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The 'Contras' is a generic term for various armed groups opposing of Nicaragua's FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional) Sandinista Junta of National Reconstruction following the July 1979 overthrow of Anastasio Somoza Debayle, and continuing through the eighties.
The term Contra is short for the Spanish term ''contrarevolucionario'', in English "counter-revolutionaries", and was used in distinction to their opponents nickname, the ''Compas'', short for ''compañeros'' ("comrades").
The Contras were initially organised, with US and Argentine support, by supporters of the overthrown Somoza regime who had served in his notorious National Guard. Over time the Contras came to include a number of other groups, each one essentially independent. Different groups of Contras had different aims and little ideological unity.
In the first years of their activity, led by former members of the National Guard, the Contras were involved in widespread murder, torture and brutality. By the end of the eighties moderate elements in the Contras had succeeded in marginalising or removing many of the brutal and corrupt elements inherited from Somoza's National Guard.
At certain times during their existence the Contras received considerable US financial and technical support, at other times the US Congress wished to distance itself and withdrew all support.
Some references use the uncapitalized form, "contra", which means "against" or "counter" in Spanish.

Contents

History

Human rights abuses

U.S. military and financial assistance

See also

References

Notes

External links

History

The Contras initially received financial and military support from the Argentine government and the US through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Contras would later receive aid through clandestine initiatives by figures in the administration of President Ronald Reagan. They received some support from Nicaraguans opposed to the Sandinistas' collectivisation of their land and the alleged imprisonment and torture of dissidents.
Early opposition to the Sandinistas comprised many disparate strands. Though the escaped remnants of Somoza's Guardia Nacional (Nicaragua) disintegrated as a unified force, many members formed groups such as the Anti-Sandinista Guerrilla Special Forces, the 15th of September Legion, and the National Army of Liberation. The core leadership was initially dominated by former Guardia NCOs.
Meanwhile, some of the Nicaraguan middle class, whose discontent with Somoza had led them to back the Sandinistas, had soon become disillusioned by Sandinista rule. Businessman José Francisco Cardenal went into exile and founded the Nicaraguan Democratic Union (UDN), with the Nicaraguan Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARN) as its armed wing.
The earliest Contras inside Nicaragua were MILPAS, peasant militias led by disillusioned Sandinistas. These militias were the majority of the first Contra groups formed in 1980-1981 in Honduras, Nicaragua's northern neighbour, allying in August 1981 as the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (''Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense'', FDN) under the command of former National Guard (army) colonel Enrique Bermúdez and Jaime Irving Steidel, a Honduran-born Field Commander, later replaced by Oscar Sobalvarro. A joint political directorate was created in February 1983 under businessman and anti-Sandinista politician Adolfo Calero.
The creation of the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) and its armed wing, the Sandino Revolutionary Front (FRS), in April 1982 saw a second front open in the war. The group was founded in neighboring Costa Rica by Edén Pastora (''Comandante Cero''), a former Sandinista and participant in the August 1978 seizure of Somoza's palace. ARDE consisted largely of Sandinista dissidents and veterans of the anti-Somoza campaign who opposed the increased influence of Soviet Union, Eastern block and Cuban officials in the Managua junta. Proclaiming his ideological distance from the FDN, Pastora nevertheless styled his force the "southern front" in a common campaign.
A third force, Misurasata, appeared among the Miskito, Sumo and Rama Amerindian peoples of Nicaragua's Atlantic coast, who in December 1981 found themselves in conflict with the authorities following the government's efforts to nationalise Indian land. They had a number of grievances against the Sandinistas, including:

★ Unilateral natural resource exploitation policies which denied Indians access to much of their traditional land base and severely restricted their subsistence activities.

★ Forced removal of at least 10,000 Indians from their traditional lands to relocation centers in the interior of the country, and subsequent burning of some villages. ^[1]

★ Economic embargoes and blockades against native villages not sympathetic to the government.
In 1983 the Misurasata movement, led by Brooklyn Rivera, split, with the breakaway Misura group of Stedman Fagoth allying itself more closely with the FDN. A subsequent autonomy statute in September 1987 largely defused Miskito resistance.
US officials were active in attempting to unite the Contra groups. In June 1985, they reorganized as the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), under the leadership of Calero, Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo, all former members of the original Sandinista cadre; after its dissolution early in 1987, the Nicaraguan Resistance (RN) was organized along similar lines in May. Splits within the rebel movement emerged with Pastora's defection in May 1984 and Misurasata's April 1985 accommodation with the Sandinista government.
Mediation by other Central American governments under Costa Rican leadership led to the Sapoa ceasefire agreement of March 23, 1988, which, along with additional agreements in February and August of 1989, provided for the Contras' disarmament and reintegration into Nicaraguan society and politics. The agreements also called for internationally-monitored elections which were subsequently held on February 25, 1990. Violeta Chamorro, a former Sandinista ally and widow of murdered anti-Somoza journalist Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal, defeated Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega and became President with the backing of the center-right UNO. Some Contra elements and disgruntled Sandinistas would return briefly to armed opposition in the 1990s, sometimes styled as ''recontras'' or ''revueltos'', but these groups were subsequently persuaded to disarm.

Human rights abuses

The Nicaragua conflict claimed an estimated 30,000 lives. The Sandinista government, its supporters, and outside groups such as Amnesty International, Americas Watch and Witness for Peace frequently accused the Contras of indiscriminate attacks on civilians. The Contras and their backers, especially in the Reagan Administration, dismissed these accusations as a propaganda campaign and accused the Sandinistas of the same crimes against humanity.
The Sandinista government alleged in their November 1984 report that since 1981 the Contras had assassinated 910 state officials; attacked nearly 100 civilian communities; caused the displacement of over 150,000 people from their homes and farms; damaged or destroyed bridges, port facilities, granaries, water and oil deposits, electrical power stations, telephone lines, saw mills, health centres, schools and dams.
A Sandinista militiaman interviewed by The Guardian stated that Contra rebels committed these atrocities against Sandinista prisoners after a battle at a Sandinista rural oupost:
:Rosa had her breasts cut off. Then they cut into her chest and took out her heart. The men had their arms broken, their testicles cut off. They were killed by slitting their throats and pulling the tongue out through the slit. The Slaugter at the Cooperatives
A similar report by the Contra newsletter ''Resistencia'' recounted that a small boy witnessed his mother being raped and tortured and saw her breasts cut off. The boy had since joined the Contras to fight the Sandinistas.
Human Rights groups routinely catalogued yearly allegations of war crimes. The Catholic Institute for International Relations summarized contra operating procedures in their 1987 human rights report: "The record of the contras in the field, as opposed to their official professions of democratic faith, is one of consistent and bloody abuse of human rights, of murder, torture, mutilation, rape, arson, destruction and kidnapping." Right to Survive: Human Rights in Nicaragua
In 1984 a CIA manual for training the Contras in psychological operations was leaked to the media, entitled "Psychological Operations in Guerrilla War". Declassified Army and CIA Manuals ^[2]
The manual recommended “selective use of violence for propagandistic effects” and to “neutralize” government officials.
An influential report on alleged Contra atrocities was issued by lawyer Reed Brody shortly before the 1985 US Congressional vote on Contra aid. The report was soon published as a book, ''Contra Terror in Nicaragua'' (Brody, 1985). It charged that the Contras attacked purely civilian targets and that their tactics included murder, rape, beatings, kidnapping and disruption of harvests. Brody's report had been requested by the Sandinista government's Washington law firm Reichler & Applebaum and the Sandinista government had provided his facilities in Nicaragua.^[3] In a letter to the New York Times, 'Contra' Terrorism Is, Unfortunately, True Brody asserted that this in no way affected his report, and added that the newspaper had confirmed the veracity of four randomly chosen incidents.
Americas Watch - which was subsequently folded into Human Rights Watch - stated that "the Contras systematically engage in violent abuses... so prevalent that these may be said to be their principal means of waging war." [1] It accused the Contras of

★ targeting health care clinics and health care workers for assassination.

★ kidnapping civilians.

★ torturing civilians.

★ executing civilians, including children, who were captured in combat.

★ raping women.

★ indiscriminantly attacking civilians and civilian houses.

★ seizing civilian property.

★ setting alight civilian houses in captured towns. Human Rights in Nicaragua 1986
American news media published several articles accusing Americas Watch and other bodies of ideological bias and unreliable reporting. They alleged that Americas Watch not only gave too much credence to alleged Contra abuses but also systematically tried to discredit Nicaraguan human rights groups such as the Permanent Commission on Human Rights, which blamed the major human rights abuses on the Sandinistas.^[4]
In 1985, the ''Wall Street Journal'' reported:
:Three weeks ago, Americas Watch issued a report on human rights abuses in Nicaragua. One member of the Permanent Commission on Human Rights commented on the Americas Watch report and its chief investigator Juan Mendez: "The Sandinistas are laying the groundwork for a totalitarian society here and yet all Mendez wanted to hear about were abuses by the contras. How can we get people in the U.S. to see what's happening here when so many of the groups who come down are pro-Sandinista?"^[5]

U.S. military and financial assistance

:''See also the Iran-Contra affair''
A key role in the development of the Contra alliance was played by the United States following Ronald Reagan's assumption of the presidency in January 1981. Reagan accused the Sandinistas of importing Cuban-style socialism and aiding leftist guerrillas in El Salvador. On November 23 of that year, Reagan signed the top secret National Security Decision Directive 17 (NSDD-17), giving the CIA the authority to recruit and support the Contras with $19 million in military aid. The effort to support the Contras was one component of the Reagan Doctrine, which called for providing military support to movements opposing Soviet-supported, communist governments. The CIA distributed to the civilians ''The Freedom Fighter's Manual'', meant to teach them simple sabotage methods (not going to work, damaging light bulbs, putting nails on roads, etc.) and more dangerous ones (how to make a molotov cocktail).
In 1984, Nicaragua filed a suit in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the United States (''Nicaragua vs. United States''), which resulted in a 1986 judgment against the US, calling on it to "cease and to refrain" from the "unlawful use of force" against Nicaragua, through such actions as the placement of underwater mines by CIA operatives and training, funding and support for the guerrilla forces. It concluded that the US was "in breach of its obligations under customary international law not to use force against another State", "not to intervene in its affairs", "not to violate its sovereignty", "not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce", and "in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956." However, regarding human rights violations by the contras, the court stated that the US can only be held accountable for acts the Contras have committed in connection with the US, and therefore the "Court does not have to determine whether the violations of humanitarian law attributed to the contras were in fact committed by them." The Court did find that the United States "has encouraged the commission by them of acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian law; but does not find a basis for concluding that any such acts which may have been committed are imputable to the United States of America as acts of the United States of America" The United States was ordered to pay reparations. International Court of Justice Year 1986, 27 June 1986, General list No. 70, paragraphs 251, 252, 157, 158, 233. Large PDF file from the ICJ website
The US, which did not participate in the merits phase of the proceedings, maintained that the ICJ's power did not supersede the Constitution of the United States and argued that the court did not seriously consider the Nicaraguan role in El Salvador, whose intervention the court would not accept. The latter argument was affirmed by the primary dissenting justices, notably US Judge Schwebel who claimed that "Nicaragua does not come before the Court with clean hands." [2] Nicaragua then took its case to the UN Security Council, where a resolution supporting the ruling of the ICJ was vetoed by the United States. Nicaragua then went to the General Assembly, which passed a resolution supporting the ruling of the ICJ 94-3.
Direct military aid was interrupted by the Boland Amendment, passed by the United States Congress in December 1982, and subsequently extended in October 1984 to forbid action by not only the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency but all US government agencies. Administration officials sought to arrange funding and military supplies by means of third-parties, culminating in the Iran-Contra Affair of 1986-1987, which concerned contra funding through the proceeds of arms sales to Iran. On February 3, 1988 the United States House of Representatives rejected President Reagan's request for $36.25 million to aid the Contras. According to the National Security Archive, Oliver North, an important official in the Iran-Contra affair, had been in contact with Manuel Noriega, the military leader of Panama later convicted on drug charges, whom he personally met.
In 1987 American public opinion was divided by the killing of American engineer Ben Linder by the Contras.
The issue of drug money and its importance in funding the Nicaraguan conflict was the subject of various reports and publications. The contras were funded by drug trafficking, of which the USA was aware.^[6]. Senator John Kerry's 1988 Committee on Foreign Relations report on Contra drug links concluded that "senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contras' funding problems." [3] On the other hand, the 1989 book, ''Kings of Cocaine'', alleges Sandinista involvement in cocaine smuggling. Barry Seal, a Medellin cartel pilot took photos which allegedly showed a high ranking Sandinista official unloading cocaine shipments at a Sandinista military airport.
The Reagan administration's support for the Contras continued to stir controversy well into the 1990s. In August 1996, ''San Jose Mercury News'' reporter Gary Webb published a series titled ''Dark Alliance'', alleging that the origins of crack cocaine in California was the responsibility of the Contras. [4] [5] Webb's controversial and highly damaging revelations were disputed at the time, but later revelations confirmed some of his findings. Freedom of Information Act inquiries by the National Security Archive and other investigators unearthed a number of documents showing that White House officials, including Oliver North, knew about and supported using money raised via drug trafficking to fund the Contras.

See also

★ Iran-Contra Affair

★ Sandinista National Liberation Front

★ Women and the Armed Struggle in Nicaragua

★ Ken Loach's Carla's Song film

References

★ Belli, Humberto. (1985). ''Breaking Faith: The Sandinista Revolution and Its Impact on Freedom and Christian Faith in Nicaragua.'' Crossway Books/The Puebla Institute.

★ Bermudez, Enrique, "The Contras' Valley Forge: How I View the Nicaraguan Crisis", ''Policy Review'' magazine, The Heritage Foundation, Summer 1988.

★ Brody, Reed. (1985). ''Contra Terror in Nicaragua: Report of a Fact-Finding Mission: September 1984-January 1985''. Boston: South End Press. ISBN 0-89608-313-6.

★ Brown, Timothy. (2001). ''The Real Contra War: Highlander Peasant Resistance in Nicaragua''. University of Oklahoma Press. ISBN 0-8061-3252-3.

★ Chamorro, Edgar. (1987). ''Packaging the Contras: A Case of CIA Disinformation''. New York: Institute for Media Analysis. ISBN 0-941781-08-9; ISBN 0-941781-07-0.

★ Christian, Shirley. (1986) ''Nicaragua, Revolution In the Family.'' New York: Vintage Books.

★ Cox, Jack. (1987) ''Requiem in the Tropics: Inside Central America.'' UCA Books.

★ Cruz S., Arturo J. (1989). ''Memoirs of a Counterrevolutionary''. (1989). New York: Doubleday.

★ Dickey, Christopher. (1985, 1987). ''With the Contras: A Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua''. New York: Simon & Schuster.

★ Garvin, Glenn. (1992). ''Everybody Had His Own Gringo: The CIA and the Contras''. Washington: Brassey's.

★ Gugliota Guy. (1989). ''Kings of Cocaine Inside the Medellin Cartel.'' Simon and Shuster.

★ Horton, Lynn. ''Peasants in Arms: War and Peace in the Mountains of Nicaragua, 1979-1994''. (1998). Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies.

★ Kirkpatrick, Jeane J.. (1982) ''Dictatorships and Double Standards.'' Touchstone. ISBN 0-671-43836-0

★ Miranda, Roger, and William Ratliff. (1993, 1994) "The Civil War in Nicaragua: Inside the Sandinistas." New Brunswick, NY: Transaction Publishers.

★ Moore, John Norton (1987). ''The Secret War in Central America: Sandinista Assault on World Order.'' University Publications of America.

★ Pardo-Maurer, Rogelio. (1990) ''The Contras, 1980-1989: A Special Kind of Politics''. New York: Praeger.

★ Persons, David E. (1987) ''A Study of the History and Origins of the Nicaraguan Contras''. Nacogdoches, Texas: Total Vision Press. Stephen Austin University Special Collections.

★ Webb, Gary (1998). ''Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion'', Seven Stories Press. ISBN 1-888363-68-1 (hardcover, 1998), ISBN 1-888363-93-2 (paperback, 1999).

Notes

1. The Americas Watch Committee. "Human Rights in Nicaragua 1986" (print), Americas Watch, February 1987.

2.
Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions since World War II, , William, Blum, Zed Books, 2003, ISBN 1-84277-369-0
3. The New Republic, January 20, 1986, with letters in The New Republic, February 17, 1986.
4. The New Republic, January 20, 1986; The New Republic, August 22, 1988; The National Interest, Spring 1990.
5. David Asman, "Despair and fear in Managua," ''Wall Street Journal,'' March 25, 1985.
6. The Contras, cocaine, and covert operations: Documentation of official U.S. knowledge of drug trafficking and the Contras

External links

★ "Nicaragua 1981-1990: Destabilization in slow motion, by William Blum.

★ "Dark Alliance", by Gary Webb, ''San Jose Mercury News'', August 1996.

★ "The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations" - National Security Archive.