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EspañolDECLINE OF THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE
The decline and fall of the Byzantine empire was a process lasting many centuries. There is no consensus on exactly when this process began; several dates have been suggested by historians:
★ 634 - Start of the Byzantine-Arab Wars
★ 1025 - Death of the soldier-emperor Basil II
★ 1071 - The Battle of Manzikert
★ 1180 - Death of Manuel I Komnenos
★ 1185 - Demise of the Komnenos dynasty
★ 1204 - Fourth Crusade conquers Constantinople
Taking into account the restoration of imperial power by the Komnenoi, recent books by Paul Magdalino and J. Birkenmeier have placed the permanent drop in imperial power after the death of the emperor Manuel I Komnenos (1180), and especially after the death of the last Komnenian emperor, Andronikos I Komnenos (1185). Although this view is not universally held, historians generally agree that after the Fourth Crusade in 1204, the empire was only a shadow of its former self. The death of Michael VIII in 1282 marks the last high point of the Byzantine empire. From then on, the empire entered its final decline.
However, the calamities of the Empire were not limited to the above dates or even the follwoing years - Throughout the 14th and 15th centuries the Empire suffered frm many natual disasters, invasions and several coups.
The Byzantine Empire was a continuation of the Eastern Roman Empire, so how well the Eastern Half ruled determined the circumstances with which the Byzantines would be forced to deal with. The loss of the Western territories in the 4th and more importantly 5th centuries led to the loss of some important cities such as Rome. The creation of the Germanic states of the Franks and the Lombards out of the rubble of the Roman Empire meant that in time they would seek to challenge the authority of the Byzantine Empire. Justinian I in the early 6th century made a serious attempt to recover the western half; however his gains were short-lived and poorly planned out - resources and troops that could have been used to defeat the Persians were diverted forcing the Byzantines into tribute and diplomacy to deal with this Eastern threat. The loss of the western territories led to the Patriarch of Rome achieving greater independence from Byzantium, which no longer provided adequate protection to the Pope. Consequently, the Holy See and Byzantium would have disagreements, culminating in the schism of 1054 sanctioning Latin invasions of Byzantium in the 13th century.
Islam gave the Arabs a new found zeal and desire to conquer the territories in the Levant and Egypt. The Arab invasions led to the loss of Egypt, Syria, Palestine and for a short period of time, Crete, Sicily, Cyprus and Asia Minor. Though Asia Minor was recaptured and substantial parts of Syria and Mesopotamia either taken back or subjugated, Egypt remained firmly in Arab hands as did the rest of Palestine. The loss of Egypt was a major blow to the Byzantines since the province of Aegyptus provided much of the Empire's grain needs, ever since the times of Roman Antiquity. The presence of a powerful Arab state (Fatimid Egypt) meant that the Byzantines had to direct large amounts of resources to stave off constant Arab incursions into Asia Minor and Syria.
Another possible explanation for the disintegration of the Byzantine Empire is the permanent settlement of Anatolia by the Seljuks, a Turkish people.
It is worth remembering that the Byzantines had faced invasion in Asia Minor for centuries. In the seventh and eighth centuries, in particular, first the Sassanid Persians and then the Muslim Arabs launched major offensives into the region. Though the Arabs were successful in conquering many Byzantine territories during the Byzantine-Arab Wars, they were ultimately unsuccessful in establishing themselves in western Anatolia or the Balkans.
However, a period of civil war in the late eleventh century enabled the Turks to make huge inroads into Byzantine territory. In many places, usurpers used mercenary Turkish troops to occupy strategic towns, only for those mercenaries to take the towns for themselves when the usurpers had departed. Thus by 1095, virtually the whole of Asia Minor, comprising about 70% of the Byzantine Empire, had been lost.
Although the three competent Komnenian emperors, especially Manuel I Komnenos (r.1143-1180), may have had the power to expel the outnumbered Seljuks, several factors combined to ensure that they never did so. Alexios was unable to derive much of the expected benefit from the First Crusade, though it did at least help him to recover Nicaea and western Asia Minor. It has even been argued that it was never in the interests of the Komnenoi to expel the Turks, as the expansion back into Anatolia would have meant sharing more power with the feudal lords, thus weakening their power. If this is so, it is deeply ironic, as re-conquering Anatolia may have saved the Byzantine Empire in the long run.
No emperor after the Komnenian period was in a position to expel the Turks from Asia Minor, while the preoccupation of the Nicaean emperors with the attempt to recover Constantinople meant that resources were diverted away from Asia Minor and towards the west. The result was a weakenining of the Byzantine defences in the region, which when combined with insufficient resources and incompetent leadership lead to the complete loss of all the empire's Asian territory to the Turks by c.1400. Yet ultimately, any explanation of the change from Byzantine to Turkish rule in Asia Minor should ideally give weight to the strengths of the victors as well as the weaknesses of the defeated. Once this is done, it is hard to assess the responsibility of individual factors for the changes that occurred in Asia Minor during this period.
Part of the reason why the Crusades were launched was to assist the weakening Byzantine Empire; the other reason was to re-open Jerusalem to Christian Pilgrims. Both of these reasons stem from the arrival of the Seljuk Turks whose newly found Islamic zeal and opportune timing resulted in the fall of Jerusalem in 1071 and a decisive victory at Manzikert. Though the Crusades assisted Byzantium in driving back some of the Turks, it also opened up Byzantium to Latin aggression which was not always directed at Byzantium's enemies - most notably the Fourth Crusade, which sacked Byzantium and reduced Imperial power to the Nicaean Empire, Trebizond and Epirus. Much of the Nicaean Emperors' efforts went into combating the Latins - even after Constantinople was returned to Byzantine rule, the Empire exerted much of its efforts into defeating its Latin neighbours, whose desires to liberate the Holy Land largely faded by 1291.
The arrival of the Seljuk Turks led to the rise of the Ottomans, warriors that followed the Noble (Bey) Osman I. Osman I carved out a small domain in north-western Asia Minor, raiding Byzantine lands and occupying country land that was poorly defended. Attempts by the Byzantine Emperors to drive back the Ottomans yielded little short term success - the excessive use of mercenaries led to much peasant resentment, giving the Ottomans support in the regions in Asia Minor. Following a number of civil disputes in the Byzantine Empire, the Ottomans subjugated the Byzantines as vassals in the late 14th century and attempts to relieve this vassal status culminated in the Fall of Constantinople in 1453.
The Byzantine Empire's survival depended upon its administration and the logistics that enabled it to run the Empire. Though considered complex, its system was one more advanced than those practiced by the Frankish Kingdoms in the West and one modelled by the Islamic Powers of the East. As the Empire evolved into an increasingly smaller and defensive state, the governing of the state changed as well. However, by the 1300's the burdens of running an Empire surrounded by many enemies became too much of a strain on Byzantium's increasingly smaller resources. By 'c'. 1350's, the Byzantines lost Thrace to the Ottomans; thereafter Constantinople became the government's primary administrative region.
The Economy of the Byzantine Empire was one of the most powerful in the world and the most powerful of Europe at the time of its height. However, the territorial losses in the 11th century led to the Byantine Emperor Alexius I to grant the Venetians numerous trading concessions to gain their assistance against the Normans and the Turks in the Crusades. The resulting economic rivalry between Byzantium and Venice led to the Byzantines giving Genoa trading concessions as well in an attempt to enlist their aid as a counter to increasing Venetian power.
In time both Venice and Genoa dominated trade in the Aegean and the rest of the Mediterranean. The loss of this vital income would lead to the loss of the ability to pay for troops and keep Byzantium together.
The Byzantine Empire experienced numerous civil wars. The defeats in the 7th and 12th centuries to the Arabs and Turks respectively speaking were in no small part assisted by numerous interal conflicts. The situation became worse later in the 14th and 15th centuries were Byzantine Emperors were forced to fight their own grandchildren/children, as with the case of Andronikus II and Andronikus III.
The Military of the Byzantine Empire was often smaller than that of its opponents and thus relied more upon strategy rather brute strength to achieve success[1][2] . This was in part achieved by the logistics of the Byzantine administration which allowed it to utilize their troops as efficiently as possible. Taxes on the peasantry were collected at times of need so as to raise the supplies needed at the time [3]. However, this bureacratic system was exploited by the social elite [3] whose increasing power challenged that of the Emperor. Whilst the ''Theme'' system worked well to provide efficient military service, it led to the decentralization of power leading to disastrous civil conflicts in the 11th, 12th and 14th centuries.
Furthermoore, as the taxation system became ever more of a burden on the peasantry, the lower classes of the Empire began to resent the state. This contributed to the loss of Asia Minor in the 11th and 14th centuries due to the arrival of the Turks.
Another major factor in the decline of the Byzantine empire may have been the disintegration of its traditional military system, the 'theme' system, which had supplied large numbers of troops for the empire in earlier centuries.
The first advantage of the theme system had been its numerical strength. It is thought that the Byzantine field army under Manuel I Komnenos (r. 1143-1180) had numbered some 40,000 men. However, there is evidence that the thematic armies of earlier centuries had provided the empire with a numerically superior force. The army of the theme of Thrakesion alone had provided about 9,600 men in the period 902-936, for example. Furthermore, the thematic armies had been stationed in the provinces, and their greater independence from central command meant that they were able to deal with threats quickly at a local level. This, combined with their greater numbers, allowed them to provide greater defense in depth.
The other key advantage of the theme system was that it had offered the Byzantine state good value for money. It provided a means of cheaply mobilising large numbers of men. The demise of the system meant that armies became more expensive in the long run, which reduced the numbers of troops that the emperors could afford to employ. The considerable wealth and diplomatic skill of the Komnenian emperors, their constant attention to military matters, and their frequent energetic campaigning, had largely countered this change. But the luck of the empire in having the talented Komneni to provide capable leadership was not a long term solution to a structural problem in the Byzantine state itself. After the death of Manuel I Komnenos in 1180, the Angeloi had not lavished the same care on the military as the Komneni had done, and the result was that these structural weakness manifested themselves in military decline. From 1185 on, Byzantine emperors had found it increasingly difficult to muster and pay for sufficient military forces, while their incompetence had exposed the limitations of the entire Byzantine military system, dependent as it was on competent personal direction from the emperor. The culmination of the empire's military disintegration under the Angeloi had therefore been reached on 13 April 1204, when the armies of the Fourth Crusade sacked Constantinople and dismantled the Byzantine Empire.
Thus, the problem was not so much that the Komnenian army was any less effective in battle (the thematic army's success rate was just as varied as that of its Komnenian counterpart); it is more the case that, because it was a smaller, more centralised force, from the twelfth century on the army required a greater degree of competent direction from the emperor in order to be effective. Although formidable under an energetic leader, the Komnenian army did not work so well under incompetent or uninterested emperors. The greater independence and resiliance of the thematic army had provided the early empire with a structural advantage that was now lost.
For all of the reasons above, it is possible to argue that the demise of the theme system was a great loss to the Byzantine empire. Although it took centuries to become fully apparent, one of the main institutional strengths of the Byzantine state was now gone. Thus it was not the army itself that was to blame for the decline of the empire, but rather the system that supported it. Without strong underlying institutions that could endure beyond the reign of each emperor, the state was extremely vulnerable in times of crisis. Byzantium had come to rely too much on individual emperors.
★ The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204, Angold, Michael, , , Longman, 1997, ISBN 0-582-29468-1
★ Byzantium - A History, Haldon, John, , , Tempus, 2002, ISBN 0-7524-2343-6
★ Byzantium and the Crusades, Harris, Jonathan, , , Hambledon and London, 2003, ISBN 1-85285-298-4
★ Alan Harvey, "Economic expansion in the Byzantine empire, 900-1200"
★ John Haldon, "The Byzantine Wars"
★ J.W. Birkenmeier, ''The Development of the Komnenian Army 1081-1180''
★ Magdalino, Paul, The empire of Manuel I Komnenos 1143-1180
★ A Short History of Byzantium, Norwich, John Julius, , , Penguin, 1998, ISBN 0-14-025960-0
1. Philip Sherrard, Great Ages of Man Byzantium, Time-Life Books
2. Haldon, John. Byzantium at War 600 - 1453. New York: Osprey, 2000.
3. Haldon, John. Byzantium at War 600 - 1453. New York: Osprey, 2000. pg 90
4. Haldon, John. Byzantium at War 600 - 1453. New York: Osprey, 2000. pg 90
★ 634 - Start of the Byzantine-Arab Wars
★ 1025 - Death of the soldier-emperor Basil II
★ 1071 - The Battle of Manzikert
★ 1180 - Death of Manuel I Komnenos
★ 1185 - Demise of the Komnenos dynasty
★ 1204 - Fourth Crusade conquers Constantinople
Taking into account the restoration of imperial power by the Komnenoi, recent books by Paul Magdalino and J. Birkenmeier have placed the permanent drop in imperial power after the death of the emperor Manuel I Komnenos (1180), and especially after the death of the last Komnenian emperor, Andronikos I Komnenos (1185). Although this view is not universally held, historians generally agree that after the Fourth Crusade in 1204, the empire was only a shadow of its former self. The death of Michael VIII in 1282 marks the last high point of the Byzantine empire. From then on, the empire entered its final decline.
However, the calamities of the Empire were not limited to the above dates or even the follwoing years - Throughout the 14th and 15th centuries the Empire suffered frm many natual disasters, invasions and several coups.
Map of the changes in borders of the Byzantine Empire
Collapse of the Western Roman Empire: 5th - 7th century
The Byzantine Empire was a continuation of the Eastern Roman Empire, so how well the Eastern Half ruled determined the circumstances with which the Byzantines would be forced to deal with. The loss of the Western territories in the 4th and more importantly 5th centuries led to the loss of some important cities such as Rome. The creation of the Germanic states of the Franks and the Lombards out of the rubble of the Roman Empire meant that in time they would seek to challenge the authority of the Byzantine Empire. Justinian I in the early 6th century made a serious attempt to recover the western half; however his gains were short-lived and poorly planned out - resources and troops that could have been used to defeat the Persians were diverted forcing the Byzantines into tribute and diplomacy to deal with this Eastern threat. The loss of the western territories led to the Patriarch of Rome achieving greater independence from Byzantium, which no longer provided adequate protection to the Pope. Consequently, the Holy See and Byzantium would have disagreements, culminating in the schism of 1054 sanctioning Latin invasions of Byzantium in the 13th century.
Rise of Islam 7th - 9th century, 11th - 15th century
Islam gave the Arabs a new found zeal and desire to conquer the territories in the Levant and Egypt. The Arab invasions led to the loss of Egypt, Syria, Palestine and for a short period of time, Crete, Sicily, Cyprus and Asia Minor. Though Asia Minor was recaptured and substantial parts of Syria and Mesopotamia either taken back or subjugated, Egypt remained firmly in Arab hands as did the rest of Palestine. The loss of Egypt was a major blow to the Byzantines since the province of Aegyptus provided much of the Empire's grain needs, ever since the times of Roman Antiquity. The presence of a powerful Arab state (Fatimid Egypt) meant that the Byzantines had to direct large amounts of resources to stave off constant Arab incursions into Asia Minor and Syria.
The arrival of the Seljuks; 11th - 13th century
Another possible explanation for the disintegration of the Byzantine Empire is the permanent settlement of Anatolia by the Seljuks, a Turkish people.
It is worth remembering that the Byzantines had faced invasion in Asia Minor for centuries. In the seventh and eighth centuries, in particular, first the Sassanid Persians and then the Muslim Arabs launched major offensives into the region. Though the Arabs were successful in conquering many Byzantine territories during the Byzantine-Arab Wars, they were ultimately unsuccessful in establishing themselves in western Anatolia or the Balkans.
However, a period of civil war in the late eleventh century enabled the Turks to make huge inroads into Byzantine territory. In many places, usurpers used mercenary Turkish troops to occupy strategic towns, only for those mercenaries to take the towns for themselves when the usurpers had departed. Thus by 1095, virtually the whole of Asia Minor, comprising about 70% of the Byzantine Empire, had been lost.
Although the three competent Komnenian emperors, especially Manuel I Komnenos (r.1143-1180), may have had the power to expel the outnumbered Seljuks, several factors combined to ensure that they never did so. Alexios was unable to derive much of the expected benefit from the First Crusade, though it did at least help him to recover Nicaea and western Asia Minor. It has even been argued that it was never in the interests of the Komnenoi to expel the Turks, as the expansion back into Anatolia would have meant sharing more power with the feudal lords, thus weakening their power. If this is so, it is deeply ironic, as re-conquering Anatolia may have saved the Byzantine Empire in the long run.
No emperor after the Komnenian period was in a position to expel the Turks from Asia Minor, while the preoccupation of the Nicaean emperors with the attempt to recover Constantinople meant that resources were diverted away from Asia Minor and towards the west. The result was a weakenining of the Byzantine defences in the region, which when combined with insufficient resources and incompetent leadership lead to the complete loss of all the empire's Asian territory to the Turks by c.1400. Yet ultimately, any explanation of the change from Byzantine to Turkish rule in Asia Minor should ideally give weight to the strengths of the victors as well as the weaknesses of the defeated. Once this is done, it is hard to assess the responsibility of individual factors for the changes that occurred in Asia Minor during this period.
Crusades
Part of the reason why the Crusades were launched was to assist the weakening Byzantine Empire; the other reason was to re-open Jerusalem to Christian Pilgrims. Both of these reasons stem from the arrival of the Seljuk Turks whose newly found Islamic zeal and opportune timing resulted in the fall of Jerusalem in 1071 and a decisive victory at Manzikert. Though the Crusades assisted Byzantium in driving back some of the Turks, it also opened up Byzantium to Latin aggression which was not always directed at Byzantium's enemies - most notably the Fourth Crusade, which sacked Byzantium and reduced Imperial power to the Nicaean Empire, Trebizond and Epirus. Much of the Nicaean Emperors' efforts went into combating the Latins - even after Constantinople was returned to Byzantine rule, the Empire exerted much of its efforts into defeating its Latin neighbours, whose desires to liberate the Holy Land largely faded by 1291.
Rise of the Ottomans
The arrival of the Seljuk Turks led to the rise of the Ottomans, warriors that followed the Noble (Bey) Osman I. Osman I carved out a small domain in north-western Asia Minor, raiding Byzantine lands and occupying country land that was poorly defended. Attempts by the Byzantine Emperors to drive back the Ottomans yielded little short term success - the excessive use of mercenaries led to much peasant resentment, giving the Ottomans support in the regions in Asia Minor. Following a number of civil disputes in the Byzantine Empire, the Ottomans subjugated the Byzantines as vassals in the late 14th century and attempts to relieve this vassal status culminated in the Fall of Constantinople in 1453.
Structure of Byzantium
The Byzantine Empire's survival depended upon its administration and the logistics that enabled it to run the Empire. Though considered complex, its system was one more advanced than those practiced by the Frankish Kingdoms in the West and one modelled by the Islamic Powers of the East. As the Empire evolved into an increasingly smaller and defensive state, the governing of the state changed as well. However, by the 1300's the burdens of running an Empire surrounded by many enemies became too much of a strain on Byzantium's increasingly smaller resources. By 'c'. 1350's, the Byzantines lost Thrace to the Ottomans; thereafter Constantinople became the government's primary administrative region.
Economy of Byzantium
The Economy of the Byzantine Empire was one of the most powerful in the world and the most powerful of Europe at the time of its height. However, the territorial losses in the 11th century led to the Byantine Emperor Alexius I to grant the Venetians numerous trading concessions to gain their assistance against the Normans and the Turks in the Crusades. The resulting economic rivalry between Byzantium and Venice led to the Byzantines giving Genoa trading concessions as well in an attempt to enlist their aid as a counter to increasing Venetian power.
In time both Venice and Genoa dominated trade in the Aegean and the rest of the Mediterranean. The loss of this vital income would lead to the loss of the ability to pay for troops and keep Byzantium together.
Politics of Byzantium
The Byzantine Empire experienced numerous civil wars. The defeats in the 7th and 12th centuries to the Arabs and Turks respectively speaking were in no small part assisted by numerous interal conflicts. The situation became worse later in the 14th and 15th centuries were Byzantine Emperors were forced to fight their own grandchildren/children, as with the case of Andronikus II and Andronikus III.
Society of Byzantium
The Military of the Byzantine Empire was often smaller than that of its opponents and thus relied more upon strategy rather brute strength to achieve success[1][2] . This was in part achieved by the logistics of the Byzantine administration which allowed it to utilize their troops as efficiently as possible. Taxes on the peasantry were collected at times of need so as to raise the supplies needed at the time [3]. However, this bureacratic system was exploited by the social elite [3] whose increasing power challenged that of the Emperor. Whilst the ''Theme'' system worked well to provide efficient military service, it led to the decentralization of power leading to disastrous civil conflicts in the 11th, 12th and 14th centuries.
Furthermoore, as the taxation system became ever more of a burden on the peasantry, the lower classes of the Empire began to resent the state. This contributed to the loss of Asia Minor in the 11th and 14th centuries due to the arrival of the Turks.
The structure of the military
Another major factor in the decline of the Byzantine empire may have been the disintegration of its traditional military system, the 'theme' system, which had supplied large numbers of troops for the empire in earlier centuries.
The first advantage of the theme system had been its numerical strength. It is thought that the Byzantine field army under Manuel I Komnenos (r. 1143-1180) had numbered some 40,000 men. However, there is evidence that the thematic armies of earlier centuries had provided the empire with a numerically superior force. The army of the theme of Thrakesion alone had provided about 9,600 men in the period 902-936, for example. Furthermore, the thematic armies had been stationed in the provinces, and their greater independence from central command meant that they were able to deal with threats quickly at a local level. This, combined with their greater numbers, allowed them to provide greater defense in depth.
The other key advantage of the theme system was that it had offered the Byzantine state good value for money. It provided a means of cheaply mobilising large numbers of men. The demise of the system meant that armies became more expensive in the long run, which reduced the numbers of troops that the emperors could afford to employ. The considerable wealth and diplomatic skill of the Komnenian emperors, their constant attention to military matters, and their frequent energetic campaigning, had largely countered this change. But the luck of the empire in having the talented Komneni to provide capable leadership was not a long term solution to a structural problem in the Byzantine state itself. After the death of Manuel I Komnenos in 1180, the Angeloi had not lavished the same care on the military as the Komneni had done, and the result was that these structural weakness manifested themselves in military decline. From 1185 on, Byzantine emperors had found it increasingly difficult to muster and pay for sufficient military forces, while their incompetence had exposed the limitations of the entire Byzantine military system, dependent as it was on competent personal direction from the emperor. The culmination of the empire's military disintegration under the Angeloi had therefore been reached on 13 April 1204, when the armies of the Fourth Crusade sacked Constantinople and dismantled the Byzantine Empire.
Thus, the problem was not so much that the Komnenian army was any less effective in battle (the thematic army's success rate was just as varied as that of its Komnenian counterpart); it is more the case that, because it was a smaller, more centralised force, from the twelfth century on the army required a greater degree of competent direction from the emperor in order to be effective. Although formidable under an energetic leader, the Komnenian army did not work so well under incompetent or uninterested emperors. The greater independence and resiliance of the thematic army had provided the early empire with a structural advantage that was now lost.
For all of the reasons above, it is possible to argue that the demise of the theme system was a great loss to the Byzantine empire. Although it took centuries to become fully apparent, one of the main institutional strengths of the Byzantine state was now gone. Thus it was not the army itself that was to blame for the decline of the empire, but rather the system that supported it. Without strong underlying institutions that could endure beyond the reign of each emperor, the state was extremely vulnerable in times of crisis. Byzantium had come to rely too much on individual emperors.
Bibliography
★ The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204, Angold, Michael, , , Longman, 1997, ISBN 0-582-29468-1
★ Byzantium - A History, Haldon, John, , , Tempus, 2002, ISBN 0-7524-2343-6
★ Byzantium and the Crusades, Harris, Jonathan, , , Hambledon and London, 2003, ISBN 1-85285-298-4
★ Alan Harvey, "Economic expansion in the Byzantine empire, 900-1200"
★ John Haldon, "The Byzantine Wars"
★ J.W. Birkenmeier, ''The Development of the Komnenian Army 1081-1180''
★ Magdalino, Paul, The empire of Manuel I Komnenos 1143-1180
★ A Short History of Byzantium, Norwich, John Julius, , , Penguin, 1998, ISBN 0-14-025960-0
Notes
1. Philip Sherrard, Great Ages of Man Byzantium, Time-Life Books
2. Haldon, John. Byzantium at War 600 - 1453. New York: Osprey, 2000.
3. Haldon, John. Byzantium at War 600 - 1453. New York: Osprey, 2000. pg 90
4. Haldon, John. Byzantium at War 600 - 1453. New York: Osprey, 2000. pg 90
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