ESCORT AIRCRAFT CARRIER

The 'escort aircraft carrier' or 'escort carrier', was a small aircraft carrier utilized by the Royal Navy and the United States Navy in World War II. In the Atlantic the escort carriers were employed to deal with the U-boat crisis of the Battle of the Atlantic, while in the Pacific they provided air support to ground forces during amphibious operations, served as backup aircraft transports for fleet carriers, and transported aircraft of all military services from the United States to points of delivery.

Contents

World War II

USN Escort Carrier Division Commanders in World War II

Escort carrier tactics when escorting convoys

USN Escort Carrier (AVG/ACV/CVE series)

The Ships

Relative carrier sizes in World War II

Post World War II

See also

References

Books

World War II

The first escort carrier was HMS ''Audacity'' which was converted from the captured German merchant ship MV ''Hannover'' and commissioned in July 1941. She was followed by additional Royal Navy merchant ship conversions. Similarly, ''Audacity'' became the model for U.S. built escort carriers, the first example of which was the USS ''Long Island'' (AVG-1).
In US service, they were initially referred to as 'auxiliary aircraft escort vessels' (hull classification symbol 'AVG') and then 'auxiliary aircraft carrier' ('ACV') before the Navy settled on the type description 'escort aircraft carrier'. Escort carriers were given the US Navy hull classification symbol 'CVE' — this was sarcastically said by their crews to stand for "Combustible, Vulnerable, and Expendable". They were informally known as "Jeep carriers" or "baby flattops." It was quickly found that the escort carriers were better aircraft platforms than the light carriers, which tended to pitch badly in moderate to high seas, and as a result, many more of them were ordered.
Escort carriers were typically around 500 ft (150 m) long, not much more than half the length of the almost 900 ft (300 m) fleet carriers of the same era, but actually less than one-third of the size: a typical escort carrier displaced about 8,000 tons, as compared to almost 30,000 tons for a full-size fleet carrier. The aircraft hangar typically ran only a third of the way under the flight deck and housed a combination of 24 to 30 fighters and bombers organized into one single 'composite squadron'. (A late ''Essex'' class fleet carrier could carry a total of 103 aircraft organized into separate fighter, bomber and torpedo-bomber squadrons)
The islands of these ships were small and cramped, located well forward of the funnels (unlike on a normal-sized carrier where the funnels were integrated into the island). Although the first escort carriers had only one aircraft elevator, two elevators, one fore and one aft, quickly became standard, so did the one aircraft catapult. The carriers employed the same system of arresting cables and tailhooks and procedures for launch and recovery were the same as on the big carriers.
The crew size was less than a third of that of a large carrier, but this was still a bigger complement than most naval vessels. It was large enough to justify the existence of facilities such as a permanent canteen or snack bar, called a gedunk bar, in addition to the mess. The bar was open for longer hours than the mess and sold several flavors of ice cream, along with cigarettes and other consumables. There were also several vending machines, which made a "gedunk" sound when operated.
Originally developed at the behest of the United Kingdom to operate as part of a North Atlantic convoy escort rather than as part of a naval strike force, many of the escort carriers produced were assigned to the Royal Navy for the duration of the war under the Lend-lease act. They supplemented and then replaced the converted merchant aircraft carriers which were put into service by the British and Dutch as an emergency measure until the escort carriers became available. As convoy escorts, they were used by the Royal Navy, to provide air scouting, to ward off enemy long-range scouting aircraft and increasingly to spot and hunt submarines. Often additional escort carriers also joined convoys, not as fighting ships but as transporters, ferrying aircraft from the US to Britain. In this case the aircraft cargo could be doubled by storing aircraft in the hangar as well as on the flight deck.
The ships sent to the Royal Navy were slightly modified, partly to suit the traditions of that service. Among other things the ice cream making machines were removed, since they were considered unnecessary luxuries on ships which served grog and other alcoholic beverages. The heavy duty washing machines of the laundry room were also removed since "all a British sailor needs to keep clean is a bucket and a bar of soap" (quoted from Warrilow).
Other modifications were due to the need for a completely enclosed hangar when operating in the North Atlantic and in support of the Arctic convoys.
Meanwhile the US discovered their own use for the escort carriers. In the North Atlantic, they would supplement the escorting destroyers by providing air support for their anti-submarine warfare. One of these escort carriers, the USS ''Guadalcanal'', was instrumental in the capture of the German submarine (U-boat) U-505 off North Africa in 1944. The Guadalcanal, and her task force, was commanded by Captain (later Admiral) Daniel V. Gallery. In 1955 the U-505 was moved to Chicago, restored, and made a permanent exhibit at the Chicago Museum of Science and Industry.
In the Pacific theatre, the escort carriers would often escort the landing ships and troop carriers during the island hopping campaign. In this role, they would provide air cover for the troopships as well as fly the first wave of attacks on the beach fortifications in amphibious landing operations. On occasion they would even escort the large carriers, serving as emergency airstrips and providing fighter cover for their larger brothers while these were busy readying or refueling their own planes. In addition to this, they would also transport aircraft and spare parts from the US to the remote island airstrips.
Perhaps the finest moment for these escort carriers was the Battle of Leyte Gulf's Battle off Samar, where three escort carrier groups fended off the battleships of the Japanese Combined Fleet, allowing General Douglas MacArthur's Army to complete the liberation of Leyte. The hero of the battle was Rear Admiral Clifton "Ziggy" Sprague.
In all, 130 escort carriers were launched or converted during the war. Of these, six were British conversions of merchant ships: HMS ''Audacity'', HMS ''Nairana'', HMS ''Campania'', HMS ''Activity'', HMS ''Pretoria Castle'' and HMS ''Vindex''. The remaining escort carriers were US-built. Like the British, the first US escort carriers were converted merchant vessels (or in the ''Sangamon'' class, converted military oilers). Later carriers were built using the hulls of Liberty Ships not yet finished but already in various stages of construction. The last 69 escort carriers of the ''Casablanca'' and ''Commencement Bay'' classes were purpose-designed and purpose-built carriers drawing on the experience gained with the previous classes.
For complete lists see:

★ list of escort aircraft carriers of the United States Navy

★ list of escort aircraft carriers of the Royal Navy

USN Escort Carrier Division Commanders in World War II

★ Rear Admiral Gerald R. Henderson

★ Vice Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie

★ Rear Admiral William Sample

★ Vice Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague

★ Vice Admiral Thomas L. Sprague

★ Admiral Felix B. Stump

Escort carrier tactics when escorting convoys

There are three basic tactics for operating an escort carrier in defence of a convoy:

★ 'Within the convoy', which gives it the protection of the convoy's escort but limits the space to turn into the wind to operate aircraft.

★ 'Near the convoy', which gives the carrier freedom of manoeuvre, but puts it outside of the screen provided by the convoy's escort, necessitating the carrier to have its own escort. The carrier is also likely to be spotted by enemy forces approaching the convoy, making it vulnerable to attack.

★ 'Some distance away from the convoy'. This increases the time required for aircraft to reach the convoy but reduces the risk of being spotted by forces attacking the convoy.
HMS ''Audacity'' was sunk while operating in the second position which was later banned by the Admiralty as too risky.

USN Escort Carrier (AVG/ACV/CVE series)

The Navy's escort carriers, called "Jeep carriers" or (by the press) "baby flat tops," never received the headlines or glory accorded their bigger sisters. Jeeps did the routine patrol work, scouting and escorting of convoys that their larger fleet-type counterparts couldn't do. Lightly armored, slower than the fleet carriers and with far less defensive armament and aircraft, they performed admirably when called upon.
Jeep carrier crews became experts at hunting, finding and killing U-boats in both ocean theaters. Jeeps and their crews also provided fighter and close air support for amphibious landings, and served as aircraft transports as the tempo of the carrier war in the Pacific mounted to a crescendo.
The need for escort carriers came early in the war when German submarines and aircraft were taking a devastating toll on convoy shipping. The heaviest losses occurred far at sea where land-based aircraft couldn't operate. The Royal Navy had experimented with catapult-launched fighter planes from merchantmen; while this was somewhat successful in combating the U-boats, the number of planes that could be embarked was limited. Something else was needed, and in a hurry. Great Britain appealed to the United States for help.
No real specifications had been developed for escort carriers at this time, although the Navy had looked into converting merchant ships for this purpose before the war began. Thus, the quick solution was to build the early CVEs on merchant ship hulls.
The first CVE was USS ''Long Island'', converted from a Maritime Commission freighter. Due to a shortage of merchant ship hulls, four escort carriers were built on ''Cimarron''-class fleet oiler hulls. These four, USS ''Sangamon'', USS ''Suwanee'', USS ''Chenango'', and USS ''Santee'', were so successful in anti-submarine work and in covering amphibious operations that, after participating in the landings in North Africa, they were deployed to the Pacific. There, the fleet was in desperate need of carriers.
These early ships paved the way for a tremendous building program of Jeeps in the United States. Between June 1941 and April 1945, 78 escort carriers would be built and launched — a remarkable feat of wartime naval construction.
In the Atlantic, escort carriers originally stayed close to the convoys they were protecting. Over time, tactics evolved that enabled the Jeep carriers and their destroyer escorts to become independent "hunter-killer" groups. They could attack concentrations of U-boats at will and were no longer required to provide constant umbrella coverage for a convoy. This tactic was further refined by having the escort carrier groups concentrate their efforts in areas where U-boats met their supply submarines ("milch cows").
This operational phase was so successful that three Jeeps — USS ''Core'', USS ''Card'' and USS ''Bogue'' — and their escorting destroyers sank a total of 16 U-boats and 8 milch cows in a period of 98 days. During this time, U-boats sank only one merchantman and shot down only three planes from the escort carriers. This loss of submarines, particularly the milch cows, was a severe blow to the German Navy. With diminished capability for refueling U-boats at sea, and with no friendly bases in the area, Admiral Karl Doenitz, commander of the German U-boat fleet, was forced to withdraw his remaining supply submarines and cancel all U-boat operations in the central Atlantic. Testimony indeed to the hard work, skill and dedication of the Jeeps and the men who served in them.
In the Pacific, Jeeps performed less glamorous but no less important duties. Whether providing air cover for amphibious landings, ferrying planes, resupplying the big carriers or performing tactical air strikes in support of ground forces ashore, the little flat tops did whatever work had to be done. With all of their versatility, however, they were never designed to go toe-to-toe with heavy enemy surface units in a running sea battle. They never had to — until 1944-10-25, off the island of Samar in the Philippines.
'Task Group 77.4' consisted of 16 CVEs organized into three task units: 'Taffy 1, Taffy 2' and 'Taffy 3', so named because of their voice radio call signs. These Jeeps were tasked with protecting the transports unloading in Leyte Gulf and supporting troops ashore by striking enemy fortifications and airfields.
The little escort carriers were preparing for another day when, early in the morning of Oct. 25, lookouts on board ships of Taffy 3 spotted Admiral Takeo Kurita's heavy surface force attempting to enter Leyte Gulf and attack the transports and beachhead. What Taffy 3 faced were four battleships and six heavy cruisers. Outgunned and outmanned, the Jeeps and their accompanying destroyers and destroyer escorts did the only thing they could in the face of such overwhelming odds and firepower — they attacked.
Taffy 3, which would bear the brunt of the fighting, began launching aircraft and making smoke. Taffy 2 and Taffy 1, further away, began launching their aircraft to come to the aid of Taffy 3. No heavy American surface units or carriers were in the area; the Jeeps were on their own.
Aircraft from the Jeeps attacked and harassed the enemy, bombing and strafing. Pilots then made "dry" runs on the cruisers and battleships when they ran out of ammunition, in the hope of distracting the enemy gunners from shooting at the little carriers. The gutsy little destroyers of Taffy 3 who've been tasked with screening the escort carriers were completely overmatched but still bore in and carried out torpedo attacks, and fired at the massive battlewagons and cruisers with their relatively puny 5-inch battery guns. The escort carriers themselves were saved from utter destruction because of excellent maneuvering by their captains, and because, when hit, their thin armor permitted the Japanese shells to pass completely through without exploding.
Bold tactics on the part of the carriers, their planes and destroyers convinced Kurita that he had encountered a much larger force of heavy American surface ships and carriers. He had no idea that relatively little stood between his ships and the transports now unloading in Leyte Gulf.
With little knowledge of the situation, and with his ships widely dispersed after fending off the destroyer attacks, Kurita ordered his ships to break off the action and retire from the area. The fight, however, was still not over.
Following Kurita's withdrawal, ships of Taffy 2 and Taffy 3 came under attack from kamikazes, or Japanese suicide pilots. The kamikazes inflicted far greater damage on the little carriers than did Kurita's gunfire, which only managed to account for one carrier, USS ''Gambier Bay''. Hits were scored on ''Santee'', ''Suwanee'', USS ''Kitkun Bay'' and USS ''St. Lo''. Of these four, ''St. Lo'' (left) was hit hardest, and she sank as a result.
This Battle off Samar, which lasted a little over two hours, wrote a glorious chapter in the history of the Jeep carriers. By the time Kurita broke off his attack and the kamikazes had been repulsed, more than 1,100 U.S. sailors were dead or missing. Two escort carriers were lost along with four of the gallant little destroyers. With no support from heavy American surface units or carriers, the Jeeps of Taffy 1, 2 and 3, their air crews and destroyers bravely and successfully defended the landing beaches and transports at Leyte Gulf. ^[1].

The Ships

Many escort carriers were Lend-Leased to the United Kingdom, this list specifies the breakdown in service to each navy.
''Long Island'' class - 2 ships, 1 in USN service (USS ''Long Island'') and 1 in British service (HMS ''Archer'').

''Bogue'' class - 45 ships, 11 in USN service, 34 in British service as HMS ''Attacker'' class (first batch) and HMS ''Ameer'' class (second batch).

''Sangamon'' class - 4 ships, all in USN service.

''Charger'' class - 4 ships, 1 mainly in USN service (USS ''Charger''), 3 in British service as ''Avenger'' class.

''Casablanca'' class - 50 ships, all in USN service.

''Commencement Bay'' class - 19 ships, all in USN service, including two which were accepted but not commissioned and laid up for many years after the war. 4 more units were canceled and scrapped on the building slips. The ''Commencement Bay'' class ships were seen as the finest escort carriers ever built, and several units continued in service after the war as training carriers, aircraft ferries and other auxiliary uses.
In addition, 6 escort carriers were produced by the British during the war {all converted from other vessels}.

Relative carrier sizes in World War II

'Relative carrier sizes'
(typical examples)

	Escort carrier	Fleet carrier
'Length:'	150 m	260 m
'Beam:'	20 m	28 m
'Displacement:'	7500 t	25,000 t
'Armament'	1x 127mm, light AA	8-16 127mm, light AA
'Armor'	None	150-200mm
'Aircraft:'	15 - 30	over 80
'Speed:'	19 knots (35 km/h)	33 knots (61 km/h)
'Crew:'	850	3000 and over

Post World War II

The years following World War II brought many revolutionary new technologies to the navy, most notably the helicopter and the jet fighter, and with this a complete rethinking of its strategies and ships' tasks. Although several of the latest ''Commencement Bay''-class CVE were deployed as floating airfields during the Korean war, the main reasons for the development of the escort carrier had disappeared or could be dealt with better by newer weapons. The emergence of the helicopter meant that helicopter-deck equipped frigates could now take over the CVE's role in a convoy while also performing their own traditional role as submarine hunters. Ship-mounted guided missile launchers took over much of the aircraft protection role, and in-flight refueling abolished the need for floating stopover points for transport or patrol aircraft. As a result, after the ''Commencement Bay'' class, no new escort carriers were designed, and with every downsizing of the navy, the CVEs were the first to be mothballed.
Several escort carriers were pressed back into service during the first years of the Vietnam war because of their ability to carry large numbers of aircraft. Redesignated AKV (air transport auxiliary), they were manned by a civilian crew and used to ferry whole aircraft and spare parts from the United States to Army, Air Force and Marine bases in South Vietnam. However, CVEs were only useful in this role for a limited period. Once all major aircraft were equipped with refueling probes, instead of shipping a plane overseas to its pilot, it became much easier to fly the aircraft directly to its base.
The last chapter in the saga of the escort carriers consisted out of two conversions: As an experiment, the USS ''Thetis Bay'' (CVE-90) was converted from an aircraft carrier into a pure helicopter carrier (CVHA-1) and used by the Marine Corps to carry assault helicopters for the first wave of amphibious warfare operations. Later, the ''Thetis Bay'' became a full amphibious assault ship (LHP-6). Although in service only from 1955 (the year of her conversion) to 1964, the experience gained in her training exercises greatly influenced the design of today's amphibious assault ships.
In the second conversion, in 1961 the USS ''Gilbert Islands'' (CVE-107) had all her aircraft handling equipment removed and four tall radio antennas installed on her long, flat deck. In lieu of aircraft, the hangar deck now had no less than 24 military radio transmitter trucks bolted to its floor. Rechristened USS ''Annapolis'' (AGMR-1), the ship was used as a communication relay ship and served dutifully through the Vietnam War as a floating radio station, relaying transmissions between the forces on the ground and the command centers back home. Like the ''Thetis Bay'', the experience gained before she was stricken in 1976 helped develop today's purpose-built amphibious command ships of the ''Blue Ridge'' class.
Unlike almost all other major classes of ships and patrol boats from World War II, most of which can be found in a museum or port, no escort carrier or light carrier has survived: all were destroyed during the war or broken up in the following decades. The last escort carrier, USS ''Gilbert Islands'', was broken up for scrap starting in 1976. The last light carrier, USS ''Cabot'', was broken up in 2002 after a decade-long attempt to preserve the vessel.

See also

★ CAM ship

★ Merchant aircraft carrier

References

★ Galuppini, Gino. ''Le guide des porte-avions''. Paris: Fernand Nathan, 1981

★ Poolman, Kenneth. ''Escort carrier 1941-1945: An account of British Escort Carriers in Trade Protection''. London: Ian Allan, 1972

★ Warrilow, Betty. ''Nabob, the first Canadian-manned aircraft carrier''. Owen Sound, Ont. : Escort Carriers Association, 1989.

★ Gallery, Daniel V. ''20 Million Tons Under The Sea''. Ballantine, 1965.

★ Al Adcock. ''Escort Carriers in action''. Squadron/Signal publications. Printing date unknown.

Books

★ The Battle Off Samar - Taffy III at Leyte Gulf, , Robert Jon, Cox, Ivy Alba Press, 2006,

★ History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Leyte, June 1944 - January 1945, Volume XII, , Samuel E., Morison, Castle Books, 1958, ISBN 0-7858-1313-6

★ The Little Giants: U.S. Escort Carriers Against Japan, , William T., Y'Blood, Naval Institute Press, 1987, ISBN 0870212753
1. 'A Brief History of U.S. Navy Aircraft Carriers: The Escort Carriers'; Researched and written by CE1 Robert A. Germinsky, U.S. Naval Reserve U.S. Navy Website