background. Henceforth, it does not come as a surprise to see that some of the first to speak about the October 17, 1961 massacre were music bands, including (but not only), hip hop bands such as famous
SuprĂȘme NTM ("''les Arabes dans la Seine''") or politically-engaged
La Rumeur. Indeed, the Algerian War is not even the subject of a specific chapter in textbook for Terminales
[49] Henceforth, Benjamin Stora can state that:
''"As Algerians do not appear in their "indigenous" conditions and their sub-citizens status, as the history of nationalist movement is never evoqued, as none of the great figures of the resistance — Messali Hadj, Ferhat Abbas — emerge nor retain attention, in one word, as no one explains to students what has been colonisation, we make them unable to understand why the decolonisation took place.''"
The Algerian War and its consequences are thus fundamental to any understanding of the state of XXIst century France, as well as the
social situation in the French suburbs, which were brought to world attention during the
civil unrest in autumn 2005. For the first time since the Algerian war, the head of the state, President
Jacques Chirac (UMP) proclaimed the
state of emergency, which was confirmed a few weeks later by the
National Assembly (the only parties to vote against its extension were the PCF communist party and the
Greens, who explicitly referred to this dark period of French history that had been the Algerian War).
For example, in
metropolitan France, in 1963, 43% of French Algerians lived in
bidonvilles (shanty towns).
[50] Thus,
Azouz Begag, Delegate Minister for Equal Opportunities in the government of current Prime Minister
Dominique de Villepin (
UMP), wrote an autobiographic novel, ''Le Gone du ChaĂąba'', about his experience living in a bidonville in the outskirts of Lyon. It is impossible to understand the third-generation of Algerian immigrants to France without recalling this
bicultural experience. An official parliamentary report on "prevention of criminality", commanded by then Interior Minister Dominique de Villepin (UMP), and made by MP
Jacques-Alain BĂ©nisti, went as far as claiming that "
Multilingualism (''bilinguisme'') was a factor of criminality." (sic
[51]). Following outcries from many NGOs and left-wing sectors, the definitive version of the BĂ©nisti report finally made of multilingualism an asset instead of a default.
[52]
Thus, the stakes of the contemporary debate on torture clearly appear in full light: after having denied its use during 40 years, the French state finally recognized it, although it never did any official proclamation about it. At least,
General Aussaresses was condemned following his justification of the use of torture for "apology of war crimes." But, in the same way that during the "events", the French state claimed torture was an isolated act, instead of admitting its responsibility in the institutionalization of torture as a standard counter-insurgency method, used to break the population's morale (and not, as Aussaresses has claimed, to "save lives" by gaining short-term information which would enable to stop "terrorists"
[53]), it now claims that it was a regrettable incident due to the context of the war. But various historical researches have proved both thesis false: "Torture in Algeria was engraved in the colonial act, it is the "normal" illustration of an abnormal system," wrote Nicolas Bancel, Pascal Blanchard and Sandrine Lemaire, who have published decisive work on the phenomena of "
human zoos."
[54] From the smokings (''enfumades'') of the Darha caves in 1844 by
PĂ©lissier to the 1945 riots in SĂ©tif,
Guelma and
Kherrata," the repression in Algeria has used the same methods. Following the
May 9,
1945 SĂ©tif massacres, other riots against European presence occurred in Guelma, Batna, Biskra and Kherrata, making 103 deaths among the colons. The repression of these riots officially made 1,500 deaths, but N. Bancel, P. Blanchard and S. Lemaire estimate it to be rather between 6 and 8,000 deaths
[55]
References
1. Martin Windrow, ''The Algerian War 1954-62.'' p. 17
2. Colonialism, a dangerous war of memories begins, by Benjamin Stora, in ''L'Humanité'', translated from December 6, 2005 article
3. (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville, ''Travail sur lâAlgĂ©rie'' in ''Ćuvres complĂštes'', Paris, Gallimard, BibliothĂšque de la PlĂ©iade, 1991, pp 704 and 705./
4. ''« LâindigĂšne musulman est français ; nĂ©anmoins il continuera Ă ĂȘtre rĂ©gi par la loi musulmane. Il peut ĂȘtre admis Ă servir dans les armĂ©es de terre et de mer. Il peut ĂȘtre appelĂ© Ă des fonctions et emplois civils en AlgĂ©rie. Il peut, sur sa demande, ĂȘtre admis Ă jouir des droits de citoyen français ; dans ce cas, il est rĂ©gi par les lois civiles et politiques de la France » (article 1 of the 1865 Code de l'indigĂ©nat)
5. le code de lâindigĂ©nat dans lâAlgĂ©rie coloniale, ''Human Rights League'' (LDH), March 6, 2005 - URL accessed on January 17, 2007
6. le code de lâindigĂ©nat dans lâAlgĂ©rie coloniale, ''Human Rights League'' (LDH), March 6, 2005 - URL accessed on January 17, 2007
7. les tirailleurs, bras armé de la France coloniale, ''Human Rights League'' (LDH), August 25, 2004 - URL accessed on January 17, 2007
8. "Alger-Bagdad", account of Yves Boisset's film documentary, ''La Bataille d'Algers'' (2006), in ''Le Canard enchaßné'', January 10, 2007, n°4498, p.7
9. Number given by the Préfecture du Gers, French governmental site - URL accessed on February 17, 2007
10. Philippeville Massacre, ''The Times'' Report published on August 22, 1955
11. Leulliette, Pierre, St. Michael and the Dragon: Memoirs of a Paratrooper, Houghton Mifflin, 1964
12. Major Gregory D. Peterson, ''The French Experience in Algeria, 1954-62: Blueprint for U.S. Operations in Iraq'', Ft Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, p.33
13. John Pimlott, "The French Army: From Indochina to Chad, 1946-1984," in Ian F. W. Beckett and John Pimlott, ''Armed Forces & Modern Counter-Insurgency,'' New York: St Martin's Press, 1985, p.66
14. Martin S. Alexander and J. F. V. Kieger, "France and the Algerian War: Strategy, Operations, and Diplomacy," ''Journal of Strategic Studies'', Vol.25, No. 2, June 2002, pp.6-7
15. Roger Faligot and Pascal Krop, ''DST, Police SecrĂšte'', Flammarion, 1999, p.174
16. Lawrence E. Cline, "Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons From Other Countries", p.8 June 2005, ISBN 1584871997, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) (available here)
17. Lawrence E. Cline, "Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency: Lessons From Other Countries", p.8 June 2005, ISBN 1584871997, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) (available here Cline sends for more details to Alistair Horne, ''A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-62'', London: Mac Millan, 1977, pp.255-257)
18. Leulliette, Pierre, St. Michael and the Dragon: Memoirs of a Paratrooper, Houghton Mifflin, 1964
19. Quand le stay-behind voulait remplacer De Gaulle, Thierry Meyssan, September 10, 2001, Voltaire Network
20. French: "''Jâai pris, au nom de la France, la dĂ©cision que voici: les AlgĂ©riens auront le libre choix de leur destin. Quand dâune maniĂšre ou dâune autre - conclusion dâun cessez-le-feu ou Ă©crasement total des rebelles - nous aurons mis un terme aux combats, quand, ensuite, aprĂšs une pĂ©riode prolongĂ©e dâapaisement, les populations auront pu prendre conscience de lâenjeu et, dâautre part, accomplir, grĂące Ă nous, les progrĂšs nĂ©cessaires dans les domaines, politique, Ă©conomique, social, scolaire, etc., alors ce seront les AlgĂ©riens qui diront ce quâils veulent ĂȘtre (...) Français dâAlgĂ©rie, comment pouvez-vous Ă©couter les menteurs et les conspirateurs qui vous disent quâen accordant le libre choix aux AlgĂ©riens, la France et De Gaulle veulent vous abandonner, se retirer de lâAlgĂ©rie et vous livrer Ă la rĂ©bellion ? (...) Je dis Ă tous nos soldats: votre mission ne comporte ni Ă©quivoque, ni interprĂ©tation. Vous avez Ă liquider la force rebelle qui veut chasser la France de lâAlgĂ©rie et faire rĂ©gner sur ce pays sa dictature de misĂšre et de stĂ©rilitĂ© (...) Enfin, je mâadresse Ă la France. Eh bien! mon cher et vieux pays, nous voici donc ensemble, encore une fois, face Ă une lourde Ă©preuve. En vertu du mandat que le peuple mâa donnĂ© et de la lĂ©gitimitĂ© nationale que jâincarne depuis vingt ans (sic), je demande Ă tous et Ă toutes de me soutenir quoi quâil arrive''".
21. French: "Cette ArmĂ©e doit ĂȘtre fanatique, mĂ©prisant le luxe, animĂ©e de lâesprit des croisĂ©s".
22. French Army audio archives
23. Manifeste des 121, transl. in English
24. Mohammed Harbi, ''La guerre d'Algérie''
25. Benjamin Stora, ''La torture pendant la guerre d'Algérie''
26. RaphaĂ«lle Branche, ''La torture et lâarmĂ©e pendant la guerre d'AlgĂ©rie, 1954-1962'', Paris, Gallimard, 2001 See also THE FRENCH ARMY AND TORTURE DURING THE ALGERIAN WAR (1954- 1962), RaphaĂ«lle Branche, UniversitĂ© de Rennes, 18 November 2004
27. L'accablante confession du général Aussaresses sur la torture en Algérie, ''Le Monde'', May 3, 2001
28. GUERRE D'ALGĂRIE : le gĂ©nĂ©ral Bigeard et la pratique de la torture, ''Le Monde'', July 4, 2000
29. Torture Bigeard: " La presse en parle trop ", ''L'Humanité'', May 12, 2000
30. La torture pendant la guerre dâAlgĂ©rie / 1954 â 1962 40 ans aprĂšs, lâexigence de vĂ©ritĂ©, AIDH
31. GUERRE D'ALGĂRIE : Mgr Joseph DorĂ© et Marc Lienhard rĂ©agissent aux dĂ©clarations du gĂ©nĂ©ral Bigeard justifiant la pratique de la torture par l'armĂ©e française, ''Le Monde'', July 15, 2000
32. « Le témoignage de cette femme est un tissu de mensonges. Tout est faux, c'est une manoeuvre », ''Le Monde'', June 22, 2000
33. Louisette Ighilahriz: "Massu ne pouvait plus nier lâĂ©vidence", ''L'HumanitĂ©'', November 23, 2000
34. Prise de tĂȘte Marcel Bigeard, un soldat propre ?, ''L'HumanitĂ©'', June 24, 2000
35. Le chef du FN oppose un « démenti formel » aux accusations de torture, ''Le Monde'', June 9, 2002
36. L'affaire du poignard du lieutenant Le Pen en Algérie, ''Le Monde'', May 17, 2003
37. Le Pen et la torture, l'enquete du "Monde" validée par le tribunal, ''Le Monde'', June 28, 2003
38. "J'ai croisé Le Pen à la villa Sésini" (I crossed Le Pen in the Sesini Villa), interview with Paul Aussaresses (whom had argued in favor of the use of torture in Algeria), ''Le Monde'', June 4, 2002
39. "Un lourd silence", ''Le Monde'', May 5, 2002
40. "Quand Le Pen travaillait 20 heures par jour" in ''L'Humanité'' (freely accessible), May 2, 2002
41. "New Revelations on Le Pen, tortionary" in ''L'Humanité'', June 4, 2002
42. "Le Pen attaque un élu du PCF en justice", in ''L'Humanité'', April 4, 1995
43. Jean Dufour: "Le Pen vient d'ĂȘtre dĂ©boutĂ©", in ''L'HumanitĂ©'', July 26, 1995
44. "Torture: Le Pen perd son procÚs en diffamation contre Le Monde", in ''L'Humanité'', June 27, 2003
45. . Concerning David Assouline's access to ''part'' of the Paris' Archives and the ''Monde'' quoting the director, see
46. Bringing down the barriers - people's memories of the Algerian War, interview with Benjamin Stora published on the INA archive website
47. French: ''« Oui, la colonisation a eu du positif... On a quand mĂȘme lĂ©guĂ© Ă lâAlgĂ©rie des infrastructures modernes, un systĂšme Ă©ducatif, des bibliothĂšques, des centres sociaux... Il nây avait que 10% dâĂ©tudiants algĂ©riens en 1962 ? Câest peu, bien sĂ»r, mais ce nâest pas rien! »'', quoted in 
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