BATTLE OF BREITENFELD (1631)

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The 'Battle of Breitenfeld' (; ) was a battle fought near Leipzig on September 7 (old style) September 17 (new style), 1631. Under the leadership of King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, the Protestant forces achieved their first major victory during the Thirty Years Wars.
The victory confirmed the Swedish king as a great tactical leader and induced many Protestant German states to ally with Sweden against Catholic Austria.

Contents

Gustavus reforms the army

Prelude

Forming up

Battle

Aftermath

References

Gustavus reforms the army

After coming to power, Gustavus had campaigned in Poland and Prussia with mixed results. Using "classical" formations of pike and shot and cavalry armed with pistols and sabres, Gustavus suffered a number of reverses at the hands of the Polish and Russian cavalry. After concluding a temporary peace and returning to Sweden, Gustavus set about reforming his army, first using the more modern "Dutch formations", and then adding several innovations of his own.
Primary among these was the abandoning of the traditional "pike square" for a more rectangular formation. In the traditional square, muskets at the rear or sides of the formation could not fire effectively due to the ranks in front. The Dutch had thinned out their formations to place more men at the front, a concept Gustavus took much further, turning his formations into rectangles only six ranks deep (as opposed to ten or more). Additionally, whereas the typical pike-and-shot formation placed the shot on the flanks of a full pike square in the middle, Gustavus placed most of the shot at the front, with the pike at the sides strictly in support. He also placed small cannons, or infantry guns among the units. This allowed them to continue to have cannon support even if the battalion became detached from the main force, and isolated from the field guns that were normally at the center of the field. These changes also made the formations much easier to maneuver on the battlefield; whereas the squares could easily turn to face a new direction, their line of march was typically fixed. Gustavus' formations could easily be re-aligned, although at the cost of some confusion while the pikemen reformed on the shot's flanks.
Another major change was to the cavalry. In traditional battle lines the cavalry lined up on either side of the primary infantry force, protecting their flanks. In most battles, the cavalry forces would attempt to drive off the opposing force, exposing the infantry's flank. In order to upset the balance of what was largely one-on-one combat, Gustavus mixed musketmen among the cavalry in their "starting positions" on the flanks. This allowed opposing cavalry to be attacked at long range, before their pistols became useful. Normally detached infantry would be easily run down, but by being placed in the midst of the cavalry, if the opposing force did rush they would do so right into the Swedish cavalry's own pistols.

Prelude

Gustavus was considered a minor concern in western Europe, as his only battles to this point were the inconclusive ones against the Poles. When he landed with a force of 13,000 men at Peenemünde in 1630, the commander of the Imperial Commander and Champion of the German Catholic League, Tilly, did not immediately respond, being engaged in what seemed to be more pressing matters. Over the next few months Gustavus was able to consolidate his bridgehead and moved to expand out across northern Germany, gaining mercenary forces along the way and expanding his army to 24,000 men.
In late August 1631 Tilly invaded Electoral Saxony in hopes of forcing its ruler, John George I, to abandon an alliance he planned to conclude with Gustavus. The Swedish king responded by uniting his army with the elector's 18,000-man forces, hoping to fight Tilly and force him to leave Saxony. Tilly arrayed his forces north of Leipzig at Breitenfeld and prepared to meet Gustavus Adolphus.

Forming up

The Imperial and Catholic League forces arranged their army in regiments of infantry and cavalry. The infantry formed up in large blocks of about 1500 men each, with a front of 150 men and a depth of 10 men. The center comprised pikemen with supporting units of musketeers on each flank. The Imperial army comprised fourteen such formations, twelve arranged in groups of three blocks, with the center block placed slightly ahead of the other two. The final two regiments were attached one each to the right and left wings. The cavalry was drawn up on each flank; Pappenheim commanding the left, and Fürstenburg, the right. The left flank was close by Breitenfeld; the right, by Seehausen. Tilly had no reserves except for some cavalry placed behind his infantry.
Gustavus Adolphus, however, arranged his forces in two long lines. Each line was five men deep for pikemen, and six men deep for musketeers. The use of linear tactics enabled Gustavus to create a front that matched Tilly's, while still giving him troops to keep in reserve. The Elector of Saxony arranged his forces in the traditional formation on the Swedish left, and all commanders placed most of their cavalry on their flanks. Since the Swedish and Saxon forces deployed separately, this placed cavalry in their center as well as on their flanks.

Battle

The battle began around noon with a two hour exchange of artillery fire, during which the Swedish fire power was demonstrated in a rate of fire of three-to-five volleys to one. This uneven exchange ended when Count Pappenheim led a charge of the heavy cavalry on Tilly's left. These cuirassiers advanced seven times, but each time was turned back by the Swedes, who's muskets proved upsetting. Swedish reserve cavalry were also able to extend the Swedish line and countercharge with sabers against the Imperial cavalry. Following the defeat of his seventh assault, Pappenheim and his cavalry quit the field in disarray, retreated to Halle. He was initially pursued by some Swedish cavalry, but these were called back by Gustavus while the Swedish guns continued to pound the troops of the Catholic League.

During this time, Tilly's infantry remained stationary, but then the cavalry on his right charged the Saxon cavalry and routed it towards Eilenburg. Seeing an opportunity, Tilly sent the majority of his infantry against the remaining Saxon forces in an oblique march diagonally across his front, and the whole Saxon body fled the field and stopped only briefly to loot the Swedish camp.

Tilly thus defeated forty percent of his enemy and was poised to deliver a devastating flank attack on the Swedish forces. As Tilly was ordering his infantry to roll up the Swedish line, however, Gustavus was able to reorder his second line into an array at a right angle to the front, in a maneuver known as refusing the flank.

While this was taking place, the Swedish cavalry (the Finnish Hakkapeliittas) re-formed, and then attacked across the former front to capture the Imperial artillery. This freed up the Swedish field guns, along with captured Imperial guns, who re-deployed into a new line on what was now the extreme right flank of the developing battle. With these guns cutting into one end of Tilly's line, and the Swedish center showing no signs of breaking, the exchange of gunfire soon wore down the Imperial troops, and their lines broke. Tilly was injured in ensuing retreat.

Aftermath

The Battle of Breitenfeld served as major endorsement of the linear tactics of Gustavus Adolphus. He was able to inflict more than sixty percent casualties on his opponent, and made up his own losses in recruited prisoners. After the battle, the Catholic League or ''Imperial army'' under Tilly only had 6,000 men left. Gustavus Adolphus, on the other hand, had a greater army after the battle than before. The battle's outcome also had the political effect of convincing Protestant states to join his cause. France later supported the militarily strong but economically weak Sweden—from 1630 to 1632, the cost of Gustavus' army was shorted by 80%, but the strength was increased to over 350%.

References

★ C.V. Wedgwood, ''The Thirty Years War'' (New York: Book of the Month Club, 1995)

★ Richard A. Preston, et al., ''Men in Arms,'' 5th ed., (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1991)

★ Archer Jones, ''The Art of War in the Western World'' (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987)