'Law and economics', or 'economic analysis of law' is an approach to
legal theory that applies methods of
economics to law. It includes the use of economic concepts to explain the effects of laws, to assess which legal rules are
economically efficient, and to predict which legal rules will be promulgated.
[1]
Relationship to other disciplines and approaches
As used by
lawyers and legal scholars, the phrase "law and economics" refers to the application of the methods of economics to legal problems.
Because of the overlap between legal systems and political systems, some of the issues in law and economics are also raised in
political economy and
political science. Most formal academic work done in law and economics is broadly within the
Neoclassical tradition. Approaches to the same issues from
Marxist and
critical theory/
Frankfurt School perspectives usually do not identify themselves as "law and economics." For example, research by members of the
critical legal studies movement considers many of the same fundamental issues as does work labeled "law and economics". The one wing that represents a non-neoclassical approach to "law and economics" is the Continental (mainly German) tradition that sees the concept starting out of the ''Staatswissenschaften'' approach and the German Historical School of Economics; this view is represented in the ''Elgar Companion to Law and Economics'' (2nd ed. 2005) and - though not exclusively - in the ''European Journal of Law and Economics''. Here, consciously non-neoclassical approaches to economics are used for the analysis of legal (and administrative/governance) problems.
Origin and history
As early as in the
18th century,
Adam Smith discussed the economic effect on
mercantilist legislation. However, to apply economics to analyze the law regulating nonmarket activities is relatively new. In
1961,
Ronald Coase and
Guido Calabresi independently from each other published two groundbreaking articles: "The Problem of Social Cost"
[2] and "Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts".
[3] This can been seen as the starting point for the modern school of law and economics.
[4]
In the early 1970's,
Henry Manne (a former student of Coase) set out to build a Center for Law and Economics at a major law school. He began at Rochester, worked at Miami, but was soon made unwelcome, moved to Emory, and ended at George Mason. The latter soon became a center for the education of judges -- many long out of law school and never exposed to numbers and economics. Manne also attracted the support of the
John M. Olin Foundation, whose support accelerated the movement. Today, Olin centers (or programs) for Law and Economics exist at many universities.
Positive and normative law and economics
Economic analysis of law is usually divided into two subfields, positive and normative.
Positive law and economics
''Positive law and economics'' uses economic analysis to predict the effects of various legal rules. So, for example, a positive economic analysis of
tort law would predict the effects of a strict liability rule as opposed to the effects of a negligence rule. Positive law and economics has also at times purported to explain the development of legal rules, for example the common law of torts, in terms of their economic efficiency.
Normative law and economics
''Normative law and economics'' goes one step further and makes policy recommendations based on the economic consequences of various policies. The key concept for normative economic analysis is
efficiency, in particular,
allocative efficiency.
The weakest concept of efficiency used by law and economics scholars is
Pareto efficiency. A legal rule is Pareto efficient if it could not be changed so as to make one person better off without making another person worse off. (By weak, economists mean that
Pareto efficiency makes very few normative assumptions, not that it is supported by weak arguments.) A stronger conception of efficiency is
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. A legal rule is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if it could be made Pareto efficient by a side payment.
Important scholars
Important figures include the
Nobel Prize winning economists
Ronald Coase and
Gary Becker,
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit judges
Frank Easterbrook and
Richard Posner, and
William Landes.
Guido Calabresi, judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, author of the 1970 book, ''
The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis'', wrote in depth on this subject, with ''Costs of Accidents'' being cited as influential in its extensive treatment of the proper incentives and compensation required in accident situations.
[5]
Influence
In the United States, economic analysis of law has been extremely influential. Judicial opinions utilize economic analysis and the theories of law and economics with some regularity. The influence of law and economics has also been felt in legal education. Many law schools in North America, Europe, and Asia have faculty members with a graduate degree in economics. In addition, many professional economists now study and write on the relationship between economics and legal doctrine.
Critique
Despite its influence, the law and economics movement has been criticized from a number of directions. This is especially true of normative law and economics. Because most law and economics scholarship operates within a neoclassical framework, fundamental criticisms of neoclassical economics have been applied to work in law and economics.
Rational choice theory
Within the legal academy, law and economics has been criticized on the ground that
rational choice theory in economics makes unrealistic simplifying assumptions about human nature (see
rational choice theory (criminology)); Posner's application of law and economic reasoning to rape and sex
[6] may be an example of this. Liberal critics of the law and economics movements have argued that normative economic analysis does not capture the importance of
human rights and concerns for
distributive justice. Some of the heaviest criticisms of the "classical" law and economics come from the
critical legal studies movement, in particular
Duncan Kennedy[1] and
Mark Kelman.
Pareto efficiency
Relatedly, additional critique has been directed toward the assumed benefits of law and policy designed to increase
allocative efficiency; when such assumptions are modeled on "first-best" (
Pareto optimal) general-equilibrium conditions. Under the
theory of the second best, for example, if the fulfillment of a subset of optimal conditions cannot be met under any circumstances, it is incorrect to conclude that the fulfillment of ''any'' subset of optimal conditions will necessarily result in an increase in allocative efficiency.
[7]
Consequently, any expression of public policy whose purported purpose is an unambiguous increase in allocative efficiency (for example, consolidation of
research and development costs through increased
mergers and acquisitions resulting from a systematic relaxation of anti-trust laws) is, according to critics, fundamentally incorrect; as there is no general reason to conclude that an increase in allocative efficiency is more likely than a decrease.
Essentially, the "first-best" neoclassical analysis fails to properly account for various kinds of general-equilibrium feedback relationships that result from intrinsic Pareto imperfections.
7
Responses
Law and economics has adapted to some of these criticisms (see "contemporary developments," below). One critic, Jon D. Hanson of Harvard Law School, argues that our legal, economic, political, and social systems are unduly influenced by an individualistic model that assumes "dispositionism" -- the idea that outcomes are the result of our "dispositions" (economists would say "preferences"). Instead, Hanson argues, we should look to the
"situation", both inside of us (including cognitive biases) and outside of us (family, community, social norms, and other environmental factors) that have a much larger impact on our actions than mere "choice." Hanson has written many
law review articles on the subject and has books forthcoming.
Contemporary developments
Law and economics has developed in a variety of directions. One important trend has been the application of
game theory to legal problems. Other developments have been the incorporation of
behavioral economics into economic analysis of law, and the increasing use of
statistical and
econometrics techniques. Within the legal academy, the term
socio-economics has been applied to economic approaches that are self-consciously broader than the
neoclassical tradition.
Universities with law and economics programs
Almost every major American law school offers courses in law and economics and has faculty working in the field; until 2005, many of these programs received funding from the
John M. Olin Foundation, which was an early supporter of the field.
Two of the leading Law Schools focusing on Law and Economics are the
University of Chicago Law School, whose distinguished faculty includes Judge
Richard A. Posner and
Ronald Coase, and the
George Mason University School of Law, whose faculty includes Nobel laureate Vernon Smith, and perennial Nobel finalist,
Gordon Tullock. In the spring of 2006,
Vanderbilt University Law School announced the creation of a new program to award a Ph.D. in Law & Economics.
In Europe, a consortium of universities from ten different countries is running the
European Master Program in Law and Economics which is the leading European program in the field since 1990. A newer
European Doctorate program in Law and Economics is operated by three leading European centers in Law and Economics. Switzerland's
University of St.Gallen has a
Law and Economics Program on both the undergraduate (Bachelor of Arts in Law and Economics) and graduate levels (Master of Arts in Law and Economics). The graduate program was initiated in October 2005 at the first international scientific conference on Law and Economics by the President of the University, Ernst Mohr and the St.Gallen Professor and leading business lawyer
Peter Nobel. The Law and Economics Program is supported by an
International Academic Council lead by leading experts in the field of law and economics, such as
Richard A. Posner, Ronald J. Gilson, Victor Goldberg or Geoffrey P. Miller.
Journals
★
American Law and Economics Review
★
Asia Pacific Law and Economics Review
★
Erasmus Law and Economics Review (
open access)
★
European Journal of Law and Economics
★
Review of Law and Economics
★
International Review of Law and Economics
★
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
★
Journal of Law, Economics & Policy
★
Journal of Law and Economics
★
Journal of Legal Studies
★
Supreme Court Economic Review (USA)
Regional and international associations
★ Asia -
Asian Law and Economics Association
★ Australia -
Australian Law and Economics Association
★ Canada -
Canadian Law and Economics Association
★ China -
MILES Institute of Law and Economics
★ Europe -
European Association of Law and Economics
★ Finland -
Finnish Association of Law and Economics
★ Greece -
Greek Association of Law and Economics
★ Israel -
Israeli Association for Law and Economics
★ Japan -
Law & Economics Association of Japan
★ Korea -
Korean Law and Economics Association
★ New Zealand -
Law and Economics Association of New Zealand
★ Scandinavia -
Scandinavian Association of Law and Economics
★ Switzerland -
Master in Law and Economics Foundation, University of St.Gallen
★ USA -
American Law and Economics Association
★ USA -
Midwestern Law and Economics Association
Bibliography
★
Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest, eds., ''Encyclopedia of Law and Economics'' (Edward Elgar, 2000)
Online version.
★
Ronald Coase, ''The Firm, The Market, and the Law'' (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, reprint ed. 1990) ISBN 0-226-11101-6.
★
Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, ''Law and Economics'' (Addison Wesley Longman, 3rd edition, 2000) ISBN 0-321-06482-8
★
David Friedman (1987). "law and economics," '', v. 3, pp. 144-48.
★
Duncan Kennedy, "Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies" (from ''The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law'' (1998))
[2]
★
Richard Posner, ''Economic Analysis of Law'' (Aspen, 7th edition, 2007) ISBN 978-0-735-56354-4 .
See also
★
Islamic economical jurisprudence
★
Public choice theory
★
New institutional economics
★
Political economy
★
Legal theory
★
Contract theory
★
Economics
★
Legal origins theory
★
Competition policy
Notes
1. David Friedman (1987). "law and economics," '', v. 3, p. 144.
2. Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost", ''The Journal of Law and Economics'' Vol.3, No.1 (1960). This issue was actually published in 1961.
3. Guido Calabresi, "Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts", ''Yale Law Journal'', Vol.70 (1961).
4. Richard Posner, ''The Economics of Justice'' 1983, p.4.
5. Liability: Perspectives and Policy, , Robert, Litan, Brookings Institution Press, 1988, ISBN 0815752717
6. ISBN 0-674-80280-2
7. Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: An Introduction, , Richard, Markovits, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 73, 1998,