INDO-PAKISTANI WAR OF 1965

The 'Indo-Pakistani War of 1965', also known as the 'Second Kashmir War', was the culmination of a series of skirmishes that occurred between April 1965 and September 1965 between India and Pakistan. The war was the second fought between India and Pakistan over the region of Kashmir, the first having been fought in 1947. The war lasted five weeks, resulted in thousands of casualties on both sides and ended in a United Nations (UN) mandated ceasefire. It is generally accepted that the war began following the failure of Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar which was designed to infiltrate and invade Jammu and Kashmir.
Much of the war was fought by the countries' land forces in the region of Kashmir and along the International Border (IB) between India and Pakistan. This war saw the largest amassing of troops in Kashmir, a number that was overshadowed only during the 2001-2002 military standoff between India and Pakistan. Most of the war was fought on land by each country's infantry and armored units, with substantial backing from their air forces. Many details of this war, like those of most Indo-Pakistani Wars, remain unclear and riddled with media biases.

Pre-war escalation

A declassified US State Department telegram that confirms the existence of hundreds of "infiltrators" in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Dated during the events running up to the 1965 war.

Since Independence, both nations were in contention over several issues, primarily on border disputes. Kashmir was a major divisive issue between both the nations, but other border disputes existed, most notably over the Rann of Kutch, a barren region in the Indian state of Gujarat. Though the erstwhile princely state of Junagadh was integrated into India, its borders, especially in the marshlands to the west were ambiguous. This gave rise to a dispute between Pakistan and India. On March 20 1965, and again in April 1965, fighting broke out between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch. Initially involving the border police from both nations, the disputed area soon witnessed intermittent skirmishes between the countries' armed forces. In June the same year, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The verdict, which came later in 1968, saw Pakistan gaining 350 square miles (900 km²) of the Rann of Kutch, as against its original claim of 3500 sq miles.Bhushan, Bharat. "Tulbul, Sir Creek and Siachen: Competitive Methodologies". South Asian Journal. March 2005, Encyclopedia Britannica and Open Forum - UNIDIR
After its successes in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of General Ayub Khan, is said to have believed that the Indian Army was unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory of Kashmir, following a loss to China in 1962.http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1965.htm "Indo-Pakistan War of 1965"]. Globalsecurity.com. Pakistan believed that the population of Kashmir was generally discontented with Indian rule and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few infiltrating saboteurs. This was codenamed 'Operation Gibraltar'.Amin, Agha Humayun. Maj (Retd). "Grand Slam — A Battle of Lost Opportunities". Defence Journal. Sept 2000 However, the Pakistani infiltrators were soon discovered, aided primarily by the local Kashmiris themselves and the entire operation ended in a complete disaster.
For its part, Pakistan claimed to have been concerned by the attempts of India to absorb Kashmir - a state that Pakistan claims as "disputed", into the Indian union by way Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution allowing the President of India to declare President's Rule in the disputed state.

The war

Pakistan's Ichhogil Canal was a vital barrier that needed to be crossed by Indian troops. This bridge across the canal was destroyed by the Pakistan Army.

On August 15, 1965, Indian forces crossed the ceasefire line and launched an attack on Pakistan administered Kashmir. Pakistani reports cite this attack as unprovoked."The Lahore Offensive". Storyofpakistan.com. 1 Jun. 2003 Indian reports cite the attack as a response to the massive armed infiltrations by Pakistan.Chakravorty, BC. "The Indo-Pak War, 1965". History Division, Ministry of Defence. Government of India. 1992 Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success in the northern sector (Kashmir). After launching a prolonged artillery barrage against Pakistan, India was able to capture three important mountain positions. However, by the end of the month both sides were on even footing as Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and Punch and India had gains in Pakistan Administered Kashmir (sometime referred as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir), having captured the Haji Pir Pass eight kilometers inside Pakistani territory.http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+in0189) "A Country Study: India"]. Library of Congress. Government of the United States. Sep 1995 Following the failure of Operation Gibraltar, that resulted in territorial gains and rapid Indian advances in Kashmir, Pakistan launched a bold counter attack on September 1, 1965 to reclaim vital posts in Kashmir lost to India. This attack, called '"Operation Grand Slam"' was intended to capture the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu and thus sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, Pakistan was on the verge of springing a surprise against Indian forces, who were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. India then called in its air force to target the Pakistani attack in the southern sector. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, initialising its air force to retaliate against Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab. But Operation Grand Slam failed to achieve its aim as the Pakistan Army was unable to capture the town. This became one of the turning points in the war, as India decided to relieve pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further south.

Lt. Col. Hari Singh of the Indian 18th Cavalry posing outside a captured Pakistani police station (Barkee) in Lahore District.

India crossed the International Border (IB) on the Western front on September 6, marking an official beginning of the war. On September 6, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran Major General Prasad battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichhogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was a ''de facto'' border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross over the Ichhogil Canal was made through the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of Lahore. This brought the Indian Army within the range of Lahore International Airport, and as result the United States requested a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore. One unit of the Jat regiment, 3 Jat had also crossed the Ichogil canal and captured^[1] the town of Batapore (Jallo Mur to Pakistan) on the west side of the canal, threatening Lahore on the very start of the war.
The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armored division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force Sabres rained down on the Indian 15th Division forcing it to withdraw to its starting point. Although 3 Jat suffered minimal casualties, the bulk of the damage being taken by Ammunition and stores vehicles, the higher commanders however, had no information of 3 Jat's capture of Batapore and misleading information led to the command to withdraw from Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move brought extreme disappointment^[2] to Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. Dograi was eventually recaptured by 3 Jat on 21 September, for the second time but after a much harder battle due to Pakistani reinforcements.

A Pakistan Army 106mm recoilless rifle position during the war.

On the days following September 9, both nations' premiere formations were routed in unequal battles. India's 1st Armored Division, labelled the "pride of the Indian Army", launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The Division divided itself into two prongs and came under heavy Pakistani tank fire at Taroah and was forced to withdraw. Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st Armored Division, pushed an offensive towards Khemkaran with the intent to capture Amritsar (a major city in Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar. The Pakistani 1st Armored Division never made it past Khem Karan and by the end of September 10 lay disintegrated under the defences of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at what is now known as the Battle of ''Asal Uttar'' (Real Answer). The area became known as 'Patton Nagar' (Patton Town) as Pakistan lost/abandoned nearly 100 tanks mostly Patton tanks obtained from the United States.
The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other. The Indian army suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, while Pakistan suffered no less than 3,800. The Indian army was in possession of 710 mile² (1,840 km²) of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 210 mile² (545 km²) of Indian territory. The territory occupied by India was mainly in the fertile Sialkot, Lahore and Kashmir sectors,^[3] while Pakistani land gains were primarily in deserts opposite Sindh and in Chumb in the northern sector.^[4]

Aerial warfare

:''See Main articles: Aerial warfare in 1965 India Pakistan War.
Indian and Pakistan accounts on the air war.''

PAF F-86 aircraft which took part in the war

The war saw the Indian Air Force and the Pakistani Air Force being involved in full scale combat for the first time since independence. Though the two forces had previously faced off in the First Kashmir War during the late 1940s, it was limited in scale compared to the '65 conflict.
Both countries hold highly contradictory claims on combat losses during the war and hardly any neutral sources have thoroughly verified the claims of both countries' claim. PAF claimed it had shot down 104 IAF planes losing only 19 in the process. India meanwhile officially stated that 35 IAF planes were lost while shooting down 73 PAF aircraft. According to Indian figures, the overall attrition rate was 2.16% for Pakistan Air Force and 1.49% for IAF.^[5] India also pointed that despite PAF claims of losing only a squadron of combat craft, Pakistan had been seeking urgent help from Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and China, for additional aircraft within 10 days of the war.^[6]
Pakistan's main strike force comprised the U.S. made F-86 Sabre jets, which claimed a fair share of Indian planes, though remaining vulnerable to the dimunitive Folland Gnat, nicknamed "Sabre Slayer".^[7] The F-104 Starfighter of the PAF was by far the fastest fighter plane operating in the subcontinent at that time. On the other hand, the Indian Air Force relied largely on the Hawker Hunter for attacks. Unlike the PAF whose planes largely consisted of American craft, IAF flew an assortment of planes from Vampires to Mysteres, many of which were outdated in comparison to PAF planes, with even the Hunters and Gnats being outmatched by the Sabres and Starfighters.^[8]Some of the fiercest dogfights occurred over Sargodha which was PAF's main base housing the bulk of its planes; IAF planes attacked the base but PAF was able to repulse the attacks. PAF responded by attacking Indian bases with some success, especially in air to ground attacks but were soon forced to back off, in order to provide cover for its ground troops elsewhere. In one incident, the Gujarat Chief Minister, Balawant Rai Mehta's civilian craft was shot down by PAF Sabres inside Indian territory, killing him and the crew. By the end of the war, neither the numerically larger IAF, nor the PAF which possessed a qualitative advantage,^[9]^[10] achieved air superiority.

Tank battles

Tanks of 18th Cavalry (Indian Army) on the move during the 1965 Indo-Pak War.

:''Main Article: International assessments on the tank battles''
The 1965 war witnessed some of the largest Tank Battles since World War II. The Pakistani Army had both numerical advantage in tanks as well as better equipment in the form of the venerable Patton Tank.^[11] Pakistani armour comprised largely of American made Patton tanks, which were superior to the British M4 Sherman tanks possessed in large numbers by Indian Army, and its "artillery guns out ranged the Indian artillery guns" according to Pakistan's Major General T.H. Malik.^[12] Moreover, the Sherman tanks on the Indian side were of mixed quality, some up gunned with the French High velocity CN 75 50 could hold there own, while older models still equipped with the M3 75mm were inferior. The Pakistani Sherman were universally equipped with the same 76mm gun. Pakistan also fielded tank destroyers with 90mm guns (in the form of M36 Jackson^[13]) compared to the 75mm guns on the former. Despite the qualitative edge of Pakistani armour,⁹^[14] Overall Pakistan was outfought on the battlefield by India's armour which made progress into the Lahore-Sialkot sector whilst halting Pakistan's counteroffensive on Amritsar.^[15] By the end of the war, Pakistan's newer and more potent Patton M-47 and M-48s proved to be too sophisticated in Pakistani hands,India and Japan: The Emerging Balance of Power in Asia By Columbia University East Asian Institute, Stanley J. Heginbotham, William Howard Wriggins. By Columbia University East Asian Institute, Published 1971, pp 254 and they were also employed in a faulty manner, often charging prepared defenses. India's Centurion heavy tanks however with thier 105mm guns and heavy armor were employed with success against the Pattons, despite the M-48's 120mm gun.

Naval hostilities

The navies of both India and Pakistan played no prominent role in the war of 1965, although Pakistani accounts dispute this.^[16] On September 7, a flotilla of the Pakistani Navy carried out a small scale bombardment of the coastal Indian town and radar station of Dwarka, which was 200 miles (300 km) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. Codenamed Operation Dwarka, it however, did not fulfill its primary objectives and there was no immediate retaliatory response from India. Later, the Indian fleet from Bombay sailed to Dwarka to patrol off that area to deter further bombardment. Nonetheless, foreign authors have noted that the "insignificant bombardment"^[17] of the town was a "limited engagement, with no strategic value."¹⁶
According to some Pakistani sources, one maiden submarine, PNS Ghazi allegedly kept the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier INS Vikrant besieged in Bombay throughout the war. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, but to restrict the war to a land-based conflict.^[18] Moreover, the ship was under refit in dry dock at that time and not even deployed. Even Pakistani defence writers have discounted claims that the Indian Navy was bottled up in harbour due to a single submarine, instead stating that 75% of the Indian Navy was under maintenance in harbour.^[19]
Further south towards Bombay, there were reports of underwater attacks by the Indian Navy against what they suspected were American-supplied Pakistani submarines, but this was never confirmed.

Covert operations

A number of covert operations were launched by the Pakistan Army to infiltrate Indian airbases and sabotage them.Defence Journal : SSG in the 1965 War The SSG (Special Services Group) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory and, according to the then Chief of Army Staff General Musa Khan, about 135 commandos were airdropped at three airfields. Given that the Indian targets (Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur) were deep into enemy territory only 22 commandos made it back alive and the stealth operation proved ineffective. Of those remaining, 93 were taken prisoner, and 20 were killed in encounters with the army, police or the civilians^[20] The daring attempt proved to be an "unmitigated disaster" with one of the Commanders of the operations, Major Khalid Butt being taken Prisoner. Despite the failed mission, Pakistan sources claim that it had impacted some of the planned Indian operations, as the 14 Indian Division was diverted to hunt for paratroopers, the next morning the PAF found the road filled with transport and destroyed many transport vehicles.^[21] The reason for this failure is attributed to the fact that they were not provided maps, proper briefing and worst of all with no planning or preparation^[22] In response to this India announced rewards for any Pakistani spies or paratroopers.^[23] Meanwhile, in Pakistan, there was a scare that India had retaliated with its own covert ops by sending commandos deep into Pakistan territory,²² but this was later known to be unfounded.^[24]

Losses

India and Pakistan hold widely divergent claims on the damage they have inflicted on each other and the amount of damage suffered by them. The following summarizes each nation's claims.

	Indian claimshttp://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/1965War/Chapter10.html	Pakistani claimshttp://www.defencejournal.com/2000/sept/grand-slam.htm	Independent Sourceshttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak_1965.htm^[25]
Casualties	-	-	2763 Indian soldiers, 3800 Pakistani soldiers
Combat flying effort	4073+ combat sorties	2279 combat sorties
Aircraft lost	35 IAF (official), 73 PAF.Other sources^[26] based on the Official Indian Armed Forces History^[27] put actual IAF losses at 71 including 19 accidents (non combat sortie rate is not known) and PAF's combat losses alone at 43.	19 PAF, 104 IAF	20 PAF, Pakistan claims India rejected neutral arbitration,^[28] India retorts that the neutral arbitration by John Fricker was nothing but a commissioned work. ( Fiza ya, Psyche of the Pakistan Air Force, , Pushpindar, Singh, Himalayan Books, 1991, ISBN 81-7002-038-7 )
Aerial victories	17 + 3 (post war)	30	-
Tanks destroyed	128 Indian tanks,http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/Patton2.html 152 Pakistani tanks captured, 150 Pakistani tanks destroyed. Officially 471 Pakistani tanks destroyed and 38 captured^[29]	165 Pakistan tanks^[30]	200 Pakistani tanks
Land area won	1,500 mi² (2,400 km²) of Pakistani territory	2,000 mi² (3,000 km²) of Indian territory	India held 710 mi² (1,840 km²) of Pakistani territory and Pakistan held 210 mi² (545 km²) of Indian territory

There have been only a few neutral assessments of the damages of the war, some of the neutral assessments are mentioned below:-

★ According to the United States Library of Congress Country Studies:

The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy--on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government..^[31]

★ TIME magazine analyzing the conflict,^[32] reported that India held 690 Mi² of Pakistan territory while Pakistan held 250 Mi² of Indian territory in Kashmir and Rajasthan, but had lost half its armour.

Cut off from U.S. and British arms supplies, denied Russian aid, and severely mauled by the larger Indian armed forces, Pakistan could continue the fight only by teaming up with Red China and turning its back on the U.N. ... India, by contrast, is still the big gainer in the war. Shastri had united the nation as never before.

★ An excerpt from Stanley Wolpert's ''India'',^[33] summarizing the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, is as follows:

In three weeks the second IndoPak War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U.S. ammunition and replacements for both armies forced cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory. India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.

★ Dennis Kux's ''"India and the United States estranged democracies"'' also provides a summary of the war.^[34]

Although both sides lost heavily in men and materiel, and neither gained a decisive military advantage, India had the better of the war. New Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated.

Ceasefire

On September 22, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The war ended the following day. The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexey Kosygin, brokered a ceasefire in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed an agreement to withdraw to pre-August lines no later than February 25,1966. The ceasefire though, was criticized by many hardliners and laymen alike in Pakistan who, relying solely on official reports and Pakistani media, believed that the leadership had surrendered military gains. Pakistan State's reports had suggested that their military was performing admirably in the war - which they blamed as being initiated by India - and thus the Tashkent Declaration was seen as having forfeited the gains.^[35] Some recent books published by Pakistani authors, including one by ex-ISI chief titled "The Myth of 1965 Victory",^[36] allegedly exposed such Pakistani fabrications about the war, but were bought out by Pakistan Army to prevent its sale because it was "too sensitive".^[37]^[38]
India reported a number of ceasefire violations by Pakistan besides the expected exchange of small arms and artillery fire. India charged Pakistan with 585 violations in 34 days, while Pakistan countered with accusations of 450 incidents by India.^[39] India reported that Pakistan utilized the ceasefire to intrude and capture an Indian village of Chananwalla in the Fazilka sector. This was recaptured by Indian troops on 25 December. On October 10, a B-57 Canberra on loan to the PAF was damaged by 3 SA-2 missiles fired from the IAF base at Ambala. Pakistan claims that the pilot, S/L Rashid Meer flew the aircraft back but given that it suffered further damage when the nose wheel did not extend^[40] while landing, the aircraft is a possible write off. Another Pakistani Army Auster was shot down on 16 December, killing one Pak Army Captain. Yet again, on 2 February 1967, an AOP was shot down by IAF Hunters.
The ceasefire ensured a six year period of relative peace between the two neighboring rivals before war broke out once again in 1971.

Intelligence failures

Indian miscalculations

A Life magazine cover story on the war showing an Indian soldier in Kashmir with a bazooka.

Strategic miscalculations by both nations ensured that the result of this war remained a stalemate. The Indian Army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a result. The "Official History of the 1965 War", drafted by the Ministry of Defence of India in 1992 was a long suppressed document that outlined intelligence and strategic blunders by India during the war. According to the document, on September 22 when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked the commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war, were he to hold off accepting the ceasefire for a while longer. The general replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank loss.
It was found later that only 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired and India still held twice the number of tanks than Pakistan did. By this time, the Pakistani Army itself had used close to 80% of its ammunition. Air Chief Marshal (retd) P.C. Lal, who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other. The battle plans drafted by the Ministry of Defence and General Chaudhari, did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle. This attitude of Gen. Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lal as the "Supremo Syndrome", a patronizing attitude sometimes attributed to the Indian army towards the other branches of the Indian Military.^[41]

Pakistani miscalculations

The Pakistani Army's failures started from the drawing board itself, with the supposition that a generally discontent Kashmiri people would rise to the occasion and revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing about a swift and decisive surrender of Kashmir. For whatever reason, the Kashmiri people did not revolt, and on the contrary provided the Indian Army with enough information for them to learn of Operation Gibraltar and the fact that the Army was battling not insurgents, as they had initially supposed, but Pakistani Army regulars. The Pakistani army failed to recognize that the Indian policy makers would attack the southern sector and open up the theater of conflict. Pakistan was forced to dedicate troops to the southern sector to protect Sialkot and Lahore instead of penetrating into Kashmir.
"Operation Grand Slam", which was launched by Pakistan to capture Akhnoor, a town north-east of Jammu and a key region for communications between Kashmir and the rest of India, was also a failure. Many Pakistani critics have criticized the Ayub Khan administration for being indecisive during Operation Grand Slam. They claim that the operation failed because Ayub Khan knew the importance of Akhnur to India (having called it India's "jugular vein") and did not want to capture it and drive the two nations into an all out war. Despite progress made in Akhnur, General Ayub Khan for some inexplicable reason relieved the commanding Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik of charge and replaced him with Gen. Yahya Khan. A 24 hour lull ensued, which allowed the Indian army to regroup in Akhnur and oppose a lackluster attack headed by General Yahya Khan. "The enemy came to our rescue", asserted the Indian Chief of Staff of the Western Command. Later, Akhtar Hussain Malik accused Ayub Khan for planning Operation Gibraltar which was doomed to fail and for relieving him of his command at a crucial moment in the war and threatened to expose the truth about the war and the army's failure, though he later dropped the idea for fear of being banned.^[42]
Some authors have noted that Pakistan might have been emboldened by a war game - conducted in March 1965 at the Institute of Defence Analysis, USA - that concluded that in the event of a war, Pakistan would win.^[43]^[44] Other authors like Stephen Philip Cohen, have consistently viewed that Pakistan Army "acquired an exaggerated view of the weakness of both India and the Indian military... the 1965 war was a shock".^[45] Pakistani Air Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of PAF during the war, Nur Khan later said that the Pakistan Army, and not India, was to be blamed for starting the war.^[46]^[47] However propaganda in Pakistan about the war continued; the war was not rationally analyzed in Pakistan,^[48]^[49] with most of the blame being heaped on the leadership and little importance given to intelligence failures that persisted until the debacle of the 1971 war, when Pakistan was comprehensively defeated and dismembered by India, leading to the creation of Bangladesh.

Involvement of other nations

The United States of America, which was the primary supplier of arms and ammunitions to both nations (especially Pakistan), placed a military embargo. The US was alarmed that weapons given to fight communism had been used by its allies to fight each other. This was a major blow to Pakistan, as much of its military hardware was supplied by the US, and it is believed to have contributed to the Pakistani decision that its forces could not sustain the fighting much beyond mid-September.^[50] Following the US decision, other NATO allies (including the UK) stopped military supplies to both nations. Both before and during the war, China had been a strong ally of Pakistan and had constantly threatened India, with whom it had fought a war in 1962. There were also reports of Chinese troop movements on the Indian border to support Pakistan.^[51] This was one of the reasons why India chose to accept the ceasefire, since it believed that it could not sustain a war on two fronts. While India's Non Aligned Movement stand saw few nations coming to its aid, Pakistan received help from other Islamic nations from Asia including Turkey and Iran. Other Islamic countries like Indonesia too extended aid to Pakistan. The USSR was more neutral than most other nations during the war and even invited both nations to host talks in Tashkent.

Consequences of the war

India

The war had created a tense state of affairs in its aftermath. Though the war was indecisive, Pakistan suffered much heavier material and personnel casualties compared to India. Many war historians believe that had the war continued, with growing losses and decreasing supplies, Pakistan would have been eventually defeated. India's decision to declare ceasefire with Pakistan caused some outrage among the Indian populace, who believed they had the upper hand. Both India and Pakistan increased their defense spending and the Cold War politics had taken roots in the subcontinent. The Indian Military, which was already undergoing rapid expansions, made improvements in command and control to address some shortcomings. Partly as a result of the inefficient information gathering, India established the Research and Analysis Wing for external espionage and intelligence. India viewed the American policy during the war as biased, since Pakistan had started the war but the US did little to restrain Pakistan.^[52] India slowly started aligning with the Soviet Union both politically and militarily. This would be cemented formally years later before the Bangladesh Liberation War. In light of the previous war against the Chinese, the performance in this war was viewed as a "politico-strategic" victory in India. The Indian premier, Shastri was hailed as a hero in India.^[53]

Pakistan

Many Pakistanis rated the performance of their military positively. September 6 is celebrated as 'Defence Day' in Pakistan in commemoration of the successful defence of Lahore against the Indian army. Pakistani Air Force's performance was seen in much better light compared to that of the ground troops. The myth of a mobile, hard hitting Pakistan Army was badly dented in the war as critical breakthroughs were not made.^[54] Several Pakistani writers criticized the military's ill-founded belief that their "Martial Race" of soldiers could defeat India in the war.^[55]^[56] Moreover, the end game left a lot to desire as Pakistan had lost more ground than gained and more importantly did not achieve the goal of occupying Kashmir, which has been viewed by many impartial observers as a defeat for Pakistan.^[57]^[58]^[59] Many high ranking Pakistani officials and military experts later criticized the faulty planning in Operation Gibraltar that ultimately led to the war. The Tashkent declaration was further seen as a raw deal in Pakistan though few citizens realised the gravity of the situation that existed at the end of the war. Under the advice of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's then foreign minister, Ayub Khan had raised very high expectations among the people of Pakistan about the superiority - if not invincibility - of its armed forces,^[60] but Pakistan's inability to attain its military aims during the war, created a political liability on Ayub.^[61] The defeat of its Kashmiri ambitions in the war led to the army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition.^[62] And with the war creating a huge financial burden, Pakistan's economy which had witnessed rapid progress in the early 60s, took a severe beating.^[63]^[64]
Pakistan was taken aback by the lack of support by the United States, an ally with whom the country had signed an Agreement of Cooperation. USA declared its neutrality in the war by cutting off military supplies to both sides, leading Islamabad to believe that they were "betrayed" by the United States.^[65] After the war, Pakistan would increasingly look towards China as a major source of military hardware and political support. Another negative consequence of the war was the growing resentment against the Pakistani government in East Pakistan, particularly for the West Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir.^[66] Bengali leaders accused the government for not providing adequate security for East Pakistan during the conflict, even though large sums of money were taken from the east to finance the war for Kashmir.^[67] In fact despite some PAF attacks being launched from East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh) during the war, India did not retaliate in that sector,^[68] although East Pakistan was defended only by a two-infantry brigade division (14 Division) without any tank support.^[69] Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was apprehensive of this situation, and the need for greater autonomy for the east led to another war between India and Pakistan in 1971..

Notes

1. Brigadier Desmond E Hayde, "The Battle of Dograi and Batapore", Natraj Publishers, New Delhi, 2006
2. http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050918/edit.htm#1
3. The Story of My Struggle By Tajammal Hussain Malik 1991, Jang Publishers, pp 78
4. Khaki Shadows by General K.M. Arif, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-579396-X, 2001
5. Book Review
6. IAF Combat Kills B. Harry
7. Please see the main article Sabre Slayer for the complete list on this issue including sources.
8. Operation Gibraltar revisited By Kamal Matinuddin The News International, Pakistan
9. "India and the United States estranged democracies", 1941-1991, ISBN 1-4289-8189-6, DIANE Publishing, pp 235, 238
10. Pakistan's Defence Journal
11. A history of the Pakistan Army - Defence Journal, Pakistan
12. The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965 A Strategic and Operational Analysis Major A.H. Amin, December 30, 2001 Orbat
13. 90mm M36 GUN MOTOR CARRIAGE “Jackson” ''Post W.W.II, the M36 was employed by the US Army in Korea and was distributed to friendly nations including France, where it was used in Indo-China (Vietnam), Pakistan..''
14. The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy By Selig Seidenman Harrison Published 1978
Free Press, pp 269
15. The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia By Devin T. Hagerty Page 70 Published by MIT Press
16. South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China By Lowell Dittmer, pp 77 ''
17. India's Quest for Security: defence policies, 1947-1965 By Lorne John Kavic, , 1967, University of California Press, pp 190
18. THE INDIAN END OF THE TELESCOPE India and Its Navy by Vice Admiral Gulab Hiranandani, Indian Navy (Retired), Naval War College Review, Spring 2002, Vol. LV, No. 2
19. Iqbal F Quadir - Pakistan's Defence Journal
20. Pak Def - SSG Regiment
21. Defence Journal : The Way it was Extracts from Pakistan Army Brigadier (Retd) ZA Khan's book
22. The Fighter Gap by Shoab Alam Khan in Defence Journal
23. Ending the Suspense September 17, 1965, TIME magazine
24. Remembering Our Warriors Brig (Retd) Shamim Yasin Manto S.I.(M), S.Bt, Q&A session: ("How would you assess the failures and successes of the SSG in the 1965 War?") February 2002, Defence Journal
25. onwar
26. Bharat-Rakshak.com http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/History/Misc/Loss1965.html
27. Official History of IAF in 65 War http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1965War/PDF/1965Chapter09.pdf
28. John Fricker an Englisman writing a book about the war http://www.chowk.com/show_article.cgi?aid=00001093&channel=civic%20center
29. PC Lal, "My years with the IAF", Lancer International, New Delhi
30. M47 & M48 Patton in Pakistani Service - PakDef.Info
31. United states Library of Congress Country Studies.
32. Silent Guns, Wary Combatants, October 1, 1965, TIME Magazine
33. [1] ''India'' by Stanley Wolpert. Published: University of California Press, 1990
34. "India and the United States estranged democracies", 1941-1991, ISBN 1-4289-8189-6, DIANE Publishing, Pg 238
35. CONTROVERSY: Why Gohar Ayub is wrong about 1965 — Khalid Hasan quoting Pakistan author Husain Haqqani: ''"The Pakistani people were told by the state that they had been victims of aggression and that the aggression had been repelled with the help of God."''...''"official propaganda convinced the people of Pakistan that their military had won the war."'' Daily Times, June 10, 2005
36. Can the ISI change its spots? By Akhtar Payami, Dawn (newspaper) October 07, 2006
37. Army attemps to prevent book sales by Amir Mir Gulf News October 1, 2006 Musharraf buys all copies of sensitive ‘65 warDaily News & Analysis
38. Inside Story of Musharraf-Mahmood Tussle by Hassan Abbas - (Belfer Center for International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government)
39. A Cease-Fire of Sorts Nov. 5, 1965 - TIME
40. "The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965", Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra, Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 2005
41. [2]
42. Musharraf, the ‘poor man’s Ataturk’ By Khalid Hasan September 19, 2004 Daily Times
43. The Crisis Game: Simulating International Conflict by Sidney F. Giffin
44. 1965 decided fate of the subcontinent Kashmir By Susmit Kumar, Ph.D.
45. The Idea of Pakistan, Stephen Philip Cohen, , , Brookings Institution Press, 2004, ISBN 0-8157-1502-1 Page 103
46. Noor Khan for early end to army rule - Pakistan Daily The Nation
47. A word from Pak: 1965 was 'wrong' The Times of India September 6, 2005]
48. Editorial: The army and the people Daily Times June 1, 2007
49. The Pakistan Army From 1965 to 1971 ''Analysis and reappraisal after the 1965 War'' by Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin
50. CCC
51. Pakistan and India Play With Nuclear Fire By Jonathan Power The Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research
52. Title: India and the United States estranged democracies, 1941-1991, ISBN 1-4289-8189-6, DIANE Publishing
53. The 1965 war with Pakistan - Encyclopædia Britannica
54. Pakistan And Its Three Wars by Vice Adm (Retd) Iqbal F Quadir - Defence Journal, Pakistan
55. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat Richard H. Shultz, Andrea Dew: "''The Martial Races Theory had firm adherents in Pakistan and this factor played a major role in the under-estimation of the Indian Army by Pakistani soldiers as well as civilian decision makers in 1965.''"
56. An Analysis The Sepoy Rebellion of 1857-59 by AH Amin ''The army officers of that period were convinced that they were a martial race and the Hindus of Indian Army were cowards. This myth was largely disproved in 1965''
57. Profile of Pakistan - U.S. Department of State, Failure of U.S.'s Pakistan Policy - Interview with Steve Coll
58. Speech of Bill McCollum in United States House of Representatives September 12, 1994
59. South Asia in World Politics By Devin T. Hagerty, 2005 Rowman & Littlefield, ISBN 0-7425-2587-2, pp 26
60. Dr. Ahmad Faruqui
61. Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror, Hassan Abbas, , , M.E. Sharpe, 2004, ISBN 0-7656-1497-9 , pp52
62. BBC
63. Embassy of Pakistan
64. Second opinion: The insidious logic of war Khaled Ahmed’s Urdu Press Review Daily Times June 3, 2002
65. [Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy By Richard N. Haass, 1998, Council on Foreign Relations, ISBN 0876092121 pp172
66. Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age By Peter Paret, 1986, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0198200978 pp802
67. Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, Rounaq Jahan, , , Columbia University Press, 1972, ISBN 0-231-03625-6 Pg 166-167
68. Reflections on two military presidents By M.P. Bhandara December 25, 2005, Dawn
69. The Pakistan Army From 1965 to 1971 ''Yahya Khan as Army Chief-1966-1971'' by Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin

Sources and external links

★ IAF Combat Kills - 1965 war,(Center for Indian Military History)

★ My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965, Mohammed Musa Khan, , , Wajidalis, 1983,

★ United States Library of Congress Country Studies - India

★ Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the 1965 War with Pakistan

★ Story of Pakistan

★ GlobalSecurity.org Indo-Pakistan War 1965

★ Pakistan Columnist AH Amin analyzes the war.

★ Grand Slam - A Battle of lost Opportunities, Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin — very detailed roll of events and analysis

★ A Critical Look at the 1965 Operations, Air Chief Marshall (retd) PC Lal — dispassionate analysis

★ The India-Pakistan War, 1965: 40 Years On - From Rediff.com

★ Lessons of the 1965 War from Daily Times (Pakistan)

★ Pak Army's Kargil like disaster of 1965 - South Asia Tribune

★ Spirit of ’65 & the parallels with today - Ayaz Amir

★ Pakistan Army version of the War - PakDef.info

★

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