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Español9/11 COMMISSION
(Redirected from National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States)
The 'National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States', also known as the '9/11 Commission', was set up on November 27, 2002 "to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 attacks", including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks.
The Commission was also mandated to provide recommendations designed to guard against future attacks. Given its significant importance in investigating one of the most important events in American history and providing recommendations to defend the U.S. against future terrorist attacks, some have compared the Commission to that of the Warren Commission of 1963–1964 in its mammoth global and national significance.
Chaired by former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean, the Commission comprised five Democrats and five Republicans. The Commission was created by Congressional legislation, with the bill signed into law by President George W. Bush.
The Commission's final report was a lengthy book, based on extensive interviews and testimony. Its primary conclusion was that the failures of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) permitted the terrorist attacks to occur and that had these agencies acted more wisely and more aggressively, the attacks could potentially have been prevented.
After the publication of its final report, the Commission closed on August 21, 2004.
After pressure from the relatives of victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was set up on November 27, 2002, by President George W. Bush and U.S. Congress. The 9/11 Commission was in session for more than a year and a half and released its final report on July 22, 2004.
The members of the Commission were:
★ Thomas Kean (Chairman) - Republican, former Governor of New Jersey
★ Lee H. Hamilton (Vice Chairman) - Democrat, former U.S. Representative from the 9th District of Indiana
★ Richard Ben-Veniste - Democrat, attorney, former chief of the Watergate Task Force of the Watergate Special Prosecutor's Office
★ Fred F. Fielding - Republican, attorney and former White House Counsel
★ Jamie Gorelick - Democrat, former Deputy Attorney General in the Clinton Administration
★ Slade Gorton - Republican, former U.S. Senator from Washington
★ Bob Kerrey - Democrat, President of the New School University and former U.S. Senator from Nebraska
★ John F. Lehman - Republican, former Secretary of the Navy
★ Timothy J. Roemer - Democrat, former U.S. Representative from the 3rd District of Indiana
★ James R. Thompson - Republican, former Governor of Illinois
The members of the Commission's staff included:
★ Philip D. Zelikow, The Commission's Executive Director; Christopher Kojm, the Commission's Deputy Executive Director; Daniel Marcus, the General Counsel; Janice Kephart, of counsel.
★ Al Felzenberg, the commission's spokesman.[1]
President Bush had initially appointed former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to head the commission, but he withdrew shortly afterward because he would have been obliged to disclose the clients of his private consulting business.[2]
Then government officials who were called to testify before the Commission included:
★ George W. Bush - President
★ Dick Cheney - Vice President
★ Colin Powell - Secretary of State
★ Donald H. Rumsfeld - Secretary of Defense
★ Condoleezza Rice - National Security Advisor
★ Richard Armitage - Deputy Secretary of State
★ Paul Wolfowitz - Deputy Secretary of Defense
Past government officials who were called to testify before the Commission included:
★ Bill Clinton - former President
★ Al Gore - former Vice President
★ Madeleine Albright - former Secretary of State
★ William Cohen - former Secretary of Defense
★ Sandy Berger - former National Security Advisor
★ Richard A. Clarke - former chief counter-terrorism adviser on the U.S. National Security Council in the George W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations
President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, former President Bill Clinton, and former Vice President Al Gore all gave private testimony without oaths. President Bush and Vice President Cheney insisted on testifying together, while Clinton and Gore met with the panel separately. As the National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice was not required to testify under oath because the position of NSA is an advisory role, independent of authority over a bureaucracy and does not require confirmation by the Senate.
Main articles: 9/11 Commission Report
The commission issued its final report on July 22, 2004. After releasing the report, Commission Chair Thomas Kean declared that both Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush had been "not well served" by the FBI and CIA [3]. The commission interviewed over 1,200 people in 10 countries and reviewed over two and a half million pages of documents, including some closely-guarded classified national security documents. Before it was released by the commission, the final public report was screened for any potentially classified information and edited as necessary.
Additionally, the commission has released several supplemental reports on the terrorists' financing, travel, and other matters.
Main articles: 9/11 Commission Report
Because the investigation was controversial and politically sensitive, many participants have been criticised during the process. Leading critics include members of the 9/11 Family Steering Committee and the Jersey Girls, who were instrumental in overcoming government resistance to establishing the 9/11 Commission in the first place, according to the documentary, "".
The 9/11 commission members were appointed by George W. Bush as well as Congress, which led to the criticism that it was not a truly independent commission. The commission stated in its report that "[their] aim has not been to assign individual blame," a judgement which some critics believed would obscure the facts of the matter in a nod to consensus politics.
Some members of victims' families have claimed that the commission has numerous conflicts of interest. 9/11 CitizensWatch, in particular, called for the resignation of Philip D. Zelikow, the executive staff director. Zelikow is a Bush-appointee who served on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. He spent three years on the President George H. W. Bush's National Security Council. Zelikow worked closely with Bush NSC advisor Condoleezza Rice and even co-wrote a book with her. Some worry that Zelikow may be using his power to deflect blame from himself and to protect Rice. Both the Family Steering Committee and 9-11 Citizens Watch demanded his resignation, without success.
In addition, many members had ties which could be viewed as conflicts of interest.
★ Jamie Gorelick, while serving in the Department of Justice under the Clinton administration, developed the policy that prevented communication between various government law enforcement and intelligence agencies, specifically the FBI and CIA. (the "wall memo").[4] She also is on the board of United Technologies. Gorelick's firm has agreed to represent Prince Mohammed al Faisal in the suit by the 9/11 families. The families contend that al Faisal has legal responsibility for the 9/11 attacks.
★ Thomas Kean has a history of investments that link him to Saudi Arabian investors who have financially supported both George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden in the past. One example is his former business connections to Khalid bin Mahfouz, an alleged terrorist financier. He was also at one point or still is on the board of Pepsi Bottling, Amerada Hess, UnitedHealth Group, CIT Group and Aramark.
★ Fred F. Fielding has done legal work for two of Bush's leading "Pioneer" fund-raisers. Fielding also works for a law firm lobbying for Spirit Airlines and United Airlines.
★ Slade Gorton has close ties to Boeing, which built all the planes destroyed on 9/11, and his law firm represents several major airlines, including Delta Air Lines.
★ James Thompson is the head of a law firm that lobbies for American Airlines, and he has previously represented United Airlines.
★ Richard Ben-Veniste has represented Democratic National Chairman Terry McAuliffe, and continues to represent Boeing and United Airlines.
★ Max Cleland, former U.S. Senator, has received $300,000 from the airline industry. He publicly complained about the White House's refusal to cooperate, then was appointed head of the U.S. Export/Import Bank by the president and resigned from the Commission.
★ Lee Hamilton sits on many advisory boards, including those to the CIA, the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council, The United States Commission on National Security, and the US Army.
★ Tim Roemer represents Boeing and Lockheed Martin.
The commission's defenders claim that these do not represent significant conflicts of interest, and that the commission maintained its neutrality.
In April 2002, Bush said that the investigation into 9/11 should be confined to Congress because it deals with sensitive information that could reveal sources and methods of intelligence.[5] But by September, the White House came under intense fire concerning the commission from many victims' families,[6] and thus President Bush finally agreed to the creation of an independent 9/11 commission. But many 9/11 victims' families believed that the scope of the investigation by the Commission did not go far enough in investigating the U.S. government's failures because the Commission was not to investigate intelligence failures.[7]
However, the White House insisted that it was to appoint the commission's chair, leading some to question the commission's independence. The initial person appointed to head the commission, Henry Kissinger, has been accused by many of having been involved in past government coverups in South America (specifically, the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile), and of having on-going business relationships with members of the Bin Laden family in Saudi Arabia.
Even after Kissinger resigned, the White House was often cited as having attempted to block the release of information to the commission[8] and for refusing to give interviews without tight conditions attached leading to threats to subpoena.[9] The Bush Administration has further been accused of attempting to derail the commission by giving it one of the smallest independent commission funding levels in recent history ($3 million),[10] and by giving the commission a very short deadline. The White House insists that they have given the commission "unprecedented cooperation".
While President Bush and Vice President Cheney did ultimately agree to testify, they did so only under several conditions:
★ They would be allowed to testify jointly;
★ They would not be required to take an oath before testifying;
★ The testimony would not be recorded electronically or transcribed, and that the only record would be notes taken by one of the commission staffers;
★ These notes would not be made public.
The commission agreed to these conditions, and the President and Vice President gave their testimony on April 29.
For more than two years after the attacks, officials with North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provided inaccurate information about the response to the hijackings in testimony and media appearances. Authorities suggested that U.S. air defenses had reacted quickly, that jets had been scrambled in response to the last two hijackings and that fighters were prepared to shoot down United Airlines Flight 93 if it threatened Washington, D.C..
The Commission reported a year later that audiotapes from NORAD's Northeast headquarters and other evidence showed clearly that the military never had any of the hijacked airliners in its sights and at one point chased a phantom aircraft—American Airlines Flight 11—long after it had crashed into the World Trade Center.[11] For example, Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold and Col. Alan Scott told the commission that NORAD had begun tracking United 93 at 9:16 a.m., but the commission determined that the airliner was not even hijacked until 12 minutes later. According to later testimony, the military was not aware of the flight until after it had crashed in Pennsylvania.
The Commission was forced to use subpoenas to obtain the cooperation of the FAA and NORAD to release evidence such as audiotapes. The agencies' reluctance to release the tapes—along with e-mails, erroneous public statements and other evidence—led some of the panel's staff members and commissioners to believe that authorities sought to mislead the commission and the public about what happened on September 11. "I was shocked at how different the truth was from the way it was described," John Farmer, a former New Jersey attorney general who led the staff inquiry into events on September 11, said in an August 2006 interview.[11]
In their book "" on their experience serving as co-chairs of the Commission, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton devoted the first chapter on how they believed the Commission was set up for failure. Hamilton listed a number of reasons why they thought this, including the late start of the Commission and the very short deadline imposed; the insufficient funds, 3 million dollars, initially allocated for conducting such an extensive investigation (later the Commission requested and received additional funds, but the chairs still felt hamstrung); the many politicians who did not want the Commission formed; the continuing resistance and opposition to the work of the Commission by many politicians, particularly those who did not wish to be blamed for any of what happened; and the denial of access by various agencies to documents and witnesses. "So there were all kinds of reasons we thought we were set up to fail." [13]
". . .Whereas the investigation of the Challenger disaster received $50 million, Bush promised only $3 million for the investigation of the much more deadly and complex disaster of 9/11. He then initially resisted when the commission asked for an additional $8 million."
from David Ray Griffin's ''The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions.'' p.284
Some conservatives believe that the Democratic Party used the commission for partisan advantage during the 2004 election campaign. Rather than focusing equally on all factors, critics predicted that Congressional Democrats would ignore any policy errors made by Bill Clinton while emphasizing the mistakes of President Bush.[14]
In contrast, many opponents of the Bush administration believe that the commission was set up to perform a superficial examination of the background of the attacks, thereby meeting public demands for an investigation while still preventing any substantive examination. Also they argue that Republicans on the commission and in Congress ignored mistakes of the Bush administration while exaggerating those made by former President Clinton.
Four books that critique the official Commission are ''Crossing the Rubicon'' by Michael Ruppert, ''The Terror Timeline: Year by Year, Day by Day, Minute by Minute'', by Paul Thompson, ''The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions, A Critique of the Kean-Zelikow Report'' by David Ray Griffin, and ''Cover Up: What the Government is Still Hiding About the War on Terror'', by Peter Lance. All describe severe conflicts of interest that the Commissioners had and point out problems in the official narrative that suggest the attacks were allowed to happen, or rather made to happen, in order to achieve long-sought policy changes (the Iraq war and "Homeland Security").
''Newsweek'', in late February, 2006, reported that a draft of the 9/11 Commission Report expressed skepticism about Dick Cheney's claim to have spoken with President Bush before giving an order to shoot down United Flight 93. According to ''Newsweek'', White House officials successfully fought to have those parts of the report toned down.[15]
Former FBI, NSA and other federal intelligence experts claim the 9/11 Commission report was fundamentally flawed because the 9/11 Commission refused to hear, ignored, or censored testimony about the many pre-September 11 warnings given to the FBI and U.S. intelligence agencies. These federal whistleblowers claim that in an effort to avoid having to hold any individual accountable, the 9/11 Commission turned a blind eye on FBI agent-provided evidence before September 11 regarding the 9/11 plot.[16]
The reputation and credibility of the commission has recently been damaged by evidence of a lack of thoroughness or possibly a coverup. In August 2005, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer claimed he had informed 9/11 Commission Executive Director Dr. Philip D. Zelikow about a highly classified data-mining project called Able Danger that had identified two of the three terrorist cells responsible for 9/11. Shaffer said Dr. Zelikow was initially very interested and gave Shaffer his card to contact him again. However, Shaffer claims when he contacted Dr. Zelikow, he was no longer interested in information about Able Danger.[17] The commission later issued a response saying they found Shaffer "not sufficiently reliable" and the information was "lacking historical significance" and did not warrant further investigation. [1] Subsequently, four additional "credible witnesses" have come forward to support Shaffer's account of Able Danger. [18]
Former Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA), a member of the Commission, said: "Bluntly, it just didn't happen and that's the conclusion of all 10 of us." A search for documents on Able Danger has not been very productive, leading U.S. Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) to speculate that a coverup may have occurred. The Pentagon investigated the matter and has not been able to find any documentary evidence confirming the allegations.[19] Pentagon spokesman Army Maj. Paul Swiergosz said: "We've interviewed 80 people involved with Able Danger, combed through hundreds of thousands of documents and millions of e-mails and have still found no documentation of Mohamed Atta." But Weldon claims that the Pentagon ordered the destruction of a large volume of documents related to Able Danger.[19]
Former FBI director Louis Freeh criticized the 9/11 Commission for ignoring key evidence from Able Danger, which, he alleged, resulted in false statements being made in the final 9/11 Commission report. For example, the 9/11 Commission concluded that "American intelligence agencies were unaware of Mr. Atta until the day of the attacks," which, Mr. Freeh stated, appears to be false, given that Able Danger had identified Mohammed Atta, the alleged ring-leader of the 19 hijackers, as an Al Qaida man active in the United States, and was tracking him for many months.
Further, Director Freeh criticized the Commission for allowing the Pentagon to withhold key evidence about the facts found by Able Danger, and concluded that these inadequacies raised serious questions about the credibility of the 9/11 Commission (Wall Street Journal, November 17, 2005, http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110007559 last visited 2007/5/28).
Main articles: Sandy Berger#Convicted of mishandling classified terror documents
★ The U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries.
★ The United States should make the difficult long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan.
★ The United States and the international community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan.
★ The problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship must be confronted, openly.
★ The U.S. government must define what the message is, that for which it stands.
Months after the 9/11 Commission had officially issued its report and ceased its functions, Chairman Kean and other commissioners toured the country to draw attention to the recommendations of the Commission for reducing the terror risk, claiming that some of their recommendations were being ignored. Co-chairs Kean and Hamilton wrote a book about the constraints they faced as commissioners titled ''Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission''.
''Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission'', by Thomas Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, is a book about the September 11, 2001 attacks and the 9/11 Commission that investigated them.
The book was released on August 15, 2006 and chronicles the work of Kean (Commission Chairman) and Hamilton (Commission Vice-Chairman) of the 9/11 Commission, which some consider one of the most important independent government commissions in American political history.
In the book, Kean and Hamilton write that the 9/11 Commission was so frustrated with repeated misstatements by officials from The Pentagon and the Federal Aviation Administration during the investigation that it considered a separate investigation into possible obstruction of justice by Pentagon and FAA officials. [21]
The book is published by Alfred A. Knopf.
1. Four in 9/11 Plot Are Called Tied to Qaeda in '00
2. Kissinger resigns as head of 9/11 commission
3. 9/11 Commission finds 'deep institutional failings'
4. Instructions on Separation of Certain Foreign Counterintelligence and Criminal Investigations
5. Bush Opposes 9/11 Query Panel
6. 9-11 Relatives Grill Bush Administration
7. Bush Backs Independent 9-11 Probe
8. Bush: Documents sought by 9/11 commission 'very sensitive'
9. 9/11 commission eyes subpoena of White House data
10. 9-11 Commission Funding Woes
11. 9/11 Panel Suspected Deception by Pentagon
12. 9/11 Panel Suspected Deception by Pentagon
13. CBC News, August 21, 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/sunday/911hamilton.html
14. Administration Drags Feet Cooperating With 9/11 Probes
15. The Shot Heard Round the World
16. The 9/11 Commission: A Play on Nothing in Three Acts
17. Inside Able Danger – The Secret Birth, Extraordinary Life and Untimely Death of a U.S. Military Intelligence Program
18. Kean-Hamilton Statement on ABLE DANGER
19. {{cite news | title = This statement needs referenced, the originally cited website is no longer available
20. {{cite news | title = This statement needs referenced, the originally cited website is no longer available
21. Book: Sept. 11 Panel Doubted Officials
★ 9/11 conspiracy theories
★ 9/11 Commission Report
★ The Family Steering Committee
★ Jersey Girls, a group of New Jersey-based 9/11 widows
★ September 11, 2001 attacks
★ War games in progress on September 11, 2001
★ 9/11 (radio communications)
★
★ 9/11 Commission Official Web Site
★ The Complete 9/11 Commission Report (7 MB PDF)
★ 9/11 Commission staff biographies
★ The full text of the 9/11 Commission Report in a searchable on-line format or downloadable eBook
★ Search the 9/11 Commission Report indexed by individual paragraphs
★ 9/11 Public Discourse Project (Set up by Commission members following completion of report)
★ Video excerpts from the final staff report hearing
★ Map showing connections between Kean, Gorelick and Lehman to major corporations
★ ''Governor Tom Kean'', a biography of 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas Kean by Alvin S. Felzenberg, Rutgers University Press.
★ 9/11 Commission Recommendations
★ Congressional Research Service, 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status, Dec. 2006
★ Opening of ''The Path to 9/11'' (based on the 9/11 Commission Report), ABC, September 10, 2006, including disclaimer.
★ ''The Five Unanswered Questions About 9/11'', a book by John Ridgeway, Seven Stories Press.
★ "9/11 Commission Report: An exercise in escapism", an article by G. Parthasarathy, ''The Hindu Business Line'', July 30, 2004.
★ ''The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions'', a book by David Ray Griffen.
★ "Whitewash as Public Service: How The 9/11 Commission Report defrauds the nation", by Benjamin DeMott, ''Harper's Magazine'', October 2004.
★ "The Final Fraud", an article by Michael Kane, Fromthewilderness.com, 2004.
Hawala: An Informal Payment System and Its Use to Finance Terrorism, by Sebastian R. Müller (Broschiert - Dec. 2006), ISBN: ISBN-10: 3865506569, ISBN-13: 978-3865506566
The Commission's seal
The 'National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States', also known as the '9/11 Commission', was set up on November 27, 2002 "to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 attacks", including preparedness for and the immediate response to the attacks.
The Commission was also mandated to provide recommendations designed to guard against future attacks. Given its significant importance in investigating one of the most important events in American history and providing recommendations to defend the U.S. against future terrorist attacks, some have compared the Commission to that of the Warren Commission of 1963–1964 in its mammoth global and national significance.
Chaired by former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean, the Commission comprised five Democrats and five Republicans. The Commission was created by Congressional legislation, with the bill signed into law by President George W. Bush.
The Commission's final report was a lengthy book, based on extensive interviews and testimony. Its primary conclusion was that the failures of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) permitted the terrorist attacks to occur and that had these agencies acted more wisely and more aggressively, the attacks could potentially have been prevented.
After the publication of its final report, the Commission closed on August 21, 2004.
History
After pressure from the relatives of victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was set up on November 27, 2002, by President George W. Bush and U.S. Congress. The 9/11 Commission was in session for more than a year and a half and released its final report on July 22, 2004.
Members
The members of the Commission were:
★ Thomas Kean (Chairman) - Republican, former Governor of New Jersey
★ Lee H. Hamilton (Vice Chairman) - Democrat, former U.S. Representative from the 9th District of Indiana
★ Richard Ben-Veniste - Democrat, attorney, former chief of the Watergate Task Force of the Watergate Special Prosecutor's Office
★ Fred F. Fielding - Republican, attorney and former White House Counsel
★ Jamie Gorelick - Democrat, former Deputy Attorney General in the Clinton Administration
★ Slade Gorton - Republican, former U.S. Senator from Washington
★ Bob Kerrey - Democrat, President of the New School University and former U.S. Senator from Nebraska
★ John F. Lehman - Republican, former Secretary of the Navy
★ Timothy J. Roemer - Democrat, former U.S. Representative from the 3rd District of Indiana
★ James R. Thompson - Republican, former Governor of Illinois
The members of the Commission's staff included:
★ Philip D. Zelikow, The Commission's Executive Director; Christopher Kojm, the Commission's Deputy Executive Director; Daniel Marcus, the General Counsel; Janice Kephart, of counsel.
★ Al Felzenberg, the commission's spokesman.[1]
President Bush had initially appointed former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to head the commission, but he withdrew shortly afterward because he would have been obliged to disclose the clients of his private consulting business.[2]
Officials called to testify
Then government officials who were called to testify before the Commission included:
★ George W. Bush - President
★ Dick Cheney - Vice President
★ Colin Powell - Secretary of State
★ Donald H. Rumsfeld - Secretary of Defense
★ Condoleezza Rice - National Security Advisor
★ Richard Armitage - Deputy Secretary of State
★ Paul Wolfowitz - Deputy Secretary of Defense
Past government officials who were called to testify before the Commission included:
★ Bill Clinton - former President
★ Al Gore - former Vice President
★ Madeleine Albright - former Secretary of State
★ William Cohen - former Secretary of Defense
★ Sandy Berger - former National Security Advisor
★ Richard A. Clarke - former chief counter-terrorism adviser on the U.S. National Security Council in the George W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations
President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, former President Bill Clinton, and former Vice President Al Gore all gave private testimony without oaths. President Bush and Vice President Cheney insisted on testifying together, while Clinton and Gore met with the panel separately. As the National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice was not required to testify under oath because the position of NSA is an advisory role, independent of authority over a bureaucracy and does not require confirmation by the Senate.
Report
The cover of the final 9/11 report, which can be purchased in bookstores across the United States and around the world
Main articles: 9/11 Commission Report
The commission issued its final report on July 22, 2004. After releasing the report, Commission Chair Thomas Kean declared that both Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush had been "not well served" by the FBI and CIA [3]. The commission interviewed over 1,200 people in 10 countries and reviewed over two and a half million pages of documents, including some closely-guarded classified national security documents. Before it was released by the commission, the final public report was screened for any potentially classified information and edited as necessary.
Additionally, the commission has released several supplemental reports on the terrorists' financing, travel, and other matters.
Criticisms
Main articles: 9/11 Commission Report
Because the investigation was controversial and politically sensitive, many participants have been criticised during the process. Leading critics include members of the 9/11 Family Steering Committee and the Jersey Girls, who were instrumental in overcoming government resistance to establishing the 9/11 Commission in the first place, according to the documentary, "".
Claims of bias within the commission
The 9/11 commission members were appointed by George W. Bush as well as Congress, which led to the criticism that it was not a truly independent commission. The commission stated in its report that "[their] aim has not been to assign individual blame," a judgement which some critics believed would obscure the facts of the matter in a nod to consensus politics.
Some members of victims' families have claimed that the commission has numerous conflicts of interest. 9/11 CitizensWatch, in particular, called for the resignation of Philip D. Zelikow, the executive staff director. Zelikow is a Bush-appointee who served on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. He spent three years on the President George H. W. Bush's National Security Council. Zelikow worked closely with Bush NSC advisor Condoleezza Rice and even co-wrote a book with her. Some worry that Zelikow may be using his power to deflect blame from himself and to protect Rice. Both the Family Steering Committee and 9-11 Citizens Watch demanded his resignation, without success.
In addition, many members had ties which could be viewed as conflicts of interest.
★ Jamie Gorelick, while serving in the Department of Justice under the Clinton administration, developed the policy that prevented communication between various government law enforcement and intelligence agencies, specifically the FBI and CIA. (the "wall memo").[4] She also is on the board of United Technologies. Gorelick's firm has agreed to represent Prince Mohammed al Faisal in the suit by the 9/11 families. The families contend that al Faisal has legal responsibility for the 9/11 attacks.
★ Thomas Kean has a history of investments that link him to Saudi Arabian investors who have financially supported both George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden in the past. One example is his former business connections to Khalid bin Mahfouz, an alleged terrorist financier. He was also at one point or still is on the board of Pepsi Bottling, Amerada Hess, UnitedHealth Group, CIT Group and Aramark.
★ Fred F. Fielding has done legal work for two of Bush's leading "Pioneer" fund-raisers. Fielding also works for a law firm lobbying for Spirit Airlines and United Airlines.
★ Slade Gorton has close ties to Boeing, which built all the planes destroyed on 9/11, and his law firm represents several major airlines, including Delta Air Lines.
★ James Thompson is the head of a law firm that lobbies for American Airlines, and he has previously represented United Airlines.
★ Richard Ben-Veniste has represented Democratic National Chairman Terry McAuliffe, and continues to represent Boeing and United Airlines.
★ Max Cleland, former U.S. Senator, has received $300,000 from the airline industry. He publicly complained about the White House's refusal to cooperate, then was appointed head of the U.S. Export/Import Bank by the president and resigned from the Commission.
★ Lee Hamilton sits on many advisory boards, including those to the CIA, the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council, The United States Commission on National Security, and the US Army.
★ Tim Roemer represents Boeing and Lockheed Martin.
The commission's defenders claim that these do not represent significant conflicts of interest, and that the commission maintained its neutrality.
Claims of lack of cooperation from the White House
In April 2002, Bush said that the investigation into 9/11 should be confined to Congress because it deals with sensitive information that could reveal sources and methods of intelligence.[5] But by September, the White House came under intense fire concerning the commission from many victims' families,[6] and thus President Bush finally agreed to the creation of an independent 9/11 commission. But many 9/11 victims' families believed that the scope of the investigation by the Commission did not go far enough in investigating the U.S. government's failures because the Commission was not to investigate intelligence failures.[7]
However, the White House insisted that it was to appoint the commission's chair, leading some to question the commission's independence. The initial person appointed to head the commission, Henry Kissinger, has been accused by many of having been involved in past government coverups in South America (specifically, the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile), and of having on-going business relationships with members of the Bin Laden family in Saudi Arabia.
Even after Kissinger resigned, the White House was often cited as having attempted to block the release of information to the commission[8] and for refusing to give interviews without tight conditions attached leading to threats to subpoena.[9] The Bush Administration has further been accused of attempting to derail the commission by giving it one of the smallest independent commission funding levels in recent history ($3 million),[10] and by giving the commission a very short deadline. The White House insists that they have given the commission "unprecedented cooperation".
While President Bush and Vice President Cheney did ultimately agree to testify, they did so only under several conditions:
★ They would be allowed to testify jointly;
★ They would not be required to take an oath before testifying;
★ The testimony would not be recorded electronically or transcribed, and that the only record would be notes taken by one of the commission staffers;
★ These notes would not be made public.
The commission agreed to these conditions, and the President and Vice President gave their testimony on April 29.
Commissioners suspected the Pentagon was deceiving the Commission
For more than two years after the attacks, officials with North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provided inaccurate information about the response to the hijackings in testimony and media appearances. Authorities suggested that U.S. air defenses had reacted quickly, that jets had been scrambled in response to the last two hijackings and that fighters were prepared to shoot down United Airlines Flight 93 if it threatened Washington, D.C..
The Commission reported a year later that audiotapes from NORAD's Northeast headquarters and other evidence showed clearly that the military never had any of the hijacked airliners in its sights and at one point chased a phantom aircraft—American Airlines Flight 11—long after it had crashed into the World Trade Center.[11] For example, Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold and Col. Alan Scott told the commission that NORAD had begun tracking United 93 at 9:16 a.m., but the commission determined that the airliner was not even hijacked until 12 minutes later. According to later testimony, the military was not aware of the flight until after it had crashed in Pennsylvania.
The Commission was forced to use subpoenas to obtain the cooperation of the FAA and NORAD to release evidence such as audiotapes. The agencies' reluctance to release the tapes—along with e-mails, erroneous public statements and other evidence—led some of the panel's staff members and commissioners to believe that authorities sought to mislead the commission and the public about what happened on September 11. "I was shocked at how different the truth was from the way it was described," John Farmer, a former New Jersey attorney general who led the staff inquiry into events on September 11, said in an August 2006 interview.[11]
Commissioners believe the Commission was set up to fail
In their book "" on their experience serving as co-chairs of the Commission, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton devoted the first chapter on how they believed the Commission was set up for failure. Hamilton listed a number of reasons why they thought this, including the late start of the Commission and the very short deadline imposed; the insufficient funds, 3 million dollars, initially allocated for conducting such an extensive investigation (later the Commission requested and received additional funds, but the chairs still felt hamstrung); the many politicians who did not want the Commission formed; the continuing resistance and opposition to the work of the Commission by many politicians, particularly those who did not wish to be blamed for any of what happened; and the denial of access by various agencies to documents and witnesses. "So there were all kinds of reasons we thought we were set up to fail." [13]
Claims that the investigation lacked adequate funds
". . .Whereas the investigation of the Challenger disaster received $50 million, Bush promised only $3 million for the investigation of the much more deadly and complex disaster of 9/11. He then initially resisted when the commission asked for an additional $8 million."
from David Ray Griffin's ''The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions.'' p.284
Claims the commission was used for partisan purposes
Some conservatives believe that the Democratic Party used the commission for partisan advantage during the 2004 election campaign. Rather than focusing equally on all factors, critics predicted that Congressional Democrats would ignore any policy errors made by Bill Clinton while emphasizing the mistakes of President Bush.[14]
In contrast, many opponents of the Bush administration believe that the commission was set up to perform a superficial examination of the background of the attacks, thereby meeting public demands for an investigation while still preventing any substantive examination. Also they argue that Republicans on the commission and in Congress ignored mistakes of the Bush administration while exaggerating those made by former President Clinton.
Four books that critique the official Commission are ''Crossing the Rubicon'' by Michael Ruppert, ''The Terror Timeline: Year by Year, Day by Day, Minute by Minute'', by Paul Thompson, ''The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions, A Critique of the Kean-Zelikow Report'' by David Ray Griffin, and ''Cover Up: What the Government is Still Hiding About the War on Terror'', by Peter Lance. All describe severe conflicts of interest that the Commissioners had and point out problems in the official narrative that suggest the attacks were allowed to happen, or rather made to happen, in order to achieve long-sought policy changes (the Iraq war and "Homeland Security").
''Newsweek'', in late February, 2006, reported that a draft of the 9/11 Commission Report expressed skepticism about Dick Cheney's claim to have spoken with President Bush before giving an order to shoot down United Flight 93. According to ''Newsweek'', White House officials successfully fought to have those parts of the report toned down.[15]
Claims the commission ignored or censored key government evidence
Former FBI, NSA and other federal intelligence experts claim the 9/11 Commission report was fundamentally flawed because the 9/11 Commission refused to hear, ignored, or censored testimony about the many pre-September 11 warnings given to the FBI and U.S. intelligence agencies. These federal whistleblowers claim that in an effort to avoid having to hold any individual accountable, the 9/11 Commission turned a blind eye on FBI agent-provided evidence before September 11 regarding the 9/11 plot.[16]
Claims the commission ignored information regarding Able Danger
The reputation and credibility of the commission has recently been damaged by evidence of a lack of thoroughness or possibly a coverup. In August 2005, Lt. Col. Anthony Shaffer claimed he had informed 9/11 Commission Executive Director Dr. Philip D. Zelikow about a highly classified data-mining project called Able Danger that had identified two of the three terrorist cells responsible for 9/11. Shaffer said Dr. Zelikow was initially very interested and gave Shaffer his card to contact him again. However, Shaffer claims when he contacted Dr. Zelikow, he was no longer interested in information about Able Danger.[17] The commission later issued a response saying they found Shaffer "not sufficiently reliable" and the information was "lacking historical significance" and did not warrant further investigation. [1] Subsequently, four additional "credible witnesses" have come forward to support Shaffer's account of Able Danger. [18]
Former Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA), a member of the Commission, said: "Bluntly, it just didn't happen and that's the conclusion of all 10 of us." A search for documents on Able Danger has not been very productive, leading U.S. Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA) to speculate that a coverup may have occurred. The Pentagon investigated the matter and has not been able to find any documentary evidence confirming the allegations.[19] Pentagon spokesman Army Maj. Paul Swiergosz said: "We've interviewed 80 people involved with Able Danger, combed through hundreds of thousands of documents and millions of e-mails and have still found no documentation of Mohamed Atta." But Weldon claims that the Pentagon ordered the destruction of a large volume of documents related to Able Danger.[19]
FBI director's critique regarding Able Danger
Former FBI director Louis Freeh criticized the 9/11 Commission for ignoring key evidence from Able Danger, which, he alleged, resulted in false statements being made in the final 9/11 Commission report. For example, the 9/11 Commission concluded that "American intelligence agencies were unaware of Mr. Atta until the day of the attacks," which, Mr. Freeh stated, appears to be false, given that Able Danger had identified Mohammed Atta, the alleged ring-leader of the 19 hijackers, as an Al Qaida man active in the United States, and was tracking him for many months.
Further, Director Freeh criticized the Commission for allowing the Pentagon to withhold key evidence about the facts found by Able Danger, and concluded that these inadequacies raised serious questions about the credibility of the 9/11 Commission (Wall Street Journal, November 17, 2005, http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110007559 last visited 2007/5/28).
Sandy Berger convicted of stealing and destroying copies of classified terror documents
Main articles: Sandy Berger#Convicted of mishandling classified terror documents
Commission recommendations
★ The U.S. government must identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries.
★ The United States should make the difficult long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan.
★ The United States and the international community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan.
★ The problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship must be confronted, openly.
★ The U.S. government must define what the message is, that for which it stands.
Work of commissioners after the Commission ceased its functions
Months after the 9/11 Commission had officially issued its report and ceased its functions, Chairman Kean and other commissioners toured the country to draw attention to the recommendations of the Commission for reducing the terror risk, claiming that some of their recommendations were being ignored. Co-chairs Kean and Hamilton wrote a book about the constraints they faced as commissioners titled ''Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission''.
''Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission'', by Thomas Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, is a book about the September 11, 2001 attacks and the 9/11 Commission that investigated them.
The book was released on August 15, 2006 and chronicles the work of Kean (Commission Chairman) and Hamilton (Commission Vice-Chairman) of the 9/11 Commission, which some consider one of the most important independent government commissions in American political history.
In the book, Kean and Hamilton write that the 9/11 Commission was so frustrated with repeated misstatements by officials from The Pentagon and the Federal Aviation Administration during the investigation that it considered a separate investigation into possible obstruction of justice by Pentagon and FAA officials. [21]
The book is published by Alfred A. Knopf.
References
1. Four in 9/11 Plot Are Called Tied to Qaeda in '00
2. Kissinger resigns as head of 9/11 commission
3. 9/11 Commission finds 'deep institutional failings'
4. Instructions on Separation of Certain Foreign Counterintelligence and Criminal Investigations
5. Bush Opposes 9/11 Query Panel
6. 9-11 Relatives Grill Bush Administration
7. Bush Backs Independent 9-11 Probe
8. Bush: Documents sought by 9/11 commission 'very sensitive'
9. 9/11 commission eyes subpoena of White House data
10. 9-11 Commission Funding Woes
11. 9/11 Panel Suspected Deception by Pentagon
12. 9/11 Panel Suspected Deception by Pentagon
13. CBC News, August 21, 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/sunday/911hamilton.html
14. Administration Drags Feet Cooperating With 9/11 Probes
15. The Shot Heard Round the World
16. The 9/11 Commission: A Play on Nothing in Three Acts
17. Inside Able Danger – The Secret Birth, Extraordinary Life and Untimely Death of a U.S. Military Intelligence Program
18. Kean-Hamilton Statement on ABLE DANGER
19. {{cite news | title = This statement needs referenced, the originally cited website is no longer available
20. {{cite news | title = This statement needs referenced, the originally cited website is no longer available
21. Book: Sept. 11 Panel Doubted Officials
See also
★ 9/11 conspiracy theories
★ 9/11 Commission Report
★ The Family Steering Committee
★ Jersey Girls, a group of New Jersey-based 9/11 widows
★ September 11, 2001 attacks
★ War games in progress on September 11, 2001
★ 9/11 (radio communications)
★
External links
★ 9/11 Commission Official Web Site
★ The Complete 9/11 Commission Report (7 MB PDF)
★ 9/11 Commission staff biographies
★ The full text of the 9/11 Commission Report in a searchable on-line format or downloadable eBook
★ Search the 9/11 Commission Report indexed by individual paragraphs
★ 9/11 Public Discourse Project (Set up by Commission members following completion of report)
★ Video excerpts from the final staff report hearing
★ Map showing connections between Kean, Gorelick and Lehman to major corporations
★ ''Governor Tom Kean'', a biography of 9/11 Commission Chairman Thomas Kean by Alvin S. Felzenberg, Rutgers University Press.
★ 9/11 Commission Recommendations
★ Congressional Research Service, 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Implementation Status, Dec. 2006
★ Opening of ''The Path to 9/11'' (based on the 9/11 Commission Report), ABC, September 10, 2006, including disclaimer.
Critical Essays and Books
★ ''The Five Unanswered Questions About 9/11'', a book by John Ridgeway, Seven Stories Press.
★ "9/11 Commission Report: An exercise in escapism", an article by G. Parthasarathy, ''The Hindu Business Line'', July 30, 2004.
★ ''The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions'', a book by David Ray Griffen.
★ "Whitewash as Public Service: How The 9/11 Commission Report defrauds the nation", by Benjamin DeMott, ''Harper's Magazine'', October 2004.
★ "The Final Fraud", an article by Michael Kane, Fromthewilderness.com, 2004.
External Sources
Hawala: An Informal Payment System and Its Use to Finance Terrorism, by Sebastian R. Müller (Broschiert - Dec. 2006), ISBN: ISBN-10: 3865506569, ISBN-13: 978-3865506566
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