(Redirected from Colonial War)
FAP's heli operating in an African theatre during the Overseas War
Portuguese colonies in Africa by the time of the Colonial War
The 'Portuguese Colonial War' (), also ''Overseas War'' () or, among some guerrilla sympathizers, ''Guinea-Bissauan Revolution'', was fought between
Portugal's military and the emerging nationalist movements in
Portugal's African colonies between
1961 and
1974. Unlike other European nations, the
Portuguese regimen did not leave its
African colonies, or the overseas provinces (''províncias ultramarinas''), during the 1950s and 1960s. During the
1960s, various armed independence movements, most prominently by
communist parties who cooperated under the
CONCP umbrella, became active in these areas, most notably in
Angola,
Mozambique, and
Portuguese Guinea. An increasingly expensive military effort costing up to half its government's revenue, and popular discontent at mainland over the Portuguese government and the war against the African independentist
guerrillas, led to the bloodless
Carnation Revolution on
25 April,
1974 in
Lisbon. In Portugal this soon lead to a democratic government. This also caused Portugal to end the war. The fighting in Africa ended in a high-priced stalemate for both parts involved in the conflict, the exodus of thousands of Portuguese citizens and military personnel (from both European and African ethnicity) from the newly-independent African territories to Portugal, and local civil wars in the former Portuguese territories of
Angola and
Mozambique which would last several decades.
Portugal had been the first European power to establish a colony in Africa when it captured
Ceuta in 1415 and now it was one of the last to leave. The departure of the Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique helped to isolate the renegade British colony of
Rhodesia, leading to the end of its
white minority rule in 1980. Portugal presided over the longest-lasting
European colonies in Africa, where after the abolition of
slavery, with varying degrees of social assent,
forced labour was eventually allowed to be continually imposed on certain social strata of the
indigenous population for commercial farming of cash crops, forestry, and mining precious minerals until
1961,
[1] the same year the conflict erupted.
Political context
There had always been opposition and
resistance movements in the European colonies in Africa and Asia. During the
twentieth century, nationalist feelings were strengthened by
World War I and
World War II. Many soldiers who fought in these conflicts were recruited in the colonies and were aware of the paradox of their colonial masters celebrating victory at the same time as their native lands lay under foreign rule.
Following World War II the two great powers, the
United States and the
Soviet Union, encouraged — both ideologically and materially — the formation of
nationalist resistance groups. At first the United States offered to support the nationalists in Angola but backed down when Portugal threatened to leave
NATO. The nationalists then sought money, expertise and weapons from the
Soviet Union,
Cuba and
China.
It is in this context that the
Asian-African Conference was held in
Bandung,
Indonesia in
1955. The conference presented a forum for the colonies, most of them newly independent and facing the same problem - pressure to align with one or the other
superpower in the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the conference the colonies were presented with an alternative. They could band together as the so-called
Third World and work both to preserve the balance of power in
Cold War relations and to use their new sense of independence for their own benefit by becoming an influence zone of their own. This would lessen the effect of the colonial and neo-colonial powers on the colonies, and increased their sense of unity and desire to support each other in their relationships with the other powers.
In the late
1950s, the
Portuguese Armed Forces saw themselves confronted with the paradox generated by the dictatorial regime of
Estado Novo that had been in power since 1926: on the one hand, the policy of Portuguese neutrality in World War II placed the Portuguese Armed Forces out of the way of a possible
East-West conflict; on the other hand, the regime felt the increased responsibility of the keeping Portugal's vast overseas territories under control. There the postwar tension approached the level of the separatist fights in the colonies of Imperial Europe. With all this, the same leaders that declared Portugal neutral in the war for ''European liberation'' chose to have Portugal join the military structure of
NATO, in a subtle desire to ally with the victors. This was to the detriment of military preparations against nationalist threats in Portugal's colonial territories that the political regime considered essential for the survival of the nation.
This integration of Portugal in the Atlantic Alliance would form a military élite that would become essential during the planning and implementation of the operations during the Overseas War. This "''NATO generation''" would ascend quickly to the highest political positions and military command without having to provide evidence of loyalty to the regime. The Colonial War would establish, in this way, a split between the military structure -- heavily influenced by the western powers with democratic governments -- and the political power of the regime. Some analysts see the "
Botelho Moniz côup as the beginning of this rupture, the origin of a lapse on the part of the regime to keep up a unique command center, an armed force prepared for threats of conflict in the colonies. This situation would cause, as would be verified later, a lack of coordination between the three general staffs (
Army,
Air Force and
Navy).
Armed conflict
The conflict began in
Angola on
4 February,
1961, in an area called the ''Zona Sublevada do Norte'' (ZSN or the Rebel Zone of the North), consisting of the provinces of
Zaire,
Uíge and
Cuanza Norte. The
liberation movements wanted national
self-determination, while for the Portuguese, who had settled in Africa and ruled considerable territory since the
15th century, their belief in a multi-racial, assimilated overseas empire justified going to war to prevent its breakup. As the war progressed, Portugal rapidly increased its
mobilized forces. Under a right-wing dictatorship, a highly militarized population was maintained where all the males were obliged to serve three years in military service, and many of those called-up to active military duty were deployed to combat zones in Portugal's African overseas provinces. By the early
1970s, it had reached the limit of its military capacity. Growing popular discontent over the war led to the
Carnation Revolution on
25 April,
1974 in
Lisbon, Portugal, an event which changed Portugal's political direction and allowed the war to end. Portugal's new leaders began a process of
democratic change at home and acceptance of its former colonies' independence abroad.
Angola
Portuguese soldiers in
Angola.
In
Angola, the rebellion of the ZSN was taken up by the União das Populações de Angola (UPA), which changed its name to
Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) in 1962. On
February 4 1961, the
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola took credit for the attack on the prison of Luanda, where seven policemen were killed. On
March 15,
1961, the UPA, in a tribal attack, started the massacre of white populations and black workers born in other regions of Angola. This region would be retaken by large military operations that, however, would not stop the spread of the
guerrilla actions to other regions of Angola, such as
Cabinda, the east, the southeast and the central plateaus.
Angola was the most successful campaign of the Colonial War (by 1974 it was clear that Portugal was winning the war in Angola), due to various factors. The country is large and the distance between the countries supporting the nationalist groups (the
Democratic Republic of the Congo and
Zambia) and the populated areas were big (so big in fact that the east part of the country was called ''Terras do Fim do Mundo'' (Lands of the End of the World) by the Portuguese); the three nationalist groups (
FNLA,
MPLA and
UNITA) spent as much time fighting each other as they did fighting the Portuguese and the strategy of
General Costa Gomes that the war was to be fought not just by the military but also involving civilian organisations led to a successful
hearts and minds campaign.
South Africa gave a lot of support to the Portuguese war effort in Angola; the Portuguese even referred to their South African counterparts as ''primos'' (cousins).
Angola also saw the development of unique and successful units:
★ the
Comandos were born out of the war in Angola and later used in Guinea and Mozambique
★ the
Special Hunters (''Caçadores Especiais'') were already in Angola when the war began, in 1961
★ the Faithfuls (''Fiéis''): a force composed by
Katanga exiles, black soldiers that opposed the rule of
Mobutu
★ the Loyals (''Leais''): a force composed by exiles from
Zambia, black soldiers that were against
Kenneth Kaunda
★ the Special Groups (''Grupos Especiais''): units of volunteer black soldiers that had commando training; also used in Mozambique
★ the Special Troops (''Tropas Especiais''): the name of the Special Groups in
Cabinda
★ the ''Flechas'' (Arrows): a very successful unit, controlled by the
PIDE/DGS, composed by
Bushmen, that specialized in tracking, reconnaissance and pseudo-terrorist operations. They were the basis for the Rhodesian
Selous Scouts. The ''Flechas'' were also employed in Mozambique.
★ the 1st Cavalry Group (''Grupo de Cavalaria Nº1''): a
horseback unit, armed with the
Heckler & Koch G3, tasked with reconnaissance and
patrolling. It was also known as "Angolan
Dragoons" (''Dragões de Angola''). The Rhodesians would develop also this concept, forming the
Grey's Scouts.
★ the 1927 Cavalry Battalion (''Batalhão de Cavalaria 1927'') - a
tank unit, equipped with the
M5A1 tank it was used for supporting infantry forces and as a
rapid reaction force. Again the Rhodesians would copy this concept forming the Rhodesian Armoured Car Regiment.
Guinea-Bissau
PAIGC emblem
A PAIGC soldier with an AK-47
PAIGC's checkpoint in 1974
In Guinea-Bissau, the
Marxist African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) started fighting in January 1963. Its
guerrilla fighters attacked the Portuguese headquarters in
Tite, located to the south of
Bissau, the capital, near the Corubal river. Similar actions quickly spread across the entire colony, requiring a strong response from the Portuguese forces.
The war in Guinea placed face to face
Amílcar Cabral, the leader of PAIGC, and
António de Spínola, the Portuguese general responsible for the local military operations. In 1965 the war spread to the eastern part of the country and in that same year the PAIGC carried out attacks in the north of the country where at the time only the minor guerrilla movement, the
Front for the Liberation and Independence of Guinea (FLING), was fighting. By that time, the PAIGC started receiving military support from the
Socialist Bloc, mainly from
Cuba, a support that would last until the end of the war.
In Guinea, the Portuguese troops mainly took a defensive position, limiting themselves to keeping the territories they already held. This kind of action was particularly devastating to the Portuguese troops who were constantly attacked by the forces of the PAIGC. They were also demoralized by the steady growth of the influence of the liberation supporters among the population that was being recruited in large numbers by the PAIGC.
With some strategic changes by António Spínola in the late 1960s, the Portuguese forces gained momentum and, taking the offensive, became a much more effective force. In 1970, Portugal attempted to overthrow
Sekou Toure (with the support of Guinean exiles) in the Operation "''Mar Verde''" (Green Sea). The objectives were: perform a
coup d'etat in
Guinea-Conakry; destroy the PAIGC naval and air assets; capture
Amilcar Cabral and free portuguese
POWs held in
Conakry. The operation was a failure, with only the POW rescue and the destruction of PAIGC ships being successful.
Nigeria and
Algeria offered support to Guinea-Conakry and the
Soviet Union sent war ships to the area (known by NATO as the West Africa Patrol).
Between 1968 and 1972, the Portuguese forces took control of the situation and sometimes carried attacks against the PAIGC positions. At this time the Portuguese forces were also adopting subversive means to counter the insurgents, attacking the political structure of the nationalist movement. This strategy culminated in the assassination of Amílcar Cabral in January 1973. Nonetheless, the PAIGC continued to fight back and pushed the Portuguese forces to the limit. This became even more visible after PAIGC received
anti-aircraft weapons provided by the Soviets, especially the
SA-7 rocket launchers, thus undermining the Portuguese air superiority.
The war in Guinea is considered "Portugal's Vietnam". The PAIGC was well trained, led and equipped and the neighbouring countries (
Senegal and specially
Guinea-Conakry) were perfect bases for the guerrilla.
The war in Guinea also saw the use of two unique units:
★ African Commandos (''Comandos Africanos''):
Commando units entirely composed by black soldiers, including the officers
★ African Special Marines (''Fuzileiros Especiais Africanos''):
Marine units entirely composed by black soldiers
Mozambique
Main articles: Mozambican War of Independence
Mozambique was the last territory to start the war of liberation. Its nationalist movement was led by the
Marxist-Leninist Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which carried out the first attack against Portuguese targets on
September 24 1964, in
Chai,
Cabo Delgado Province. The fighting later spread to
Niassa,
Tete at the centre of the country. A report from Battalion No. 558 of the Portuguese army makes references to violent actions, also in Cabo Delgado, on
August 21,
1964.
On
November 16 of the same year, the Portuguese troops suffered their first losses fighting in the north of the country, in the region of
Xilama. By this time, the size of the guerrilla movement had substantially increased; this, along with the low numbers of Portuguese troops and colonists, allowed a steady increase in FRELIMO's strength. It quickly started moving south in the direction of
Meponda and
Mandimba, linking to Tete with the aid of
Malawi.
Until 1967 the FRELIMO showed less interest in Tete region, putting its efforts on the two northernmost districts of the country where the use of
landmines became very common. In the region of Niassa, FRELIMO's intention was to create a free corridor to
Zambézia. Until April 1970, the military activity of FRELIMO increased steadily, mainly due to the strategic work of Samora Machel in the region of Cabo Delgado.
The war in Mozambique saw a great involvement of
Rhodesia, supporting the Portuguese troops in operations and even conducting operations independently. But by the 70s, Portugal was clearly losing the war. The Operation "''Nó Górdio''" (Gordian Knot) - conducted in 1970 - a conventional-style operation to destroy the guerrilla bases in the north of Mozambique, was a failure and even worsened the situation; the construction of the
Cahora Bassa Dam tied up large numbers of Portuguese troops (near 50% of all the troops in Mozambique) and brought the FRELIMO to the
Tete Province, closer to the cities and more populated areas in the south. Still, although the FRELIMO tried to halt and stop the construction of the dam, it was never able to do so. In 1974, the FRELIMO launched mortar attacks against Vila Pery (now
Chimoio) an important city and the first (and only) heavy populated area to be hit by the FRELIMO.
In Mozambique unique units were also used:
★ the Special Groups (''Grupos Especiais''): units similar to the ones used in Angola
★ the Paratrooper Special Groups (''Grupos Especiais Pára-Quedistas''): units of volunteer black soldiers that had paratrooper training
★ the Combat Tracking Special Groups (''Grupos Especiais de Pisteiros de Combate''): special units trained in tracking
★ the ''Flechas'': a unit similar to the one employed in Angola
Role of the Organisation of African Unity
The
Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded May 1963. Its basic principles were co-operation between African nations and solidarity between African peoples. Another important objective of the OAU was an end to all forms of colonialism in Africa. This became the major objective of the organization in its first years and soon OAU pressure led to the situation in the Portuguese colonies being brought up at the
UN Security Council.
The OAU established a committee based in
Dar es Salaam, with representatives from
Ethiopia,
Algeria,
Uganda,
Egypt,
Tanzania,
Zaire,
Guinea,
Senegal and
Nigeria, to support African liberation movements. The support provided by the committee included military training and weapon supplies.
The OAU also took action in order to promote the international acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE), composed by the
FNLA. This support was transferred to the
MPLA and to its leader,
Agostinho Neto in 1967. In November of 1972, both movements were recognized by the OAU in order to promote their merger. After 1964, the OAU recognized PAIGC as the legitimate representatives of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde and in 1965 recognised
FRELIMO for Mozambique.
Armament and support
Portugal
When the war began, in 1961, the Portuguese forces were badly equipped to cope with the demands of a counter-insurgency conflict. It was standard procedure, up to that point, to send the oldest and obsolete material to the colonies. Thus, the first military operations were conducted using
World War II radios and the old
Mauser rifle. The
Portuguese Army rapidly saw the need for a modern
battle rifle and adopted the
Heckler & Koch G3 as the standard rifle of the military (although several
FN FAL rifles were also issued). The Paratroopers rarely used the G3, instead adopting the
AR-10, until a collapsible stock version of the G3 rifle became available. For the
machine-gun role, the
MG42 was used until 1968, when the
HK21 became available. Some
submachine guns (specially the
Uzi) were also used, mainly by reserve and Cavalry troops. Support weapons were also employed, ranging from the
Bazooka to 60, 81, and later, 120 mm
mortars and even
howitzers. Several
armored cars were also used:
Panhard AML,
Panhard EBR,
Fox and (in the 70s) the
Chaimite.
Unlike the
Vietnam War, Portugal's low budget could not afford a general use of the
helicopter. Only those troops involved in
raids (also called ''golpe de mão'' (hand blow) in Portuguese) - mainly
Commandos and Paratroopers - would deploy by helicopter. Most deployments were either on foot or in vehicles (
Berliet and
Unimog trucks). The helicopters were reserved for support (in a
gunship role) or
MEDEVAC. The
Alouette III was the most widely used helicopter, although the
Puma was also used with great success. Other aircraft were employed: for
air support the
T6 and the
Fiat G.91 were used; for
reconnaissance the
Dornier Do 27 was employed. In the transport role, the
Portuguese Air Force used mainly the
Nord Noratlas and the
C-47 (both were also used for the deployment of Paratroopers).
The
Portuguese Navy (particularly the
Marines) made extensive use of patrol boats,
landing craft, and
Zodiac boats. They were employed specially in Guinea, but also in the
Congo River (and other smaller rivers) in Angola and in the
Zambezi (and other rivers) in Mozambique. They even used small patrol crafts in the
Lake Malawi.
The Navy also used Portuguese civilian
cruisers as troop transports, and drafted
Portuguese Merchant Navy personnel to man ships carrying troops and material.
Most weaponry was purchased from
France,
West Germany and
South Africa and, to a lesser extent,
Belgium and
Israel.
Guerrilla movements
The armament of the nationalist groups was mainly from the
Eastern block and (specially in Mozambique)
China, but they also used western armaments (such as the
Thompson submachine gun, and British, French and German weapons). All guerrillas used roughly the same weaponry: the
Mosin-Nagant bolt-action rifle,
SKS and
AK47 automatic rifles (the latter was only issued to the best guerilla units and even Portuguese soldiers used captured AK47s because they were considered superior to the G3), and the
PPSh-41 submachine gun. The guerrilla movements also made extensive use of machine guns: the
Degtyarev light machine gun was the most widely used, together with the
DShK and the
SG-43 Gorunov heavy machine guns. The support weapons used were the mortars,
recoilless rifles,
RPG-2 and specially the
RPG-7 (again considered superior to the Portuguese counterpart, the bazooka).
Anti-aircraft weapons were also employed, specially by the
PAIGC and the
Frelimo. The
ZPU-4 was the most widely used, but by far the most effective was the
Strela 2, introduced in Guinea in 1973 and in Mozambique in 1974.
Mines were one of the most successful weapons of the guerrilla movements, and the most feared weapon by the Portuguese forces. All guerrillas used a variety of mines, combining
anti-tank with
anti-personnel mines with devastating results, successfully undermining the mobility of the Portuguese forces. Some mines that were used includes the
PMN (Black Widow),
TM-46, and
POMZ. Even amphibious mines were used such as the
PDM.
The PAIGC was the better armed, trained and led of all the guerrilla movements. By 1970 it had members in the
Soviet Union learning how to fly
MIGs and soviet-supplied amphibious assault crafts and
APCs.
Opposition
The government presented as a general consensus that the colonies were a part of the national unity, closer to overseas provinces than to true colonies. The
communists were the first party to oppose the official view, since they saw the Portuguese presence in the colonies as an act against the colonies' right to
self determination. During its 5th Congress, in 1957, the illegal
Portuguese Communist Party (''Partido Comunista Português'' - PCP) was the first political organization to demand the immediate and total independence of the colonies. However, being the only truly organized opposition movement, the PCP had to play two roles. One role was that of a communist party with an anti-colonialist position; the other role was to be a cohesive force drawing together a broad spectrum of opposing parties. Therefore it had to accede to views that didn't reflect its true anticolonial position.
Several opposition figures outside the PCP also had anticolonial opinions, such as the candidates to the fraudulent presidential elections, like
Norton de Matos (in 1949),
Quintão Meireles (in 1951) and
Humberto Delgado (in 1958). The communist candidates had, obviously, the same positions. Among them were
Rui Luís Gomes and
Arlindo Vicente, the first would not be allowed to participate in the election and the second would support Delgado in 1958.
After the electoral fraud of
1958, Humberto Delgado formed the
Independent National Movement (''Movimento Nacional Independente'' - MNI) that, in October of
1960, agreed that there was a need to prepare the people in the colonies, before giving them the right of self-determination. Despite this, no detailed policies for achieving this goal were set out.
In
1961, the nº8 of the ''Military Tribune'' had as its title "''Let's end the war of Angola''". The authors were linked to the
Patriotic Action Councils (''Juntas de Acção Patriótica'' - JAP), supporters of Humberto Delgado, and responsible for the attack on the
barracks of Beja. The
Portuguese Front of National Liberation (''Frente Portuguesa de Libertação Nacional'' - FPLN), founded in December
1962, attacked the conciliatory positions. The official feeling of the Portuguese state, despite all this, was the same: Portugal had inalienable and legitimate rights over the colonies and this was what was transmitted through the media and through the state propaganda.
In April
1964, the Directory of Democratic-Social Action (''Acção Democrato-Social'' - ADS) presented a political solution rather than a military one. In agreement with this initiative in
1966,
Mário Soares suggested there should be a referendum on the overseas policy Portugal should follow, and that the referendum should be preceded by a national discussion to take place in the six months prior to the referendum.
The end of Salazar's rule in 1968, due to illness, did not prompt any change in the political panorama. The radicalization of the opposition movements started with the younger people who also felt victimized by the continuation of the war. The
universities played a key role in the spread of this position. Several magazines and newspapers were created, such as ''Cadernos Circunstância'', ''Cadernos Necessários'', ''Tempo e Modo'', and ''Polémica'' that supported this view. It was in this environment that the
Armed Revolutionary Action (''Acção Revolucionária Armada'' - ARA), the armed branch of the Portuguese Communist party created in the late 1960s, and the
Revolutionary Brigades (''Brigadas Revolucionárias'' - BR), a left-wing organization, became an important force of resistance against the war, carrying out multiple acts of sabotage and bombing against military targets. The ARA began its military actions in October of
1970, keeping them up until August of
1972. The major actions were the attack on the Tancos air base that destroyed several helicopters on
March 8 1971, and the attack on the
NATO headquarters at
Oeiras in October of the same year. The BR, on its side, began armed actions on
7 November 1971, with the sabotage of the NATO base at
Pinhal de Armeiro, the last action being carried out
9 April 1974, against the
Niassa ship which was preparing to leave Lisboa with troops to be deployed in
Guinea. The BR acted even in the colonies, placing a bomb in the Military Command of Bissau on
22 February1974.
Furthermore, the alliance of the business and financial sectors, middle classes and workers' movements made an important mark on the policy of the regime in
1973. They now were supporting the independence of the colonies, a few months before the
Carnation Revolution.
Economic consequences of the war
Evolution of the expenditure of the Portuguese state with the military during the war
The
State Budget during the 1960s and the 1970s clearly expressed the Portuguese financial sacrifice in order to keep fighting in Africa. Obviously the country's expenditure on the armed forces ballooned since the beginning of the war in 1961. The expenses were divided into ordinary and extraordinary ones; the latter were the main factor in the huge increase in the military budget, making war in the colonies a severe financial burden. Since the rise of
Marcelo Caetano, after Salazar's incapacitation, spending on military forces increased even further.
See also
★
Angolan War of Independence
★
Mozambican War of Independence
★
Rhodesian Bush War
★
South African Border War
★
Carnation Revolution
★
Comandos
★
CTOE
★
Portuguese Armed Forces
★
Military history of Africa
----
References
1. [1], "...only in 1961 did it abolish forced labour in its largest African colony.", The Guardian, retrieved February 2007
Bibliography
★
Becket, Ian et all., ''A Guerra no Mundo'', ''Guerras e Guerrilhas desde 1945'', Lisboa, Verbo, 1983
★
Marques, A. H. de Oliveira, ''História de Portugal'', 6ª ed., Lisboa, Palas Editora, Vol. III, 1981
★
Mattoso, José, ''História Contemporânea de Portugal'', Lisboa, Amigos do Livro, 1985, «Estado Novo», Vol. II e «25 de Abril», vol. único
★ Mattoso, José, ''História de Portugal'', Lisboa, Ediclube, 1993, vols. XIII e XIV
★
Pakenham, Thomas, ''
The Scramble for Africa'', Abacus, 1991 ISBN 0-349-10449-2
★
Reis, António, ''Portugal Contemporâneo'', Lisboa, Alfa, Vol. V, 1989;
★
Rosas, Fernando e
Brito, J. M. Brandão, ''Dicionário de História do Estado Novo'', Venda Nova, Bertrand Editora, 2 vols. 1996
★ Vários autores, ''Guerra Colonial'', edição do Diário de Notícias
★ ''Jornal do Exército'', Lisboa, Estado-Maior do Exército
★ Cann, John P, ''Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961-1974'', Hailer Publishing, 2005
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