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EspañolANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL AGREEMENT
The 'Anglo-German Naval Agreement' (A.G.N.A) of June 18 1935 was a bilateral agreement between the United Kingdom and Nazi Germany regulating the size of the ''Kriegsmarine'' in relation to the Royal Navy. The A.G.N.A fixed a ratio where the total tonnage of the Kriegsmarine was to be 35% of the total tonnage of the Royal Navy on a permanent basis[1].
The A.G.N.A was both a ambitious attempt on both of London and Berlin to reach better relations, but which ultimately floundered because of conflicting expectations between the two states. For the Germans, the A.G.N.A. was intended to mark the beginning of a Anglo-German alliance against France and the Soviet Union, whereas for the British, the A.G.N.A. was to be the beginning of a series of arms limitation agreements that were made to limit German expansionism. The A.G.N.A was highly controversial both at the time and since because the 35:100 tonnage ratio agreed to allowed Germany the right to build a Navy beyond the limits set by the Treaty of Versailles, and the British had made the agreement without consulting France or Italy first.
Part V of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles had imposed severe restrictions on the size and capacities on the armed forces of the ''Reich''. In regards to the Navy, Germany was allowed no submarines, no naval aviation, and no battleships; the total naval forces allowed to the Germans were six heavy cruisers of no more than 10,000 tons displacement, six light cruisers of no more than 6000 tons displacement, 12 destroyers of no more than 800 tons displacement and 12 torpedo boats[2]. Through the interwar years, German opinion had protested these restrictions as harsh and unjust, and demanded that either all of the other states of Europe disarm down to German levels, or alternatively, Germany be allowed to rearm to the level of all the other European states. In Britain, where after 1919, there was much guilt over the alleged excessively harsh terms of Versailles, the German claim to “equality” in armaments often met with considerable sympathy. More importantly, every German government of the Weimar Republic was implacably opposed to the terms of Versailles, and given that Germany was potentially Europe’s strongest power, from the British perspective it made sense to revise Versailles in Germany’s favor as the best way of preserving the peace[3]. The British attitude was well summarized in a Foreign Office memo from 1935 that stated "...from the earliest years following the war it was our policy to eliminate those parts of the Peace Settlement which, as practical people, we knew to be unstable and indefensible"[4]. The change of regime in Germany in 1933 did cause alarm in London, but there was considerable uncertainty about what were Hitler’s long term intentions. In August 1933, chief of the Committee of Imperial Defense (CID), the Royal Marine General Sir Maurice Hankey, visited Germany, and wrote down his impressions of the “New Germany” in October 1933. Hankley’s report concluded with the words: “Are we still dealing with the Hitler of ''Mein Kampf'' , lulling his opponents to sleep with fair words to gain time to arm his people, and looking always to the day when he can throw off the mask and attack Poland? Or is it a new Hitler, who discovered the burden of responsible office, and wants to extricate himself, like man an earlier tyrant from the commitments of his irresponsible days? That is the riddle that has to be solved”[5]. This uncertainity over what were Hitler's ultimate intentions in foreign policy was to colour much of British policy towards Germany until 1939.
Equally important as one of the origins of the A.G.N.A were the deep cuts made to the Royal Navy after the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 and the London Naval Conference of 1930[6]. The cuts imposed by two naval conferences, combined with the effects of the Great Depression caused the collapse of much the British ship-building industry[7]. The collapse of the British ship-building industry in the early 1930s was to seriously hinder efforts at British naval rearmament later in the decade, and was to lead the Admiralty to greatly value treaties that imposed both quantitative and qualitative limitations on potential enemies as the best way of ensuring British sea supremacy[8]. Since Britain with its empire faced world-wide defense commitments, and the British lacked in the 1930s both the industrial infrastructure and financial resources to build up a navy capable of being simultaneously strong in both Far Eastern and European waters, the importance of potential enemies placing voluntary limitations on the size and scale of their navies[9]. In particular, Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, the First Sea Lord between 1933-1938, came to argue in favor of such treaties that ensure a highly standardized classification of different warships that discourage technical innovations that under the existing financial and industrial conditions, the Royal Navy could not always hope to match[10]. Admiral Chatfield especially wished for the Germans to do away with their ''Deutschland''-class ''Panzerschiffe'' (known as “pocket battleships” to the British), as such ships that embraced the characteristics of both battleships and cruisers were highly dangerous to Chatfield’s vision of a world of highly regulated classification of warship types and designs[11]. As part of the effort to do away with the ''Panzerschiffe'', the British Admiralty stated in March 1932 and again in the spring of 1933, that Germany was entitled to “a moral right to some relaxation of the treaty [of Versailles]”[12].
In February 1932, the World Disarmament Conference opened in Geneva, Switzerland. Among the more hotly debated issues at the conference was the German demand for “equality” in armaments (i.e. abolishing Part V of Versailles) versus the French demand for “security” in armaments (i.e. maintaining Part V as the best way of ensuring French security). The British position was an attempt to play the “honest broker”, and sought to seek a compromise between the French claim to “security” and the German claim to “equality”, which in practice meant backing the German claim to rearm beyond Part V, but not allowing the Germans to rearm enough to threaten France. Various British compromise proposals along these lines were rejected by both the French and German delegations as unacceptable. In September 1932, Germany walked of the conference, claiming it was impossible to achieve “equality”. By this time, the electoral success of the National Socialist German Workers Party had alarmed London, and it was felt unless the Weimar Republic could achieve some dramatic foreign policy success, Adolf Hitler might come to power. In order to lure the Germans back to Geneva, after several months of strong British diplomatic pressure on the French, in December 1932, all of the other delegations voted for a British-sponsored resolution that would allow for the "theoretical equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations"[13]. Germany agreed to return to the conference. Thus, before Hitler became Chancellor, it had been accepted that Germany could rearm beyond the limits set by Versailles, through the precise extent of German rearmament was still open to negotiation.
During the 1920s, Hitler’s thinking on foreign policy went through a dramatic change. At the beginning of his political career, Hitler was hostile to Britain as one enemies of the ''Reich'', but strongly influenced by the British opposition to the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, Hitler came to rank Britain as a potential ally[14]. In ''Mein Kampf'', and even more in its sequel, ''Zweites Buch'', Hitler strongly criticized the pre-1914 German government for embarking on a naval and colonial challenge to the British Empire, and in Hitler’s view, needlessly antagonizing the British[15]. In Hitler’s view, Britain was a fellow “Aryan” power, whose friendship could be won by a German "renunciation" of naval and colonial ambitions against Britain[16]. In return for such a “renunciation”, Hitler expected an Anglo-German alliance directed France and the Soviet Union, and British support for the German efforts to acquire ''Lebensraum'' in Eastern Europe. As the first step towards the Anglo-German alliance, Hitler had written in ''Mein Kampf'' of his intention to seek a “sea pact”, by which Germany would “renounce” any naval challenge against Britain[17].
In January 1933, Hitler became the German chancellor. The new government in Germany had inherited a strong negotiating position at Geneva from the previous government of General Kurt von Schleicher. The German strategy was to make idealistic offers of limited rearmament, out of the expectation that all such offers would be rejected by the French, allowing Germany to go on ultimately with the maximum rearmament. The ultra-nationalism of the Nazi regime had alarmed the French, who put the most minimal possible interpretation of German "theoretical equality” in armaments, and thereby played into the German strategy. In October 1933, the Germans again walked out of the conference, stating if everyone else should either disarm to the Versailles level, or allow Germany to rearm beyond Versailles[18]. Through the Germans never had any serious interest in accepting any of the various British compromise proposals, in London, the German walk-out was widely, if erroneously blamed on French “intransigence”. The British government was left with the conviction that in the future, that opportunities for arms limitation talks with the Germans should not be lost because of French “intransigence”. Subsequent British offers to arrange for the German return to the World Disarmament Conference were sabotaged by the Germans putting forward proposals that were meant to appeal to the British, while being unacceptable to the French. In April 1934, the last such effort ended with the French Premier Louis Barthou's rejection of the latest German offer as unaccepable. At the same time, Admiral Erich Raeder of the ''Reichsmarine'' persuaded Hitler of the advantages of ordering two more ''Panzerschiffe'', and in 1933 advised the Chancellor that Germany would be best off by 1948 a with a fleet of three aircraft carriers, 18 cruisers, eight Panzerschiffe, 48 destroyers and 74 U-boats[19]. Admiral Reader argued to Hitler that Germany needed naval parity with France as a minimum goal, whereas Hitler from April 1933 onwards, expressed a desire for a ''Reichsmarine'' of 33.3% of the total tonnage of the Royal Navy[20]. In November 1934, the Germans formally informed the British of their wish to reach a treaty with Britain, under which the ''Reichsmarine'' would be allowed to grow until the size of 35% of the Royal Navy (the figure was raised because the phrase of a German goal of “one third of the Royal Navy except in cruisers, destroyers, and submarines” did not sound well in speeches)[21]. Admiral Reader felt that the 35:100 ratio was unacceptable towards Germany, but was overruled by Hitler who insisted on the 35:100 ratio[22]. Aware of the German desire to expand their Navy beyond Versailles, Admiral Chatfield repeatedly advised it would best to reach a naval treaty with Germany, so to regulate the future size and scale of the German Navy[23]. Through the Admiralty described the idea of a 35:100 tonnage ratio between London and Berlin as “the highest that we could accept for any European power”, it advised the government that Germany could earliest build a Navy to that size was by 1942, and that though they would prefer a smaller tonnage ratio than 35:100, a 35:100 ratio was nonetheless acceptable[24]. In December 1934, a study done by Captain Edward King, Director of the Royal Navy's Plans Division suggested that the most dangerous form a future German Navy might take from the British perspective would be a ''Kreuzerkrieg'' (Cruiser war) fleet[25]. Captain King argued that ''guerre-de-course'' German fleet of ''Panzerschiffe'', crusisers, and U-boats operating in task forces would be highly dangerous for the Royal Navy, and that a German "balanced fleet" that would be a mirror image of the Royal Navy would be the least dangerous form the German Navy could take[26]. A German "balanced fleet" would have proportionally the same number of battleships, crusisers, destroyers, etc that the the British fleet possessed, and from the British point of view, this would be in the event of war, the easiest German fleet to defeat[26].
Through every government of the Weimar Republic had violated Part V of Versailles, in 1933 and 1934, the Nazi government had become more flagrant and open in violating Part V. In 1933, the Germans started to build their first U-boats since World War One, and in April 1935, launched their first U-boats[28]. On April 25, 1935, the British Naval attaché to Germany, Captain Gerard Muirhead-Gould was officially informed by Captain Leopold Bürkner of the ''Reichsmarine'' that Germany had laid down 12 250 ton U-boats at Kiel[29]. On April 29, 1935, the Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon informed the House of Commons that Germany was now building U-boats[29]. On May 2, 1935, the Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald told the House of his government’s intention to reach a naval pact to regulate the future growth of the German Navy[31].
In a more general sense, because of the British championship of German "theoretical equality” at the World Disarmament Conference, London was in a weak moral position to oppose the German violations. The German response to British complaints about violations of Part V were that they were merely unilaterally exercising rights the British delegation at Geneva were prepared to concede to the ''Reich''. In March 1934, a British Foreign Office memo stated "Part V of the Treaty of Versailles...is, for practical purposes, dead, and it would become a putrefying corpse which, if left unburied, would soon poison the political atmosphere of Europe. Moreover, if there is to be a funeral, it is clearly better to arrange it while Hitler is still in a mood to pay the undertakers for their services"[32]. In December 1934, a secret Cabinet committee met to discuss the situation caused by German rearmament. The British Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon stated at one of the committee’s meeting that "If the alternative to legalizing German rearmament was to prevent it, there would be everything to be said, for not legalizing it"[33]. But since London had already rejected the idea of a war to end German rearmament, the British government chose a diplomatic strategy that would exchange abolition of Part V in exchange for German return to both the League of Nations, and the World Disarmament Conference"[34]. At the same meeting, Simon stated "Germany would prefer, it appears, to be `made an honest woman'; but if she is left too long to indulge in illegitimate practices and to find by experience that she does not suffer for it, this laudable ambition may wear off"[35]. In January 1935, Simon wrote to King George V that “The practical choice is between a Germany which continues to rearm without any regulation or agreement and a Germany which, through getting a recognition of its rights and some modifications of the Peace Treaties enters into the comity of nations and contributes in this or other ways to European stability. As between these two courses, there can be no doubt which is the wiser"[36]. In February 1935, at a summit in London between the French Premier Pierre Laval and the British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald led to an Anglo-French communiqué issued in London that proposed talks with the Germans on arms limitation, an air part, and security pacts for Eastern Europe and the nations along the Danube[37].
In early March 1935, talks intended to discuss the scale and extent of German rearmament in Berlin between Hitler and Simon were postponed when Hitler took offense at a British government White Paper justifying a higher defense budget under the grounds that Germany was violating Versailles, and claimed to have contacted a “cold”. In the interval between Hitler “recovering” from his “diplomatic cold” and Simon's visit, the German government took the chance to formally reject all of the clauses of Versailles relating to disarmament on the land and air. In the 1930s, the British government was obsessed with the idea of a German bombing attack destroying London, and so placed a great deal of a value reaching a air part outlawing bombing[38]. The idea of a naval agreement was felt to be a useful stepping stone to a air pact[39]. On March 26, 1935, during one of his meetings with Simon, and his deputy Sir Anthony Eden, Hitler stated his intention to formally reject the naval disarmament section of Versailles, but was prepared to discuss a treaty regulating the scale of German naval rearmament[40]. On May 21, 1935, Hitler in a speech in Berlin formally offered to discuss a treaty offering a German Navy that was to operate forever on a 35:100 naval ratio[41]. During his "peace speech" of May 21, Hitler disallowed any intention of engaging in a pre-1914 style naval race with Britain, and stated: "The German ''Reich'' goverment recognizes of itself the overwhelming importance for existence and thereby the justification of dominance at sea to protect the British Empire, just as, on the other hand, we are determined to do everything necessary in protection of our own continental existence and freedom"[22]. For Hitler, his speech illustrated the ''pro quid quo'' of a Anglo-German alliance, namely British acceptance of German mastery of continental Europe in exchange for German acceptance of British mastery over the seas[22]. .
On May 22, 1935, the British Cabinet voted to take up formally Hitler offer’s of May 21 as soon as possible [44]. Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador in Berlin advised London no chance at a naval agreement with Germany should be lost “owning to French shortsightedness” [44]. Admiral Chatfield informed the Cabinet that it most unwise to “oppose [Hitler’s] offer, but what the reactions of the French will be to it are more uncertain and its reaction on our own battleship replacement still more so”[44]. On March 27, 1935, Hitler had appointed Joachim von Ribbentrop, who served as both Hitler’s Extraordinary Ambassador-Plenipotentiary at Large (making part of the ''Auswärtiges Amt'', the German Foreign Office) and as the chief of a Nazi Party organization named the ''Dienststelle Ribbentrop'' that competed with the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' was appointed to head the German delegation to negotiate any naval treaty[47]. Baron Konstantin von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister was first opposed to this arrangement, but changed his mind when he decided that the British would never accept the 35:100 ratio, and having Ribbentrop head the mission was the best way to discredit his rival[48].
On June 2, 1935, Ribbentrop arrived in London. The talks began on Tuesday, June 4, 1935 at the Admiralty office with Ribbentrop heading the German delegation and Simon the British delegation[49]. Ribbentrop, who was determined to succeed at his mission, no matter what, began his talks by stating the British could either accept the 35:100 ratio as “fixed and unalterable” by the weekend, or else the German delegation would go home, and the Germans would build their navy up to any size they wished[50]. Simon was visibly angry with Ribbentrop’s behavior, stated that “It is not usual to make such conditions at the beginning of negotiations” , and walked out of the talks[51]. On Wednesday, June 5, 1935, a change of opinion came over the British delegation. In a report to the British Cabinet, that they “definitely of the opinion that, in our own interest, we should accept this offer of Herr Hitler’s while it is still open…If we now refuse to accept the offer for the purposes of these discussions, Herr Hitler will withdraw the offer and Germany will seek to build to a higher level than 35 per cent…Having regard to past history and to Germany’s known capacity to become a serious naval rival of this country, we may have cause to regret it if we fail to take this chance…”[52]. Also on June 5, during talks between Sir Robert Craigie, the British Foreign Office’s naval expert and Ribbentrop’s deputy, Admiral Karl-Georg Schuster, the Germans conceded that the 35:100 ratio would take the form of tonnage ratios, during the Germans would more or less build their tonnage up to whatever the British tonnage was in various warship categories[49]. On the afternoon of that same day, the British Cabinet voted to accept the 35:100 ratio, and Ribbentrop was informed of the Cabinet’s acceptance in the evening[52]. During the next two weeks, talks continued in London on various technical issues, mostly relating to how the tonnage ratios would be calculated in the various warship categories[55]. Ribbentrop was desperate for success, agreed to almost all of the British demands[55]. On June 18th, 1935, the A.G.N.A was signed in London by Ribbentrop, and the new British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare. Hitler called June 18th, 1935 the day of the signing of the A.G.N.A. “the happiest day of his life” as he believed that the A.G.N.A marked the beginning of a Anglo-German alliance [57].
The Anglo-German Naval Agreement made it possible for the German navy to control a major portion of the sea traffic traveling in and out of the Baltic, including sea traffic traveling through the Gulf of Bothnia. It was from the Gulf of Bothnia and the Swedish port of Luleå that the majority of Germany's iron-ore imports originated. Half of Germany's iron-ore imports came from Sweden, an important consideration for the German military's attempts at rebuilding its war arsenal. Grand Admiral Raeder, head of the German navy, said himself that it would be "utterly impossible to make war should the navy not be able to secure the supplies of iron-ore from Sweden."
At the time of the signing of the AGNA, Denmark had the capability of deciding what ships made their way into and out of the Baltic, but when Germany invaded Denmark and Norway (Operation Weserübung, April 9, 1940), it was Germany that gained complete control of the Baltic, since the United Kingdom had voluntarily withdrawn from Baltic waters. It was now truly a 'bottle' that the Germans were capable of closing. If the British naval withdrawal from the Baltic had not been included in the AGNA, and had the British navy continued to sail the waters of the Baltic, Germany's ability to secure the iron-ore shipping routes to Sweden in time of war would have been made more difficult. In fact, Germany's ability to initiate war may have been quashed, with such a vital mineral as iron-ore cut off from the German mainland. However, while the United Kingdom's superior navy may have been able to stave off a smaller German naval fleet initially, in the long run the power of the German Luftwaffe would have challenged Britain's ability to control the German navy in the Baltic.
Germany's expanded power, as granted through the AGNA, posed a serious threat to the independence of nations that bordered the Baltic, particularly Sweden and the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. It forced some of those nations to seriously reconsider their traditional policies and alliances.
1. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 35-36.
2. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 20.
3. Gilbert, Martin ''The Roots of Appeasement'' page 57.
4. Medlicott, W.N. ''Britain and Germany'', Athlone Press: London, United Kingdom, 1969 page 3.
5. Document 181 C10156/2293/118 “Notes by Sir Maurice Hankely on Hitler’s External Policy in Theory and Practice October 24, 1933” from ''British Documents on Foreign Affairs'' Germany 1933 page 339.
6. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 11-12.
7. Maiolo, Joseph The ''Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 12-13.
8. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 13-15.
9. Maiolo, Joseph The ''Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 11-12 & 14-15.
10. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 15-16
11. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 15-16 & 21
12. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 21.
13. Weinberg, Gerhard ''The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Diplomatic Revolution in Europe'' page 40; Doerr, Paul ''British Foreign Policy 1919-1939''page 128.
14. Jäckel, Eberhard ''Hitler's World View'' page 31
15. Jäckel, Eberhard ''Hitler's World View'' page 20
16. Jäckel, Eberhard ''Hitler's World View'' page 20
17. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 22
18. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 21
19. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 23
20. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 24
21. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 24.
22. Kershaw, Ian ''Hitler Hubris'' page 556
23. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 26.
24. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 26-28
25. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 68-69
26. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 69-70
27. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 69-70
28. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 29-30
29. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 33
30. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 33
31. Maiolo, Joseph'' The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 33
32. Medlicott, W.N. ''Britain and Germany'' page 9.
33. Dutton, David ''Simon'' page 187.
34. Dutton, David ''Simon'' page 187
35. Dutton, David ''Simon'' page 188
36. Haraszti, Eva ''Treaty-Breakers or "Realpolitiker"?'' page 22
37. Messerschmidt, Manfred “Foreign Policy and Preparation for War” from ''Germany and the Second World War'' page 613
38. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 31-32
39. Ibid.
40. Weinberg, Gerhard ''The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Diplomatic Revolution in Europe'' page 212.
41. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 34
42. Kershaw, Ian ''Hitler Hubris'' page 556
43. Kershaw, Ian ''Hitler Hubris'' page 556
44. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 34.
45. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 34.
46. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 34.
47. Bloch, Michael ''Ribbentrop'' pages 68-69
48. Bloch, Michael ''Ribbentrop'' page 69
49. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 35.
50. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 34; Bloch, Michael ''Ribbentrop'' page 72.
51. Bloch, Michael ''Ribbentrop'' page 72.
52. Bloch, Michael ''Ribbentrop'' page 73.
53. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 35.
54. Bloch, Michael ''Ribbentrop'' page 73.
55. Bloch, Michael ''Ribbentrop'' pages 73-74.
56. Bloch, Michael ''Ribbentrop'' pages 73-74.
57. Kershaw, Ian ''Hitler Hubris'' page 558.
★ Bloch, Michael ''Ribbentrop'', Crown Publishers Inc: New York, New York, United States of America, 1992.
★ Dutton, David ''Simon A Political Biography of Sir John Simon'', Aurum Press: London, United Kingdom, 1992.
★ Gilbert, Martin ''The Roots of Appeasement'', Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, United Kingdom 1966.
★ Haraszti, Eva ''Treaty-Breakers or "Realpolitiker"? The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935'', Akademiai Kiado: Budapest, Hungary, 1974.
★ Kershaw, Sir Ian ''Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris'', W.W. Norton: New York, New York, United States of America, 1998.
★ Jäckel, Eberhard ''Hitler's World View A Blueprint for Power'', Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America, 1981.
★ Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933-39 A Study in Appeasement and the Origins of the Second World War'', Macmillan Press: London, 1998.
★ Medlicott, W.N. ''Britain and Germany: The Search For Agreement 1930-1937'', Athlone Press: London, United Kingdom, 1969.
★ Messerschmidt, Manfred “Foreign Policy and Preparation for War” pages 541-718 from ''Germany and the Second World War The Build-up of German Aggression'', Volume I, Clarednon Press: Oxford, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom, 1990.
★ Watt, D.C. "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgement" pages 155-175 from ''Journal of Modern History'', Volume 28, Issue #2, June 1956.
★ Weinberg, Gerhard ''The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933-36'', University of Chicago Press: Chicago, Illinois, United States of America, 1970.
★ Stresa front
★ Events preceding World War II in Europe
★ The Anglo-German Naval Agreement 1935
The A.G.N.A was both a ambitious attempt on both of London and Berlin to reach better relations, but which ultimately floundered because of conflicting expectations between the two states. For the Germans, the A.G.N.A. was intended to mark the beginning of a Anglo-German alliance against France and the Soviet Union, whereas for the British, the A.G.N.A. was to be the beginning of a series of arms limitation agreements that were made to limit German expansionism. The A.G.N.A was highly controversial both at the time and since because the 35:100 tonnage ratio agreed to allowed Germany the right to build a Navy beyond the limits set by the Treaty of Versailles, and the British had made the agreement without consulting France or Italy first.
| Contents |
| Background |
| Negotiation |
| Impact |
| Endnotes |
| Reference |
| See also |
| External links |
Background
Part V of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles had imposed severe restrictions on the size and capacities on the armed forces of the ''Reich''. In regards to the Navy, Germany was allowed no submarines, no naval aviation, and no battleships; the total naval forces allowed to the Germans were six heavy cruisers of no more than 10,000 tons displacement, six light cruisers of no more than 6000 tons displacement, 12 destroyers of no more than 800 tons displacement and 12 torpedo boats[2]. Through the interwar years, German opinion had protested these restrictions as harsh and unjust, and demanded that either all of the other states of Europe disarm down to German levels, or alternatively, Germany be allowed to rearm to the level of all the other European states. In Britain, where after 1919, there was much guilt over the alleged excessively harsh terms of Versailles, the German claim to “equality” in armaments often met with considerable sympathy. More importantly, every German government of the Weimar Republic was implacably opposed to the terms of Versailles, and given that Germany was potentially Europe’s strongest power, from the British perspective it made sense to revise Versailles in Germany’s favor as the best way of preserving the peace[3]. The British attitude was well summarized in a Foreign Office memo from 1935 that stated "...from the earliest years following the war it was our policy to eliminate those parts of the Peace Settlement which, as practical people, we knew to be unstable and indefensible"[4]. The change of regime in Germany in 1933 did cause alarm in London, but there was considerable uncertainty about what were Hitler’s long term intentions. In August 1933, chief of the Committee of Imperial Defense (CID), the Royal Marine General Sir Maurice Hankey, visited Germany, and wrote down his impressions of the “New Germany” in October 1933. Hankley’s report concluded with the words: “Are we still dealing with the Hitler of ''Mein Kampf'' , lulling his opponents to sleep with fair words to gain time to arm his people, and looking always to the day when he can throw off the mask and attack Poland? Or is it a new Hitler, who discovered the burden of responsible office, and wants to extricate himself, like man an earlier tyrant from the commitments of his irresponsible days? That is the riddle that has to be solved”[5]. This uncertainity over what were Hitler's ultimate intentions in foreign policy was to colour much of British policy towards Germany until 1939.
Equally important as one of the origins of the A.G.N.A were the deep cuts made to the Royal Navy after the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 and the London Naval Conference of 1930[6]. The cuts imposed by two naval conferences, combined with the effects of the Great Depression caused the collapse of much the British ship-building industry[7]. The collapse of the British ship-building industry in the early 1930s was to seriously hinder efforts at British naval rearmament later in the decade, and was to lead the Admiralty to greatly value treaties that imposed both quantitative and qualitative limitations on potential enemies as the best way of ensuring British sea supremacy[8]. Since Britain with its empire faced world-wide defense commitments, and the British lacked in the 1930s both the industrial infrastructure and financial resources to build up a navy capable of being simultaneously strong in both Far Eastern and European waters, the importance of potential enemies placing voluntary limitations on the size and scale of their navies[9]. In particular, Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, the First Sea Lord between 1933-1938, came to argue in favor of such treaties that ensure a highly standardized classification of different warships that discourage technical innovations that under the existing financial and industrial conditions, the Royal Navy could not always hope to match[10]. Admiral Chatfield especially wished for the Germans to do away with their ''Deutschland''-class ''Panzerschiffe'' (known as “pocket battleships” to the British), as such ships that embraced the characteristics of both battleships and cruisers were highly dangerous to Chatfield’s vision of a world of highly regulated classification of warship types and designs[11]. As part of the effort to do away with the ''Panzerschiffe'', the British Admiralty stated in March 1932 and again in the spring of 1933, that Germany was entitled to “a moral right to some relaxation of the treaty [of Versailles]”[12].
In February 1932, the World Disarmament Conference opened in Geneva, Switzerland. Among the more hotly debated issues at the conference was the German demand for “equality” in armaments (i.e. abolishing Part V of Versailles) versus the French demand for “security” in armaments (i.e. maintaining Part V as the best way of ensuring French security). The British position was an attempt to play the “honest broker”, and sought to seek a compromise between the French claim to “security” and the German claim to “equality”, which in practice meant backing the German claim to rearm beyond Part V, but not allowing the Germans to rearm enough to threaten France. Various British compromise proposals along these lines were rejected by both the French and German delegations as unacceptable. In September 1932, Germany walked of the conference, claiming it was impossible to achieve “equality”. By this time, the electoral success of the National Socialist German Workers Party had alarmed London, and it was felt unless the Weimar Republic could achieve some dramatic foreign policy success, Adolf Hitler might come to power. In order to lure the Germans back to Geneva, after several months of strong British diplomatic pressure on the French, in December 1932, all of the other delegations voted for a British-sponsored resolution that would allow for the "theoretical equality of rights in a system which would provide security for all nations"[13]. Germany agreed to return to the conference. Thus, before Hitler became Chancellor, it had been accepted that Germany could rearm beyond the limits set by Versailles, through the precise extent of German rearmament was still open to negotiation.
During the 1920s, Hitler’s thinking on foreign policy went through a dramatic change. At the beginning of his political career, Hitler was hostile to Britain as one enemies of the ''Reich'', but strongly influenced by the British opposition to the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, Hitler came to rank Britain as a potential ally[14]. In ''Mein Kampf'', and even more in its sequel, ''Zweites Buch'', Hitler strongly criticized the pre-1914 German government for embarking on a naval and colonial challenge to the British Empire, and in Hitler’s view, needlessly antagonizing the British[15]. In Hitler’s view, Britain was a fellow “Aryan” power, whose friendship could be won by a German "renunciation" of naval and colonial ambitions against Britain[16]. In return for such a “renunciation”, Hitler expected an Anglo-German alliance directed France and the Soviet Union, and British support for the German efforts to acquire ''Lebensraum'' in Eastern Europe. As the first step towards the Anglo-German alliance, Hitler had written in ''Mein Kampf'' of his intention to seek a “sea pact”, by which Germany would “renounce” any naval challenge against Britain[17].
In January 1933, Hitler became the German chancellor. The new government in Germany had inherited a strong negotiating position at Geneva from the previous government of General Kurt von Schleicher. The German strategy was to make idealistic offers of limited rearmament, out of the expectation that all such offers would be rejected by the French, allowing Germany to go on ultimately with the maximum rearmament. The ultra-nationalism of the Nazi regime had alarmed the French, who put the most minimal possible interpretation of German "theoretical equality” in armaments, and thereby played into the German strategy. In October 1933, the Germans again walked out of the conference, stating if everyone else should either disarm to the Versailles level, or allow Germany to rearm beyond Versailles[18]. Through the Germans never had any serious interest in accepting any of the various British compromise proposals, in London, the German walk-out was widely, if erroneously blamed on French “intransigence”. The British government was left with the conviction that in the future, that opportunities for arms limitation talks with the Germans should not be lost because of French “intransigence”. Subsequent British offers to arrange for the German return to the World Disarmament Conference were sabotaged by the Germans putting forward proposals that were meant to appeal to the British, while being unacceptable to the French. In April 1934, the last such effort ended with the French Premier Louis Barthou's rejection of the latest German offer as unaccepable. At the same time, Admiral Erich Raeder of the ''Reichsmarine'' persuaded Hitler of the advantages of ordering two more ''Panzerschiffe'', and in 1933 advised the Chancellor that Germany would be best off by 1948 a with a fleet of three aircraft carriers, 18 cruisers, eight Panzerschiffe, 48 destroyers and 74 U-boats[19]. Admiral Reader argued to Hitler that Germany needed naval parity with France as a minimum goal, whereas Hitler from April 1933 onwards, expressed a desire for a ''Reichsmarine'' of 33.3% of the total tonnage of the Royal Navy[20]. In November 1934, the Germans formally informed the British of their wish to reach a treaty with Britain, under which the ''Reichsmarine'' would be allowed to grow until the size of 35% of the Royal Navy (the figure was raised because the phrase of a German goal of “one third of the Royal Navy except in cruisers, destroyers, and submarines” did not sound well in speeches)[21]. Admiral Reader felt that the 35:100 ratio was unacceptable towards Germany, but was overruled by Hitler who insisted on the 35:100 ratio[22]. Aware of the German desire to expand their Navy beyond Versailles, Admiral Chatfield repeatedly advised it would best to reach a naval treaty with Germany, so to regulate the future size and scale of the German Navy[23]. Through the Admiralty described the idea of a 35:100 tonnage ratio between London and Berlin as “the highest that we could accept for any European power”, it advised the government that Germany could earliest build a Navy to that size was by 1942, and that though they would prefer a smaller tonnage ratio than 35:100, a 35:100 ratio was nonetheless acceptable[24]. In December 1934, a study done by Captain Edward King, Director of the Royal Navy's Plans Division suggested that the most dangerous form a future German Navy might take from the British perspective would be a ''Kreuzerkrieg'' (Cruiser war) fleet[25]. Captain King argued that ''guerre-de-course'' German fleet of ''Panzerschiffe'', crusisers, and U-boats operating in task forces would be highly dangerous for the Royal Navy, and that a German "balanced fleet" that would be a mirror image of the Royal Navy would be the least dangerous form the German Navy could take[26]. A German "balanced fleet" would have proportionally the same number of battleships, crusisers, destroyers, etc that the the British fleet possessed, and from the British point of view, this would be in the event of war, the easiest German fleet to defeat[26].
Through every government of the Weimar Republic had violated Part V of Versailles, in 1933 and 1934, the Nazi government had become more flagrant and open in violating Part V. In 1933, the Germans started to build their first U-boats since World War One, and in April 1935, launched their first U-boats[28]. On April 25, 1935, the British Naval attaché to Germany, Captain Gerard Muirhead-Gould was officially informed by Captain Leopold Bürkner of the ''Reichsmarine'' that Germany had laid down 12 250 ton U-boats at Kiel[29]. On April 29, 1935, the Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon informed the House of Commons that Germany was now building U-boats[29]. On May 2, 1935, the Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald told the House of his government’s intention to reach a naval pact to regulate the future growth of the German Navy[31].
In a more general sense, because of the British championship of German "theoretical equality” at the World Disarmament Conference, London was in a weak moral position to oppose the German violations. The German response to British complaints about violations of Part V were that they were merely unilaterally exercising rights the British delegation at Geneva were prepared to concede to the ''Reich''. In March 1934, a British Foreign Office memo stated "Part V of the Treaty of Versailles...is, for practical purposes, dead, and it would become a putrefying corpse which, if left unburied, would soon poison the political atmosphere of Europe. Moreover, if there is to be a funeral, it is clearly better to arrange it while Hitler is still in a mood to pay the undertakers for their services"[32]. In December 1934, a secret Cabinet committee met to discuss the situation caused by German rearmament. The British Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon stated at one of the committee’s meeting that "If the alternative to legalizing German rearmament was to prevent it, there would be everything to be said, for not legalizing it"[33]. But since London had already rejected the idea of a war to end German rearmament, the British government chose a diplomatic strategy that would exchange abolition of Part V in exchange for German return to both the League of Nations, and the World Disarmament Conference"[34]. At the same meeting, Simon stated "Germany would prefer, it appears, to be `made an honest woman'; but if she is left too long to indulge in illegitimate practices and to find by experience that she does not suffer for it, this laudable ambition may wear off"[35]. In January 1935, Simon wrote to King George V that “The practical choice is between a Germany which continues to rearm without any regulation or agreement and a Germany which, through getting a recognition of its rights and some modifications of the Peace Treaties enters into the comity of nations and contributes in this or other ways to European stability. As between these two courses, there can be no doubt which is the wiser"[36]. In February 1935, at a summit in London between the French Premier Pierre Laval and the British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald led to an Anglo-French communiqué issued in London that proposed talks with the Germans on arms limitation, an air part, and security pacts for Eastern Europe and the nations along the Danube[37].
In early March 1935, talks intended to discuss the scale and extent of German rearmament in Berlin between Hitler and Simon were postponed when Hitler took offense at a British government White Paper justifying a higher defense budget under the grounds that Germany was violating Versailles, and claimed to have contacted a “cold”. In the interval between Hitler “recovering” from his “diplomatic cold” and Simon's visit, the German government took the chance to formally reject all of the clauses of Versailles relating to disarmament on the land and air. In the 1930s, the British government was obsessed with the idea of a German bombing attack destroying London, and so placed a great deal of a value reaching a air part outlawing bombing[38]. The idea of a naval agreement was felt to be a useful stepping stone to a air pact[39]. On March 26, 1935, during one of his meetings with Simon, and his deputy Sir Anthony Eden, Hitler stated his intention to formally reject the naval disarmament section of Versailles, but was prepared to discuss a treaty regulating the scale of German naval rearmament[40]. On May 21, 1935, Hitler in a speech in Berlin formally offered to discuss a treaty offering a German Navy that was to operate forever on a 35:100 naval ratio[41]. During his "peace speech" of May 21, Hitler disallowed any intention of engaging in a pre-1914 style naval race with Britain, and stated: "The German ''Reich'' goverment recognizes of itself the overwhelming importance for existence and thereby the justification of dominance at sea to protect the British Empire, just as, on the other hand, we are determined to do everything necessary in protection of our own continental existence and freedom"[22]. For Hitler, his speech illustrated the ''pro quid quo'' of a Anglo-German alliance, namely British acceptance of German mastery of continental Europe in exchange for German acceptance of British mastery over the seas[22]. .
Negotiation
On May 22, 1935, the British Cabinet voted to take up formally Hitler offer’s of May 21 as soon as possible [44]. Sir Eric Phipps, the British Ambassador in Berlin advised London no chance at a naval agreement with Germany should be lost “owning to French shortsightedness” [44]. Admiral Chatfield informed the Cabinet that it most unwise to “oppose [Hitler’s] offer, but what the reactions of the French will be to it are more uncertain and its reaction on our own battleship replacement still more so”[44]. On March 27, 1935, Hitler had appointed Joachim von Ribbentrop, who served as both Hitler’s Extraordinary Ambassador-Plenipotentiary at Large (making part of the ''Auswärtiges Amt'', the German Foreign Office) and as the chief of a Nazi Party organization named the ''Dienststelle Ribbentrop'' that competed with the ''Auswärtiges Amt'' was appointed to head the German delegation to negotiate any naval treaty[47]. Baron Konstantin von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister was first opposed to this arrangement, but changed his mind when he decided that the British would never accept the 35:100 ratio, and having Ribbentrop head the mission was the best way to discredit his rival[48].
On June 2, 1935, Ribbentrop arrived in London. The talks began on Tuesday, June 4, 1935 at the Admiralty office with Ribbentrop heading the German delegation and Simon the British delegation[49]. Ribbentrop, who was determined to succeed at his mission, no matter what, began his talks by stating the British could either accept the 35:100 ratio as “fixed and unalterable” by the weekend, or else the German delegation would go home, and the Germans would build their navy up to any size they wished[50]. Simon was visibly angry with Ribbentrop’s behavior, stated that “It is not usual to make such conditions at the beginning of negotiations” , and walked out of the talks[51]. On Wednesday, June 5, 1935, a change of opinion came over the British delegation. In a report to the British Cabinet, that they “definitely of the opinion that, in our own interest, we should accept this offer of Herr Hitler’s while it is still open…If we now refuse to accept the offer for the purposes of these discussions, Herr Hitler will withdraw the offer and Germany will seek to build to a higher level than 35 per cent…Having regard to past history and to Germany’s known capacity to become a serious naval rival of this country, we may have cause to regret it if we fail to take this chance…”[52]. Also on June 5, during talks between Sir Robert Craigie, the British Foreign Office’s naval expert and Ribbentrop’s deputy, Admiral Karl-Georg Schuster, the Germans conceded that the 35:100 ratio would take the form of tonnage ratios, during the Germans would more or less build their tonnage up to whatever the British tonnage was in various warship categories[49]. On the afternoon of that same day, the British Cabinet voted to accept the 35:100 ratio, and Ribbentrop was informed of the Cabinet’s acceptance in the evening[52]. During the next two weeks, talks continued in London on various technical issues, mostly relating to how the tonnage ratios would be calculated in the various warship categories[55]. Ribbentrop was desperate for success, agreed to almost all of the British demands[55]. On June 18th, 1935, the A.G.N.A was signed in London by Ribbentrop, and the new British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare. Hitler called June 18th, 1935 the day of the signing of the A.G.N.A. “the happiest day of his life” as he believed that the A.G.N.A marked the beginning of a Anglo-German alliance [57].
Impact
The Anglo-German Naval Agreement made it possible for the German navy to control a major portion of the sea traffic traveling in and out of the Baltic, including sea traffic traveling through the Gulf of Bothnia. It was from the Gulf of Bothnia and the Swedish port of Luleå that the majority of Germany's iron-ore imports originated. Half of Germany's iron-ore imports came from Sweden, an important consideration for the German military's attempts at rebuilding its war arsenal. Grand Admiral Raeder, head of the German navy, said himself that it would be "utterly impossible to make war should the navy not be able to secure the supplies of iron-ore from Sweden."
At the time of the signing of the AGNA, Denmark had the capability of deciding what ships made their way into and out of the Baltic, but when Germany invaded Denmark and Norway (Operation Weserübung, April 9, 1940), it was Germany that gained complete control of the Baltic, since the United Kingdom had voluntarily withdrawn from Baltic waters. It was now truly a 'bottle' that the Germans were capable of closing. If the British naval withdrawal from the Baltic had not been included in the AGNA, and had the British navy continued to sail the waters of the Baltic, Germany's ability to secure the iron-ore shipping routes to Sweden in time of war would have been made more difficult. In fact, Germany's ability to initiate war may have been quashed, with such a vital mineral as iron-ore cut off from the German mainland. However, while the United Kingdom's superior navy may have been able to stave off a smaller German naval fleet initially, in the long run the power of the German Luftwaffe would have challenged Britain's ability to control the German navy in the Baltic.
Germany's expanded power, as granted through the AGNA, posed a serious threat to the independence of nations that bordered the Baltic, particularly Sweden and the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. It forced some of those nations to seriously reconsider their traditional policies and alliances.
Endnotes
1. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 35-36.
2. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 20.
3. Gilbert, Martin ''The Roots of Appeasement'' page 57.
4. Medlicott, W.N. ''Britain and Germany'', Athlone Press: London, United Kingdom, 1969 page 3.
5. Document 181 C10156/2293/118 “Notes by Sir Maurice Hankely on Hitler’s External Policy in Theory and Practice October 24, 1933” from ''British Documents on Foreign Affairs'' Germany 1933 page 339.
6. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 11-12.
7. Maiolo, Joseph The ''Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 12-13.
8. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 13-15.
9. Maiolo, Joseph The ''Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 11-12 & 14-15.
10. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 15-16
11. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 15-16 & 21
12. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 21.
13. Weinberg, Gerhard ''The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Diplomatic Revolution in Europe'' page 40; Doerr, Paul ''British Foreign Policy 1919-1939''page 128.
14. Jäckel, Eberhard ''Hitler's World View'' page 31
15. Jäckel, Eberhard ''Hitler's World View'' page 20
16. Jäckel, Eberhard ''Hitler's World View'' page 20
17. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 22
18. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 21
19. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 23
20. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 24
21. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 24.
22. Kershaw, Ian ''Hitler Hubris'' page 556
23. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 26.
24. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 26-28
25. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 68-69
26. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 69-70
27. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 69-70
28. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 29-30
29. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 33
30. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 33
31. Maiolo, Joseph'' The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 33
32. Medlicott, W.N. ''Britain and Germany'' page 9.
33. Dutton, David ''Simon'' page 187.
34. Dutton, David ''Simon'' page 187
35. Dutton, David ''Simon'' page 188
36. Haraszti, Eva ''Treaty-Breakers or "Realpolitiker"?'' page 22
37. Messerschmidt, Manfred “Foreign Policy and Preparation for War” from ''Germany and the Second World War'' page 613
38. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' pages 31-32
39. Ibid.
40. Weinberg, Gerhard ''The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Diplomatic Revolution in Europe'' page 212.
41. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 34
42. Kershaw, Ian ''Hitler Hubris'' page 556
43. Kershaw, Ian ''Hitler Hubris'' page 556
44. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 34.
45. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 34.
46. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 34.
47. Bloch, Michael ''Ribbentrop'' pages 68-69
48. Bloch, Michael ''Ribbentrop'' page 69
49. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 35.
50. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 34; Bloch, Michael ''Ribbentrop'' page 72.
51. Bloch, Michael ''Ribbentrop'' page 72.
52. Bloch, Michael ''Ribbentrop'' page 73.
53. Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany'' page 35.
54. Bloch, Michael ''Ribbentrop'' page 73.
55. Bloch, Michael ''Ribbentrop'' pages 73-74.
56. Bloch, Michael ''Ribbentrop'' pages 73-74.
57. Kershaw, Ian ''Hitler Hubris'' page 558.
Reference
★ Bloch, Michael ''Ribbentrop'', Crown Publishers Inc: New York, New York, United States of America, 1992.
★ Dutton, David ''Simon A Political Biography of Sir John Simon'', Aurum Press: London, United Kingdom, 1992.
★ Gilbert, Martin ''The Roots of Appeasement'', Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, United Kingdom 1966.
★ Haraszti, Eva ''Treaty-Breakers or "Realpolitiker"? The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935'', Akademiai Kiado: Budapest, Hungary, 1974.
★ Kershaw, Sir Ian ''Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris'', W.W. Norton: New York, New York, United States of America, 1998.
★ Jäckel, Eberhard ''Hitler's World View A Blueprint for Power'', Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America, 1981.
★ Maiolo, Joseph ''The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933-39 A Study in Appeasement and the Origins of the Second World War'', Macmillan Press: London, 1998.
★ Medlicott, W.N. ''Britain and Germany: The Search For Agreement 1930-1937'', Athlone Press: London, United Kingdom, 1969.
★ Messerschmidt, Manfred “Foreign Policy and Preparation for War” pages 541-718 from ''Germany and the Second World War The Build-up of German Aggression'', Volume I, Clarednon Press: Oxford, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom, 1990.
★ Watt, D.C. "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgement" pages 155-175 from ''Journal of Modern History'', Volume 28, Issue #2, June 1956.
★ Weinberg, Gerhard ''The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933-36'', University of Chicago Press: Chicago, Illinois, United States of America, 1970.
See also
★ Stresa front
★ Events preceding World War II in Europe
External links
★ The Anglo-German Naval Agreement 1935
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