(Redirected from Low Intensity Conflict)'Low intensity conflict' (LIC) is the use of
military forces applied selectively and with restraint to enforce compliance with the policies or objectives of the
political body controlling the military force. The term can be used to describe conflicts where at least one or both of the opposing parties operate along such lines.
Low intensity operations
'Low-Intensity Operations' is a
military term for the deployment and use of troops and/or assets in situations other than
war. Generally these operations are against
non-state adversaries and are given terms like
counter-insurgency,
anti-subversion, and
peacekeeping. Some, depending on political alignment, view LIC as a form of terrorism.
[1] The term "low intensity operations" appears to have originated with General Sir
Frank Kitson.
Official state definitions
US Army Field Manual
Low-intensity conflict is defined by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (as promulgated in the US Army Field Manual 100-20) as:
... a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. It frequently involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of the armed forces. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global security implications.
Implementation
Weapons
As the name suggests, in comparison with conventional operations the armed forces involved operate at a greatly reduced tempo, with fewer soldiers, a reduced range of tactical equipment and limited scope to operate in a military manner. For example the use of
air power, pivotal in modern warfare, is often relegated to transport and surveillance.
Artillery is often not used when LIC occurs in
populated areas. The role of the armed forces is dependent on the stage of the insurrection, whether it has progressed to armed struggle or is in an early stage of propaganda and protests.
Intelligence
Intelligence gathering is essential to an efficient basis of LIC operation instructions. Electronic and signal gathering intelligence,
ELINT and
SIGINT, proves largely ineffective against low intensity opponents. LIC generally requires more ''hands-on''
HUMINT methods of information retrieval.
Stages
In the first stages of insurrection, much of the army's work is "soft" - working in conjunction with civil authorities in
psychological operations,
propaganda, counter-organizing, so-called "hearts-and-minds." If the conflict progresses, possibly into armed clashes, the role develops with the addition of the identification and removal of the armed groups - but again, at a low level, communities rather than entire cities. Throughout the conflict there is a general need for the armed forces to operate in a manner to which they are not well-suited or adequately trained - police-work, individual assassination, arrests, interrogations and torture being problematic and often leading to human rights abuses and unnecessary deaths.
Examples
Examples of low-intensity operations include the British campaigns against the
Mau Mau in Kenya in the 1950s, the
Malayan Races Liberation Army led by the Communist leader Chin Peng in Malaya in the
Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960, Aden in the 60s, Oman in the 70s, against
EOKA in
Cyprus in the 1960s, and "
the troubles" in
Northern Ireland from the late 1960s to mid-1990s. Since World War II, the British military has engaged in over fifty low intensity campaigns. The U.S.
Rapid Deployment Forces were formed to deal with low intensity conflicts.
The
Israeli Defence Forces have performed hundreds of low-intensity operations during the
al-Aqsa Intifada and achieved overwhelming results. The Israeli
SHABAK has successfully created a large network of
HUMINT agents for the purpose of extracting intelligence to enable IDF identification and termination of insurgent leaders.
LIC Doctrines
★
Urban warfare:
★
★
MOUT : the macromanagemental facet of
urban warfare, how to utilize
infantry,
tanks,
snipers and
bulldozers in order to clear a populated area from armed enemy's forces with minimal casualties to raiding forces and civilian population.
★
★
CQB : the micromanagemental facet of
urban warfare, how a squad of infantry should fight in narrow alleys, buildings and tunnels.
★
Counter terror
★
★ (when fighting against
terrorist groups)
★
Intelligence gathering
★
★
HUMINT : HUMINT stands for Human Intelligence, and refers to intelligence-gathering by means of
interrogation,
espionage and use of
secret agent networks in the local population.
★
★
SIGINT : SIGINT stands for Signals Intelligence, and refers to intelligence-gathering by interception of signals, whether by radio interception or other means.
★
★
ELINT : stands for Electronic Intelligence, and refers to intelligence-gathering by use of electronic sensors.
See also
★
Guerrilla warfare
★
Fourth Generation Warfare
References
Further reading
★ General Sir
Frank Kitson. ''Low-intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping.'' Faber and Faber, 1971. ISBN 0-571-16181-2
★ British Army (Ed.) ''Land Operations, Volume III,
Counter Revolutionary Operations'', 1969.
★ Robert Asprey. ''War in the Shadows'', ISBN 0-595-22593-4
★ David Buffaloe. ''Conventional Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict: The 82nd Airborne at Firebase Shkin, Afghanistan''
[2], October 2004.
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