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The 'Treaty of Sztumska Wieś', also known as the 'Armistice', 'Peace' or 'Truce' of 'Stuhmsdorf(f)', was signed on 12 September 1635 between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Sweden in the village of Sztumska Wieś (Stuhmsdorf), Royal Prussia, just south of Sztum (Stuhm). Sweden, weakened by its involvement in the Thirty Years' War, agreed to the terms that were mostly favourable to the Commonwealth in terms of territorial concessions. The Commonwealth regained many of the territories it had lost in the past decades of the Polish-Swedish War, but the Treaty was also beneficial to Sweden and her allies (France, England and the Dutch Republic), which wanted Sweden to be able to concentrate on the Thirty Years' War in Germany, without the need to worry about possible conflict with the Commonwealth.

Contents

Sides and motivations

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

Sweden

International involvement

France, England and Denmark

Brandenburg-Prussia

Early negotiations

Later negotiations

Provisions of the treaty

See also

References

Sides and motivations

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

The Polish side was not unified. The Polish king Władysław IV Waza, from the Swedish House of Vasa, wanted to regain the Swedish crown, which had been held and then lost by his father Sigismund III Vasa. As this was a daunting task, his less ambitious motivations were to gain fame and strengthen his position in the Commonwealth, where Golden Liberties made the king's position among the weakest in Europe. He hoped these goals would be achievable during the war and argued that the Commonwealth could gain more by warring with Sweden; however he was also not averse to peaceful resolution, if it were to give him what he wanted. He thought that the negotiations gave him the opportunity to trade in his right to the Swedish crown for a hereditary claim to one of the regained lands (here he was supported by primate of Poland, Jan Wężyk), and entrusted this matter to the Prussian mediators.
The szlachta (Polish nobility) advisors to Władysław, representing the Polish parliament (Sejm), were not convinced that the war would be beneficial, although many (like kanclerz and bishop Jakub Zadzik, hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski, and Royal Secretary and voivode Stanisław Lubomirski agreed that the Swedes had to leave Poland — by negotiations, if possible, by war, if necessary. Few however wished the war to continue for the sake of helping Władysław regain the Swedish crown, and as usual, there was much disagreement between allies of the king, who wanted to strengthen his power, and those who feared that any victory for the king would mean loss for the nobility (Czapliński, 1974).

Sweden

After the recent setbacks that Sweden and its allies suffered in Germany (such as the Battle of Nördlingen and the defection of Prince-Elector of Saxony), Sweden's negotiating position was somewhat weakened. The recent Polish victories against Muscovy and the Ottoman Empire made also many Swedes uneasy, as they reminded themselves that the Commonwealth was not a foe easy to defeat. Nonetheless the Swedes realised that their recent gains in Germany were much less easy to defend than the territories they captured from the Commonwealth in Prussia and Livonia, and so they were more ready to give up German than Prussian territories. They were however willing to give up their conquest in Prussia, but only if Władysław would renounce his claim to the Swedish crown, and they would retain their conquests in Livonia.
Sweden's position was also weakened by the disagreements within its government, as there was a power struggle between Swedish chancellor Axel Oxenstierna and his opponents in the Swedish Parliament. Some of these struggles led to leaks which gave leverage to the Polish side[1].

International involvement

Many European powers were interested in the outcome of the negotiations, and they were also named as mediators by the 1629 Truce of Altmark, giving them ample opportunity to influence the outcome of the Polish-Swedish negotiations.

France, England and Denmark

The peace between Poland and Sweden was also supported by French Cardinal Richelieu[2] [3], who wanted to weaken the Holy Roman Empire, using Sweden and German Protestants as a tool to keep Germany divided and embroiled in conflict. To this end, he needed Sweden to continue to take part in the Thirty Years' War and to ensure Poland's neutrality[4]. Richelieu had no wish to see Poland open a second front in Prussia, and thus he sent Claude d'Avaux[5], one of his trusted negotiators, there.
French efforts were supported by the Dutch and English ambassadors at the conference, and expedited by a lavish flow of money.[6] England sent the former military commander Sir George Douglas[7] with instructions to support Władysław, especially as at that time there were negotiations between the Commonwealth and England regarding the possible marriage between Władysław and an English princess (eventually futile). Netherlands envoys included Rochus van den Honaert, Andries Bicker and Joachim Andraee.

Brandenburg-Prussia

George William of Brandenburg, Duke of Prussia and prince-elector of Brandenburg, was interested in peaceful resolution of the Polish-Swedish conflict, as he did not want his lands to be affected by a new round of warfare. Brandenburg mediators included Andreas Kreutz, Johan Georg Saucken and Peter Bergmann (Czapliński, 1974).

Early negotiations

The negotiations started on 24 January 1635 in the Prussian village of Preussisch Holland (now Pasłek). Polish negotiators were led by bishop and chancellor Jakub Zadzik, and included hetman Krzysztof Radziwiłł, voivode of Bełsk Rafał Leszczyński, Crown referendarz Remigian Zaleski, starost of Dorpaty, Ernest Denhoff and starost of Stężyce, Abraham Gołuchowski. Swedish negotiators were led by Per Brahe (the younger) and included governor of Prussia, Herman Wrangel and advisors Sten Bielke, Achacy Axelson and Johan Nicodemi (Czapliński, 1974).
The early negotiations were unsuccessful, as both sides played delaying tactics, disputing the titles of their monarchs, and awaiting most of the international mediators (only Branderburg was present). Although Swedes expected that the delay would be to their benefit, Władysław played their refusal to negotiate to the Sejm, and, with the support of some magnates, like Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł (who advocated the expansion of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Navy), the Sejm was convinced to vote for new, significant taxes. Even before the vote was passed Władysław gathered a new army of about 21 000 soldiers, sent Jerzy Ossoliński to gather Polish allies in non-occupied Prussia, and with the help of Danzig (Gdańsk) merchant Georg Hewel (Jerzy), bought 10 ships to be converted into warships, and established the 'Sea Commission' (Komisja Morska) led by Gerard Denhoff.

Later negotiations

Between the few months dividing Pr. Holland and Stuhmsdorf (now Pasłęk and Sztumska Wieś) negotiations, the military and political situation of Sweden further worsened, with more defeats in the field, and more allies defecting to the Holy Roman Empire. Now Swedes were much more willing to discuss their retreat from Prussia, and were much more wary of the war with Poland. By the end of March they were ready to accept most of the Polish terms (Czapliński, 1974).
On 24 May, the negotiations began in Stuhmsdorf (although actually Polish negotiators had their quarters in the nearby Jonasdorf (now Jankowiec), and Swedes in Marienwerder (now Kwidzyń). Foreign mediators arrived, Swedish negotiators were joined by Jacob De la Gardie, while on the Polish side Krzysztof Radziwłł was replaced by Jakub Sobieski (Czapliński, 1974).
After the first month and a half, the idea of a peace was discarded, and Swedes proposed to retreat from all Prussia for a 50-year truce if Władysław renounced his claims to the Swedish crown.
Both the Polish magnates and the delegates of the petty nobility from local sejmiks saw no reason to fight when Sweden was offering them favourable concessions without any need for bloodshed and trade losses, which would surely occur if they pressed for war, especially considering the expenses of the recent two wars (the Smolensk War against Russia and the Polish-Ottoman War (1633-1634)), coupled with the unrest in the south-east provinces, where occasional Tatar raids, supported by the Ottomans, required a significant presence of the Polish forces.[Czapliński, 1974] Władysław, who had managed to gather significant forces on the border and 12 ships on the sea, was disappointed to realize that he now had almost no support among szlachta for the war (Krzysztof Radziwiłł was among the few left) - even though he himself had gained almost nothing from the treaty. Nonetheless he was eventually convinced by his advisors to sign the treaty without gaining almost anything for himself.
The treaty eventually proved to be a partial disappointment to Swedish chancellor Axel Oxenstierna and a partial victory of his opponents in the Swedish Parliament[8], nonetheless Oxensierna, who was hoping the Swedish side would not be forced to so many concessions, succeeded to keep Sweden involved in the Germany's war despite many calls from the Parliament for complete withdrawal of Swedish forces from that area[9].
George William's desire for a settlement giving him undisturbed possession of his Duchy of Prussia prevailed over the imperialist policy which, by Adam von Schwarzenberg's advice, he had followed in acceding to the Peace of Prague. The Treaty of Stuhmsdorf (Sztumska Wieś) left Brandenburg in full possession of the Duchy of Prussia; however, by liberating the Swedish troops under Lennart Torstenson which had been occupying Prussia and Livonia[10], it placed both Mecklenburg and Pomerania in the power of Sweden; the Treaty also jeopardised the prospect of the acquisition of Pomerania by the Brandenburg dynasty on the death, then imminent, of Duke Bogusław XIV (who would die in 1637[11]); and seriously threatened the security of the the country of Mark.[12] Therefore the treaty could be seen as a political mistake by George William, whose gains in the short-term were outweighed by his losses in the long-term[13].

Provisions of the treaty

The treaty signed on September 12 introduced an armistice for 26 and a half years. The armistice was an extension of the 1629 Truce of Altmark. The Swedes retained part of Livonia (Inflanty) north of Daugava river and the town of Riga, but had to guarantee the Catholics inhabiting that area the right to worship. Further, they had to return to the Commonwealth the territories they occupied in Royal Prussia (ports of Elbing (Elbląg), Memel (Klaipėda) and Pillau (Piława), the latter returning to the duke of Prussia, George William of Brandenburg), withdrawing their garrisons from them, and ceded the right to collect tariffs (3.5%) from the Polish trade through the Baltic Sea passing through Danzig (Gdańsk), which had been a sore spot to Polish szlachta, for whom the grain trade through Danzig was a major source of income. The Swedes also were to return the ships of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Navy they seized in the past years; however the Commonwealth Navy was forbidden from supporting enemies of Sweden [14].
The treaty would be broken by Sweden during their invasion of the Commonwealth in 1655.

See also

★ List of treaties

References

★ Władysław Czapliński, Władysław IV i jego czasy (Władysław IV and his times), Poland, 1974.

★ Sztumska Wieś.

★ A.W. Ward The Later Years of the Thirty Years' War (1635-48).