In late May and early June
1942, a series of 'attacks on the cities of
Sydney and
Newcastle' in
New South Wales,
Australia were made by submarines of the
Imperial Japanese Navy. These events are an example of
Axis naval activity in Australian waters during
World War II.
On the night of
31 May –
1 June three 2-man
''Ko-hyoteki'' class midget submarines entered
Sydney Harbour in an attempt to sink
Allied warships. Two of the midget submarines were destroyed before they could engage enemy vessels. The third attempted to torpedo the heavy cruiser
USS ''Chicago'' but instead sank the converted ferry
HMAS ''Kuttabul'', resulting in the deaths of 21 sailors. This midget submarine then disappeared, its fate remaining a mystery until its wreck was discovered in 2006 by amateur scuba divers off
Sydney's northern beaches.
Immediately following the raid, the five Japanese fleet submarines responsible for delivering the midgets embarked on a campaign to disrupt merchant shipping in eastern Australian waters. Over the next month, the submarines attacked at least seven merchant vessels, sinking three. As part of this campaign, two of the submarines carried out
bombardments of the ports of
Sydney and
Newcastle during the early morning of
8 June. The bombardments caused minimal damage, and the only casualty was a pilot ordered to engage the submarines, who was killed when the engine of his aircraft failed.
The midget submarine operation and later bombardments are the only occasions when either city has been attacked. The physical effects were minimal: the Japanese had intended for the midgets to destroy several major warships, but the only vessel sunk was an unarmed depot ship. The bombardments also failed to damage any significant targets. The main impact was psychological. Fear of an impending invasion was inspired in the population, and the Australian military was forced to upgrade defences and to commence
convoy operations to protect merchant shipping.
Forces
Japanese
The
Imperial Japanese Navy intended to use six submarines in the attack on Sydney Harbour:
''B1'' type submarines ''
I-21'', ''
I-27'', ''
I-28'', and ''
I-29'', and
''C1'' type submarines ''
I-22'' and ''
I-24''.
[1][2] The six submarines made up the Eastern Attack Group of the 8th Submarine Squadron, under the command of Captain
Hankyu Sasaki.
Sometime in late April or early May 1942, ''I-21'' and ''I-29'' were ordered to reconnoitre various
Australasian ports in order to select the harbour best suited for a stealth attack on Allied warships by midget submarines.
Each submarine was equipped with a
Yokosuka E14Y1 Glen floatplane for aerial reconnaissance.
''I-21'' examined
Nouméa in New Caledonia,
Suva in Fiji, then
Auckland in New Zealand, while ''I-29'' was sent to
Sydney, Australia.
On
11 May, ''I-22'', ''I-24'', ''I-27'', and ''I-28'' were ordered to proceed to the Japanese naval base at
Truk Lagoon, in the
Caroline Islands, where they would each be equipped with a
''Ko-hyoteki'' class midget submarine.
[5] ''I-28'' failed to reach Truk; she was torpedoed on the surface by the American submarine
USS ''Tautog'' on
17 May.
[6] The three remaining submarines left Truk on approximately
20 May for a point south of the
Solomon Islands.
[7] ''I-24'' was forced to return the next day, when an explosion in her midget's battery compartment killed the smaller submarine's navigator and injured the commander.
[8] The damaged midget was replaced by the submarine that would have accompanied ''I-28''.
Allies
The Naval Officer-in-Charge of
Sydney Harbour at the time of the attack was
Rear Admiral Gerald Muirhead-Gould
RN.
[9] On the night of the attack, the following major vessels were present in Sydney Harbour:
Heavy cruisers
USS ''Chicago'' and
HMAS ''Canberra'', cruiser
HMAS ''Adelaide'', destroyer
USS ''Perkins'',
destroyer tender USS ''Dobbin'', auxiliary minelayer
HMAS ''Bungaree'', corvettes
HMAS ''Whyalla'',
HMAS ''Geelong'', and
HMIS ''Bombay'', armed merchant cruisers
HMS ''Kanimbla'' and
HMAS ''Westralia'', and
Netherlands submarine ''K-IX''.
[10] A converted ferry,
HMAS ''Kuttabul'', was alongside at Garden Island in use as a temporary barracks for sailors transferring between ships.
The
Hospital Ship ''Oranje'' was also in the harbour, but departed an hour before the attack.
[11]
Harbour defences
The static
defences of Sydney Harbour at the time of the attack consisted of eight
indicator loops: six outside the harbour, one between
North Head and
South Head, and one between
South Head and
Middle Head, as well as a partially constructed anti-submarine boom net between George's Head on Middle Head and Green Point on Inner South Head.
The central section of the net was completed, and support piles were in place to the west, but gaps up to 400 metres (1,300 feet) wide remained on each side.
[13][14] The delay in completing the boom net prior to the attack was caused by material shortages, not lack of interest.
[15] The North Head – South Head indicator loop had been giving faulty signals since early 1940, and any data from it was disregarded.
[16] On the day of the attack the six outer indicator loops were not functioning, as there were not enough trained personnel to man both the inner and outer loop monitoring stations.
Harbour defence craft included two auxiliary anti-submarine vessels (HMAS ''Yandra'' and HMAS ''Bingera''), two auxiliary minesweepers (HMAS ''Goonambee'' and HMAS ''Samuel Benbow'') six pleasure
launches converted to channel patrol boats and armed with
depth charges (HMAS ''Yarroma'', HMAS ''Lolita'', HMAS ''Steady Hour'', HMAS ''Sea Mist'', HMAS ''Marlean'', and HMAS ''Toomaree'') and four unarmed auxiliary patrol boats.
[18]
Lead up
Following the use of five
''Ko-hyoteki'' class midget submarines against American battleships during the
attack on Pearl Harbor, plans were initiated on
16 December 1941 for a second midget submarine operation.
[19] The midget submarine raid on Pearl Harbour had not been successful, and it was hoped that upgrades to the submarines, intensified crew training, and the selection of a less well defended target would combine for greater results and an increased chance of the midget crews returning alive.
The plans called for two simultaneous attacks against
Allied naval vessels in the
Indian Ocean and
South Pacific.
These attacks were intended as diversions ahead of the
attack on Midway Island in the North Pacific, with the Japanese hoping to convince the Allies that they intended to attack to the south or west of their conquests.
[20] The two attacks were to be carried out by the 11 submarines of the 8th Submarine Squadron, the Western Attack Group of five submarines in the Indian Ocean, and the Eastern Attack Group of six submarines in the Pacific.
The submarine groups were to select a suitable port of attack based on their own reconnaissance. The Western Attack Group selected the port of
Diégo-Suarez in Madagascar.
[21] This attack, which occurred at nightfall on
30 May and resulted in the damaging of
HMS ''Ramillies'' and the sinking of the tanker ''British Loyalty'', came 22 days after the British captured the port from
Vichy France at the beginning of the
Battle of Madagascar.
[13]
The target for the Eastern Attack Group was to be chosen from among
Noumea,
Suva,
Auckland, and
Sydney.
''I-21'' and ''I-29'' were sent to make the decision, with ''I-29'' sailing to Sydney.
On the evening of
16 May, ''I-29'' fired on the 5,135 ton
Russian merchant vessel ''Wellen'', 30 miles from
Newcastle, New South Wales.
Although ''Wellen'' escaped with minimal damage, shipping between Sydney and Newcastle was suspended for 24 hours, while aircraft and all available anti-submarine ships from Sydney, including Dutch Light Cruiser
HNLMS ''Tromp'', Australian Destroyer
HMAS ''Arunta'' and American Destroyer
USS ''Perkins'', searched unsuccessfully for the submarine.
It was concluded by Muirhead–Gould that the submarine had operated alone and had left the area immediately after the attack.
[23]
A reconnaissance flight over Sydney by ''I-29's
Glen floatplane on
23 May revealed the presence of several
capital ships, including two battleships or large cruisers, five other large warships, several minor war vessels and patrol boats, and prolific merchant shipping.
[24] This report, which was partially intercepted by the Allied
FRUMEL signals intelligence network, resulted in the selection of Sydney as the target.
The three midget-carrying submarines proceeded to a point approximately 35 miles northeast of
Sydney Heads, where they joined with ''I-29'' and ''I-21''.
[26] All five submarines were in place by
29 May.
Midget submarine operation
Final reconnaissance
Before dawn on
30 May I-21's
Glen floatplane performed a final reconnaissance flight over Sydney Harbour.
The two aircrew were instructed to map the locations of the major vessels and of the submarine net.
[27] The floatplane was spotted by multiple observers but was mistaken for an American
Curtiss Seagull.
No alarm was raised until 5:07 am, when it was realised that the only ship in the area carrying Seagulls was the American cruiser ''Chicago'', which still had her four aircraft onboard.
fighters were launched from
Richmond Air Force Base, but failed to locate ''I-21'' or the floatplane.
The floatplane was seriously damaged on landing and had to be scuttled, although both aircrew survived.
The reconnaissance flight did not result in any special defence measures being put in place in Sydney.
The plan was to launch the midgets progressively between 5:20 pm and 5:40 pm, from points 5 to 7 miles (8 to 11 km) outside of Sydney Harbour.
[29] The first midget was scheduled to pass through the Heads just after 6:30 pm, but due to heavy seas was over an hour late.
The other two midgets were to follow at twenty minute intervals, but were similarly delayed.
Attack
.jpg)
HMAS ''Kuttabul'' following the Japanese attack
Midget submarine ''M-14'', launched from ''I-27'', was the first to enter Sydney Harbour.
[30] The midget was detected by the Middle Head – South Head loop at 8:01 pm, but the reading was dismissed due to heavy civilian traffic.
[31] Shortly after this, ''M-14'' became entangled in the anti-submarine net near the western edge, and was unable to free itself.
[32] At 8:15 pm, the struggling midget was spotted by a Maritime Services Board watchman, who rowed to the nearby patrol boat HMAS ''Yarroma'' to report it.
[33] The report was not passed on to Sydney Naval Headquarters until 9:52 pm.
HMA Ships ''Yarroma'' and ''Lolita'' were then ordered to investigate.
Upon confirming that the object in the net was a 'baby submarine', ''Lolita'' dropped three depth charges while
Yarroma's commander requested permission from Sydney Naval Headquarters to open fire.
[34] The depth charges failed to detonate, as the water was too shallow for the fuse setting.
At 10:35 pm, while ''Yarroma'' was waiting for permission to fire, the two crewmen on ''M-14'' activated a demolition charge, killing themselves and destroying the forward section of the submarine.
The general alarm, along with orders for ships to take anti-submarine measures, was given by Muirhead-Gould at 10:27 pm, and again at 10:36 pm.
Sydney Harbour was closed to arrivals and departures at the first alarm, but Muirhead-Gould ordered ferries and other internal traffic to continue operating, as he believed that having the extra vessels under way at speed within the harbour would help force any submarines to remain submerged.
Midget submarine ''M-24'' was the second to enter the harbour, crossing the indicator loop undetected at 9:48 pm, and at approximately 10 pm passed through the anti-submarine net by following a Manly ferry.
It passed quite close to the moored position of
USS ''Chicago'' off Garden Island, and at 10:52 pm the midget was spotted by a ''Chicago'' searchlight operator.
The ship opened fire with a 5 inch gun and a quadruple machinegun mount, but failed to significantly damage the submarine, as the weapons could not far enough.
[36] Some of the 5 inch shells hit the turret of
Fort Denison, and fragments were later found in the suburbs of
Cremorne and
Mosman.
[37] Fleeing west towards the
Sydney Harbour Bridge, ''M-24'' was also fired upon by HMA Ships
''Whyalla'' and
''Geelong'' before it was able to submerge and escape.
[38] Upon returning to periscope depth, the midget found itself to the west of
Fort Denison.
It turned and sailed east for about 1 mile (1.6 km), then took up a firing position south-west of
Bradley's Head, from where its commander could easily see ''Chicago'' against the construction floodlights at Garden Island’s new Captain Cook Graving Dock.
[39]
Midget submarine ''M-21'', from ''I-27'' is estimated to have entered the harbour at the same time that USS ''Chicago'' opened fire on ''M-24''.
[40] It was spotted by the unarmed auxiliary patrol boat HMAS ''Lauriana'', which illuminated the submarine's conning tower while sending an alert signal to the Port War Signal Station and the nearby anti-submarine vessel HMAS ''Yandra''.
''Yandra'' attempted to ram the submarine, lost contact, regained contact at 11:03 pm, and dropped six depth charges.
[41] At the time of the attack, it was assumed that the depth charges had destroyed or disabled the midget, but ''M-21'' had survived.
Historians believe that the midget probably took refuge on the harbour floor and waited until the Allied vessels had moved away before resuming the attack.
Muirhead-Gould did not order ships to observe
blackout conditions until 11:14 pm, and the Garden Island floodlights remained on until 12:25 am.
[42] Approximately 5 minutes later, ''M-24'' fired the first of its two torpedoes, which missed USS ''Chicago'' and passed underneath
Netherlands submarine ''K-IX'' and
HMAS ''Kuttabul'', then hit the breakwater ''Kuttabul'' was tied up against.
[43][44] The explosion split ''Kuttabul'' in half and sank her, and damaged ''K-IX''.
[45][46] 19
Royal Australian Navy and 2
Royal Navy sailors were killed, and another 10 sailors were wounded.
Residences in the area were shaken by the explosion, and Garden Island's lights and telecommunications were damaged.
The second torpedo was fired several minutes later, as the midget submarine lost longitudinal stability immediately after firing a torpedo.
[47] This torpedo also missed ''Chicago'', and ran aground on the eastern shore of Garden Island without exploding.
The midget then dived and moved to leave the harbour.
[48]
A crossing over the indicator loop that was recorded at 1:58 am was initially believed to be another midget submarine entering the harbour, although later analysis showed that the reading indicated an outbound vessel and was therefore most likely to be ''M-24'' exiting the harbour.
''M-24'' did not return to its mother submarine, and
its fate was unknown until 2006.
.jpg)
The unexploded torpedo at Garden Island several days after the attack.
USS ''Chicago'' left her anchorage at 2:14 am, leaving a sailor behind on the
mooring buoy.
Just before 3 am, as ''Chicago'' was leaving the harbour, the lookouts spotted a submarine periscope passing alongside the cruiser.
[50] At 3:01 am, an inbound signal registered on the indicator loop.
This was ''M-21'' re-entering Sydney Harbour after recovering from the attack four hours previous.
fired on ''M-21'' in
Neutral Bay at 3:50 am, and at 5 am, three auxiliary patrol boats: HMA Ships ''Steady Hour'', ''Sea Mist'', and ''Yarroma'', spotted the submarine's conning tower in
Taylors Bay.
The patrol boats had been ordered to set their depth charge fuses to 15 metres (49 ft), and when ''Sea Mist'' passed over where the submarine had just submerged and dropped a depth charge, she had only five seconds to clear the area.
''M-21'' was damaged by the blast, inverting and rising to the surface before sinking again.
[51] ''Sea Mist'' dropped a second depth charge, damaging one of her two engines in the process and preventing her from making further attacks.
''Steady Hour'' and ''Yarroma'' continued the attack, dropping seventeen depth charges on visual sightings and instrument contacts of the midget over the next three and a half hours.
At some point during the night, the crew of ''M-21'' committed suicide.
Secondary missions
As detailed in the operation plan, the five mother submarines waited off
Port Hacking on the nights of
1 June and
2 June for the midgets submarines to return.
FRUMEL picked up wireless traffic between the five Japanese submarines, and the
RAAF tasked three
Lockheed Hudsons and two
Bristol Beauforts with finding the source of the communications.
The five bombers were unsuccessful in locating the submarines.
On
June 3, Sasaki abandoned hope of recovering the midget submarines, and the submarines dispersed on their secondary missions.
Attacks on allied merchant shipping
Four of the submarines began operations against Allied merchant shipping. ''I-21'' patrolled north of Sydney Harbour, while ''I-24'' patrolled south of Sydney.
[53] ''I-27'' began searching off
Gabo Island for ships departing
Melbourne, and ''I-29'' travelled to
Brisbane.
''I-22'' left the group, to conduct reconnaissance operations at
Wellington and
Auckland in
New Zealand, then at
Suva in
Fiji.
Between
1 June and
25 June, when the four submarines arrived at
Kwajalein Atoll in the
Marshall Islands to re-supply before proceeding to Japanese shipyards for maintenance, the four submarines attacked at least seven Allied merchant vessels.
[54] Of these, three were sunk: ''Iron Chieftain'' by ''I-24'' on
3 June, ''Iron Crown'' by ''I-27'' on
4 June, and ''Guatemala'' by ''I-21'' on
12 June.
[55] This resulted in changes in merchant traffic to be implemented, with travel north of Melbourne restricted until a system of escorted convoy routes was established.
[56] ''I-21'' was the only submarine to return to Australian waters, sinking three ships and damaging two during January and February 1943, which made her the most successful Japanese submarine to
operate in Australian waters.
[57]
Bombardment
.jpg)
A house in Sydney's Eastern Suburbs damaged by a Japanese shell
On the morning of
8 June ''I-24'' and ''I-21'' briefly bombarded Sydney and
Newcastle.
[15] Just after midnight, ''I-24'' surfaced 9 miles (14.4 km) south-south-east of
Macquarie Lighthouse.
[59] The submarine's commander ordered the gun crew to target the
Sydney Harbour Bridge.
Ten shells were fired over a four minute period, nine landing in the
Eastern Suburbs and one landing in water.
[60] After the shots were fired, ''I-24''
crash dived, foiling attempts by coastal artillery batteries to target the submarine.
[61] Only one shell detonated, and the only injuries sustained were cuts and fractures from falling bricks or broken glass.
[62] Lt George Cantello, a
United States Army Air Forces pilot based at
Bankstown Airport, was ordered into the air, but was killed when he crashed his
Airacobra in a paddock at
Hammondville following engine failure.
[63] A memorial park was established in Hammondville in 1988, following efforts by residents and the US Consulate in Sydney.
At 2:15 am, ''I-21'' performed a similar attack against Newcastle, from 9 kilometres (5.6 mi) north–east of
Stockton Beach.
[64] 34 shells were fired over a sixteen minute period, eight of them
star shells.
Fire was returned by
Fort Scratchley—the only time an Australian land fortification has fired on an enemy warship during wartime—but the submarine was able to complete her bombardment and escape.
[65][66] Again, only a single shell detonated, in the middle of an empty park, no fatalities were recorded, and only light damage was done to property.
Analysis
The attack on Sydney Harbour revealed flaws in both the Allied defences and the Japanese tactics. The attack is considered to have ended in failure on both sides. During the primary attack the Japanese lost all three midget submarines in exchange for only a single barracks ship. The subsequent operations were no more successful, as the five large Japanese submarines sank only three merchant ships and caused minimal property damage during the two bombardments. Conversely, the performance of the Allied defenders was also poor, and the lack of damage in Sydney Harbour was attributed to "a combination of good luck and aggressive counter-attack".
As a result, the main impact of the midget submarine attack and subsequent operations was psychological; dispelling any belief that Sydney was immune to Japanese attack and highlighting Australia's proximity to the
Pacific War.
[67][68]
No official inquiry was made into the events, despite demand from some sections of the media, as it was believed it could lead to
defeatism and reduce faith in
John Curtin's government, particularly following the damaging inquiry into Australian defences which followed the
Japanese aerial attack on Darwin three months earlier.
[69]
Failures in Allied defences
The Allies did not respond adequately to the multiple warnings of Japanese activity off the east coast of Australia prior to the attack. Most of these warnings were explained away or simply ignored. The unsuccessful attack on the freighter ''Wellen'' on
16 May was attributed to a single submarine which departed Australian waters immediately after the attack.
[70] The first reconnaissance flight was unnoticed, and although
FRUMEL intercepted the report and distributed it on
30 May, it was apparently unrecognised by Muirhead-Gould.
[71] Radio chatter between the Japanese submarines was intercepted by
New Zealand naval authorities on
26 May and
29 May.
Although these transmissions could not be decrypted,
radio direction finding indicated that a submarine or submarines were approaching Sydney.
An anti-submarine patrol was considered in response to the
29 May fix, but it was not performed, as all anti-submarine craft were tasked with protecting a northbound troop convoy.
[25] The only response to the second reconnaissance flight on
29 May 1942 was to launch a group of search planes.
[73] No other defence measures were put into place.
The midget attack on
Diego Suarez in
Madagascar occurred on the morning of
31 May (Sydney time) but no alert was sent to other command regions, as the attack was believed at the time to be the responsibility of
Vichy France.
[74]
During the attack, there were several delays between events and responses to them. Over two hours passed between ''M-14'' being observed in the boom net and Muirhead-Gould's first order for ships to commence anti-submarine actions.
[75] It was two hours after this warning before the auxiliary patrol boats were mobilised and they did not leave their anchorage for a further hour.
Part of this delay was associated with the lack of effective communications.
[76] None of the auxiliary patrol craft in the harbour were equipped with radio communications, and all instructions and reports had to be made by signal lights via the Port War Signal Station or Garden Island, or by physical communication facilitated by
launches.
In Muirhead-Gould's preliminary report on the attack, he stated that the Port War Signal Station was not designed for the volume of communications traffic the attack caused.
[78] Telephone communications with Garden Island were unreliable during the early part of the attack, and were disabled after the first torpedo exploded.
[36] The need to keep information secret, promoted heavily by propaganda, may have also contributed to the delays and the scepticism shown by the defenders.
[80] As the auxiliary patrol boat crews, the indicator loop staff, and other personnel manning defensive positions would have been outside of 'need to know' and would not have been informed about any of the incidents prior to the attack, they would not have been alert, contributing to the disbelief demonstrated in the early hours of the attack.
Flaws in Japanese tactics
The main flaw in the Japanese plans was the use of midget submarines for the primary attack. Midget submarines were originally intended to operate during fleet actions; released from modified
seaplane carriers to run amok through the enemy fleet, sinking their ships as they were busy engaging the Japanese surface vessels.
[81] This concept went out of favour as changing Japanese naval thinking and experience led to recognition that naval warfare would be centred around
carrier-supported aerial combat.
As a result, the midget program's focus changed to the infiltration of enemy harbours, where they would attack vessels at anchor.
[82] This concept failed completely during the
Attack on Pearl Harbor when the midgets had no effect, and tying up 11 large submarines for six weeks in support of further midget submarine attacks on Sydney and Diego Suarez proved a waste of resources.
Moreover, the failure at Sydney and Diego Suarez demonstrated that the improvements to the midget submarines made after Pearl Harbor had not increased the overall impact of the midget program.
[19][84] The modifications had various effects. The ability to man and deploy the midgets while the mother ships were submerged prevented the Army coastal radars from detecting the mother submarines.
However, the submarines were still difficult to control, unstable, and prone to surfacing or diving uncontrollably.
[85] These manoeuvrability issues contributed to ''M-14's entrapment in the anti-submarine net, and the repeated detection of ''M-21'' and ''M-24''.
Beyond the use of the unreliable midgets, historians have identified areas in the plan of attack where significantly more damage could have been done if the Japanese had capitalised on the opportunities created. If the plan had called for a simultaneous, co-ordinated attack by the midget submarines, opposed to the piecemeal execution employed, the defences would have been overwhelmed.
[86] A chance for more damage came following the destruction of ''Kuttabul'', when several naval vessels headed to sea, including USS ''Chicago'', USS ''Perkins'', Netherlands submarine ''K-IX'', HMAS ''Whyalla'', and HMIS ''Bombay''.
[43] This was a missed opportunity for the five mother submarines, already at the recovery position off
Port Hacking, to sink several major warships as they exited
Sydney Heads.
[88]
USS ''Chicago's survival
Several factors beyond the control of any of the combatants contributed to the survival of USS ''Chicago''. At the time of
M-24's attack on ''Chicago'', the latter had spent some time preparing to depart Sydney Harbour, and although still moored and stationary, was producing large volumes of white smoke as the boilers warmed up.
[89] This smoke, streaming to the stern under the influence of the wind, and contrasting against the dark, low-lying cloud, may have given the impression that ''Chicago'' was moving, causing ''M-24'' to
lead the target when firing its torpedoes, and resulting in the misses across the bow.
[90] Another factor which may have influenced
Chicago's survival was the extinguishing of Garden Island's floodlights, which would have aided
M-24's targeting, minutes before the first torpedo was fired.
Bombardment impact
The bombardments failed to cause significant physical damage, but had a major psychological impact on the residents of Sydney and Newcastle. Due to the inaccuracy of the submarines' range-finding equipment, coupled with the unstable firing platform of a submarine at sea, specific targeting was impossible.
[64] The intention of the submarine bombardment was to frighten the population of the target area.
The failure of the majority of the shells to detonate was attributed to various causes. The fuses of the
armour piercing rounds carried by the submarines for use against steel ship hulls may not have been triggered by the less solid bricks and mortar of the buildings.
[92] The shells had been stored in the submarines' deck lockers for several weeks, and may have been affected by sea water.
The age of the shells may also have been a factor; some of the shells recovered from the Newcastle bombardment had been manufactured in England at the start of
World War I.
[93]
In Sydney, fear of an impending Japanese invasion caused people to move west, causing housing prices in the
Eastern Suburbs to drop, while those beyond the
Blue Mountains rose significantly.
[94] The attack also led to a significant increase in the membership of volunteer defence organisations, and defences in Sydney Harbour and Port Newcastle were strengthened.
[95]
Aftermath
The midget submarine attack on Sydney Harbour and the subsequent bombardments of Sydney and Newcastle are the only occasions these cities have come under direct attack from an enemy force.
News of the submarine attack was not published until Tuesday
2 June, as the majority of the attack occurred after the newspapers went to press on the morning on
1 June.
[67] Front page coverage on Monday was instead given to
Operation Millennium, the first 1,000-bomber raid performed by the
Royal Air Force, while several newspapers included a small interior article mentioning the
final reconnaissance flyover.
.jpg)
The burial service for the Australian sailors killed during the raid on Sydney
It was several days before the 21 dead aboard ''Kuttabul'' could be recovered.
[97] They were buried on
3 June, in a ceremony attended by Muirhead-Gould and over 200 personnel from the Royal Australian Navy.
The Navy base at Garden Island was commissioned as
HMAS ''Kuttabul'' on
1 January 1943, in commemoration of the ferry and the lives lost.
[98]
The two main targets of the attack,
USS ''Chicago'' and
HMAS ''Canberra'', were both lost within the next year: ''Canberra'' sinking on
9 August 1942 during the
Battle of Savo Island, and ''Chicago'' on
30 January 1943 following the
Battle of Rennell Island.
[99] None of the Japanese submarines involved in the attack survived the war. ''I-21'' was sunk on
4 February 1944 by
USS ''Charrette'' and
USS ''Fair'' off the
Marshall Islands, ''I-22'' on
December 25 1942 by an American torpedo boat off
New Guinea, ''I-24'' on
10 June 1943 by an American patrol craft near the
Aleutian Islands, ''I-27'' on
12 February 1943 by
HMS ''Paladin'' and
HMS ''Petard'' off the
Maldives, and ''I-29'' on
26 July 1944 by
USS ''Sawfish'' in the
Philippines.
[100]
''M-14'' and ''M-21''
The composite midget submarine at the Australian War Memorial
''M-14'' and ''M-21'' were recovered in the days following the attack.
[75] Although both had been damaged during the attack, it was possible to assemble a complete submarine from the two vessels.
This rebuilt submarine was mounted on a trailer and toured throughout southern
New South Wales,
Victoria, and western
South Australia.
The purpose of the tour was twofold; it allowed Australians to see a Japanese midget submarine and raised money for the Naval Relief Fund.
The submarine arrived at the
Australian War Memorial in
Canberra on
28 April 1943, flying the
White Ensign and a
paying-off pennant.
The composite submarine remains on display at the Memorial as part of a permanent exhibition on the attack.
[102] The leftover conning tower from ''M-21'' is on display at the
Royal Australian Navy Heritage Centre on Garden Island.
[103]
The four recovered Japanese bodies were cremated at Rookwood Cemetery; the Japanese flag was draped over each coffin and full naval honours were observed.
These observances drew criticism, but Muirhead-Gould defended his actions as respecting the courage of the four submariners, regardless of their origin.
[104] It was also hoped that the Japanese Government would notice the respect paid to the sailors and improve the conditions Australian prisoners-of-war were experiencing in Japanese internment camps.
[105] The funeral service was noted in Japan, but did not lead to any major improvement in Australian POW conditions.
An exchange of Japanese and Allied diplomatic personnel stranded in the opposing nations occurred in August 1942, allowing
Tatsuo Kawai, the Japanese ambassador to Australia, to return home with the ashes of the four Japanese submariners.
When the exchange ship ''Kamakura Maru'' arrived in
Yokohama, several thousand people were present to honour the four men.
[106]
Relatives of four of the Japanese sailors killed in the midget submarines which raided Sydney Harbour greet
''Kamakura Maru'' as she arrives at Yokohama with the ashes of the four submariners in October 1942
''M-24''
Following the disappearance of ''M-24'' after the attacks, numerous efforts were made to locate the third midget submarine. Over the sixty years following the attack, more than 50 people approached the Royal Australian Navy claiming to have found the submarine.
All of these claims were found to be false.
[107] One theory about the midget's fate was that it was damaged, along with ''M-21'' in or around Taylors Bay, which would account for reports from HMAS ''Steady Hour'' and HMAS ''Yarroma'' of multiple submarines during their three-hour effort against ''M-21''.
[108] A second theory stated that the midget attempted to return to the mother submarines but exhausted its battery power before reaching the Port Hacking recovery point and would therefore be found outside and to the south of Sydney Heads.
The third theory was that the midget's crew decided to avoid endangering the five larger submarines during the recovery process, and either ran straight out to sea or headed north to the
Hawkesbury River.
[109][110] The crew may also have set the midget to periscope depth to act as a decoy.
The mystery of ''M-24's'' fate was solved in November 2006, when a group of seven amateur scuba divers found a small submarine sitting upright on the seabed, approximately 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) from
Bungan Head, off
Sydney's Northern Beaches.
[111] Commander Shane Moore, the Royal Australian Navy officer responsible for the Navy's heritage collection, confirmed that the wreck was ''M-24'' after viewing footage from multiple dives, along with measurements taken by the group.
The wreck had several bullet holes in it, most likely from
Chicago's quadruple machinegun mount.
The coordinates of the wreck were kept secret and presented to Defence Minister
Brendan Nelson, who promised to have the wreck protected as a
war grave.
The wreck was
gazetted on
1 December 2006 as a heritage site.
A 500 metre (1,650 ft) wide exclusion zone has been established around the wreck site, and any vessels entering it can be subject to fines of up to A$1.1 million.
A ceremony honouring
M-24's crew was held aboard
HMAS ''Newcastle'' on
7 February 2007, with RAN
Vice Admiral Russ Shalders and
JMSDF Admiral
Eiji Yoshikawa attending.
[112] The ceremony was held as part of Admiral Yoshikawa's visit to observe the Royal Australian Navy.
Another ceremony was held on
6 August 2007 at
HMAS ''Kuttabul'' Naval Base, which was attended by relatives of the midget submarines' crews, one of the survivors from ''Kuttabul'', and dignitaries and military personnel from Australia and Japan.
[113] Relatives of
M-24's crew were then taken to the wreck site aboard
HMAS ''Melbourne'', where they poured
sake into the sea before being presented with sand taken from next to the submarine.
Footnotes
Some sources give the date of the reconnaissance flight as
29 May.
As this midget submarine was the only one not recovered, its specific designation is unknown, and is referred to differently in the various sources. Gill refers to it as ''Midget A'', Jenkins refers to it as ''Ban's midget'' (after the midget's commander, Sub–Lieutenant Katsuhisa Ban), and Carruthers refers to it as ''I-24'', naming it after the mother submarine. Numerous sources discussing the 2005 and 2006 findings (such as newspaper articles) refer to it as M-24 or M24. This designation is used in this article for consistency with the identified midget submarines and to avoid confusion with the mother submarine.
References
1. Jenkins (1992). p 161
2. ''Type B1'', CombinedFleet.com; ''Type C1'', CombinedFleet.com
3. Carruthers (2006). p 59
4. Jenkins (1992). p 163
5. Gill (1968). p 61
6. Gill (1968). pp 61–62
7. Gill (1968). p 62
8. Jenkins (1992). p 164
9. Carruthers (2006). p 30
10. Jenkins (1992). pp 193–194
11. Jenkins (1992). p 190
12. Stevens (2005). pp 192–194
13. Gill (1968). p 65
14. Stevens (2005). p 193
15. Stevens (2005). p 194
16. Fullford (1994). p 190
17. Carruthers (2006). p 177
18. Gill (1968). p 66; Jenkins (1992). p 194
19. Carruthers (2006). p 58
20. Morison (1949). p 68
21. Jenkins (1992). p 162
22. Gill (1968). p 65
23. Carruthers (2006). p 87
24. Jenkins (1992). pp 170-171
25. Stevens (2005). p 192
26. Gill (1968). p 64
27. Carruthers (2006). p 89
28. Jenkins (1992). pp 189–193
29. Jenkins (1992). p 205
30. Gill (1968). p 67
31. Jenkins (1992). p 206
32. Jenkins (1992). p 207
33. Jenkins (1992). p 208
34. Jenkins (1992). p 209
35. Jenkins (1992). p 210
36. Jenkins (1992). p 211
37. Cathcart (2004).
38. Jenkins (1992). p 212
39. Jenkins (1992). pp 212–214
40. Gill (1968). p 68
41. Jenkins (1992). p 213
42. Jenkins (1992). pp 213–214
43. Gill (1968). p 70
44. Jenkins (1992). pp 214–215
45. Carruthers (2006). p 143
46. Jenkins (1992). p 215
47. Jenkins (1992). p 214
48. Jenkins (1992). p 216
49. Carruthers (2006). p 189
50. Jenkins (1992). p 218
51. Jenkins (1992). p 219
52. Carruthers (2006). pp 88–89
53. Jenkins (1992). p 239
54. Jenkins (1992). p 254
55. Jenkins (1992). pgs 241, 244, 253
56. Stevens (2005). p 195
57. Jenkins (1992). pgs 254, 260–261
58. Stevens (2005). p 194
59. Jenkins (1992). p 247
60. Jenkins (1992). p 248
61. Jenkins (1992). pp 248–249
62. Jenkins (1992). p 249
63. ''P-400 Serial Number ?'', Pacific Wreck Database
64. Jenkins (1992). p 250
65. Vale (2002)
66. Jenkins (1992). p 251
67. Jenkins (1992). p 225
68. Gill (1968). p 74
69. Carruthers (2006). pgs 169, 176
70. Carruthers (2006). p 174
71. Jenkins (1992). pp 170–171
72. Stevens (2005). p 192
73. Jenkins (1992). p 193
74. Jenkins (1992). p 198
75. Gill (1968). p 72
76. Gill (1968). p 73
77. Carruthers (2006). p 176
78. Muirhead-Gould (1942). Reproduced in Carruthers (2006). p 244
79. Jenkins (1992). p 211
80. Fullford (1994). pp 194–195
81. Jenkins (1992). p 68
82. Jenkins (1992). p 71
83. Carruthers (2006). p 58
84. Jenkins (1992). p 291
85. Jenkins (1992). p 70
86. Fullford (1994). p 188
87. Gill (1968). p 70
88. Jenkins (1992). p 290
89. Carruthers (2006). p 137
90. Carruthers (2006). pgs 137–139
91. Jenkins (1992). p 250
92. Jenkins (1992). p 249
93. Carruthers (2006). p 197
94. Jenkins (1992). p 258
95. Nichols (2006a). p 28–29
96. Jenkins (1992). p 225
97. Carruthers (2006). p 151
98. Elbourne (2006).
99. Gill (1968). pgs 150–153, 273
100. Carruthers (2006). p 216
101. Gill (1968). p 72
102. ''Virtual Tour: ANZAC Hall'', Australian War Memorial
103. ''M24 Japanese Midget Submarine wreck site'', NSW Heritage Office Database
104. Jenkins (1992). p 230
105. Jenkins (1992). p 231
106. Jenkins (1992). p 232–233
107. McNicoll (2006).
108. Gill (1968). p 71
109. Jenkins (1992). p 217
110. Carruthers (2006). p 184
111. ''Found it!'' (2006).
112. Wurth (2007).
113. McNicoll (2007).
Bibliography
★
Japanese Submarine Raiders 1942: A maritime mystery, , Steven, Carruthers, Casper Publications, 2006,
★
Rewind (ABC-TV): Midget Subs
★
Wonderful Kuttabul - a long history of service
★
★
We Stood And Waited: Sydney's anti-ship defences 1939-1945, , Richard, Fullford, Royal Australian Artillery Historical Society, 1994,
★
Royal Australian Navy, 1942-1945, , G. Hermon, Gill, Australian War Memorial, , NLA registry number Aus 68-1798
★
Battle Surface! Japan's Submarine War Against Australia 1942-44, , David, Jenkins, Random House Australia, 1992,
★
Nine's midget submarine scoop scuttled
★
Ceremony ends missing sub saga D.D. McNicoll
★
History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Volume 4. Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions. May 1942 - August 1942, , Samuel Eliot, Morison, University of Illinois Press, 2001,
★
M24 Japanese Midget Submarine wreck site
★
Found at last Robert Nichols
★
The Night the War Came to Sydney, , Robert, Nichols, Wartime, 2006a
★
P-400 Serial Number ?
★
A Critical Vulnerability: The Impact of the Submarine Threat on Australia’s Maritime Defence (1915-1954), , David, Stevens, Sea Power Centre, 2005,
★
Type B1
★
Type C1
★
★
Virtual Tour: ANZAC Hall
★
Fallen submariners honored in Australia Bob Wurth
External links
★
Found It! - the
60 Minutes segment revealing the discovery of ''M-24''
★
Australia's War 1939-1945: Australia Attacked - Sydney Harbour Overview of the events. Includes an animation showing the events immediately prior to and during the attack.
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