NAVAL BATTLE OF GUADALCANAL
The 'Naval Battle of Guadalcanal', sometimes referred to as the 'Third Battle of Savo Island' or, in Japanese sources, as the 'Third Battle of the Solomon Sea' (第三次ソロモン海戦), took place November 12-November 15, 1942, and was the decisive battle in a series of naval battles that took place between Allied (primarily U.S.) and Japanese forces during the months-long Guadalcanal campaign in the Solomon Islands. The battle consisted of a sequence of combined air and sea engagements spread over four days, most of them in the vicinity of Guadalcanal. All of the engagements were directly related to a single effort by the Japanese to reinforce their land forces on Guadalcanal, and are all therefore considered to be different parts of the same battle.
In two extremely destructive nighttime surface warship engagements, both adversaries lost numerous ships. Also, U.S. daytime air attacks over several days sank or damaged several Japanese warships and transport ships. The sum of these engagements was that the U.S. was successful in turning back Japan's last major attempt to dislodge Allied forces from their positions on Guadalcanal and nearby Tulagi. Thus, the battle resulted in a significant strategic victory for the U.S. and its allies.
Background
On August 7, 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S.) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as bases for threatening the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and to secure the islands as starting points for a campaign with the eventual goal of isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign.[3]
Because of the constant threat by Japanese aircraft and warships around the Solomon Islands, Allied forces were unable to frequently resupply their forces on Guadalcanal, who were often under attack from Japanese land and sea forces in the area.[4] In early November, 1942, Allied intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese were preparing another offensive to try to retake the islands from the Allies.[5] Therefore, the U.S. mounted a major resupply and reinforcement effort by sending Task Force 67, a large reinforcement and resupply convoy commanded by Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, to support its forces at Guadalcanal on November 11. The supply ships were protected by task groups commanded by Rear Admirals Daniel J. Callaghan and Norman Scott as well as aircraft from Henderson Field on Guadalcanal.[6] The Japanese conducted several air attacks on these supply ships at Guadalcanal on November 11 and November 12, using aircraft based at Buin, Bougainville in the Solomon Islands. However, most of the U.S. supply ships were unloaded without serious damage, and 12 of the Japanese aircraft were shot down[7] by anti-aircraft fire from the U.S. ships or by fighter aircraft launched from Henderson Field.[8]
The previous major attempt to retake Guadalcanal and Henderson Field by the Japanese Army had occurred from October 20 to October 26 in the Battle for Henderson Field and had been defeated with heavy losses for the Japanese.[9] At the same time, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (the commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet) had attempted to decisively defeat U.S. naval forces in the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. In that battle, U.S. naval forces were defeated and driven from the area with the loss of one aircraft carrier and severe damage to another. However, the Japanese carriers were also forced to retreat because of crippling losses to their carrier aircraft and aircrews.[10] Thereafter, Yamamoto's ships returned to their main bases at Truk in Micronesia, where he had his headquarters, and Rabaul on New Britain while three of the four Japanese carriers returned to Japan for repairs and refitting.[11]
The Japanese army planned another attack on Guadalcanal, but further reinforcements were needed before the operation could proceed. The army requested assistance from Yamamoto to deliver the needed reinforcements to the island and to support their planned offensive on the Allied forces guarding Henderson Field. To support the reinforcement effort, Yamamoto provided 11 large transport ships to carry 7,000 army troops, their ammunition, food, and heavy equipment to Guadalcanal. He also provided a warship support force that included two battleships. The two battleships, ''Hiei'' and ''Kirishima'', equipped with special fragmentation shells, were to bombard Henderson Field and destroy it and the aircraft stationed there in order to allow the slow, heavy transports to reach Guadalcanal safely.[12] The warship force was commanded from ''Hiei'' by recently-promoted Vice Admiral Hiroaki Abe.[13]
First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 13
Prelude
Abe's warship force and the transports assembled near the Shortland Islands[14] and proceeded down "The Slot" towards Guadalcanal on November 12 with an estimated arrival time for the warships of early morning, November 13, with the slower transport ships travelling some distance behind.[15] In addition to the two battleships, the Japanese force included the light cruiser ''Nagara'' and 11 destroyers: ''Samidare'', ''Murasame'', ''Asagumo'', ''Teruzuki'', ''Amatsukaze'', ''Yukikaze'', ''Ikazuchi'', ''Inazuma'', ''Akatsuki'', ''Harusame'', and ''Yudachi''.[16] Three More destroyers (''Shigure'', ''Shiratsuyu'', and ''Yugure'') would provide a rear guard in the Russell Islands during Abe's foray into "Ironbottom Sound" off the north coast of Guadalcanal.[17] U.S. reconnaissance aircraft spotted the approach of the Japanese ships and passed a warning to the Allied command.[18]
Thus warned, Turner detached all usable combat ships to protect the troops ashore from the expected Japanese naval attack and troop landing and ordered the supply ships at Guadalcanal to depart by early evening November 12. Callaghan was a few days senior to the more experienced Scott, and therefore was placed in overall command.[19] Callaghan prepared his force to meet the Japanese that night in the sound. His force comprised two heavy cruisers (USS ''San Francisco'' and USS ''Portland''), three light cruisers (USS ''Helena'', USS ''Juneau'', and USS ''Atlanta''), and eight destroyers: USS ''Cushing'', USS ''Laffey'', USS ''Sterett'', USS ''O'Bannon'', USS ''Aaron Ward'', USS ''Barton'', USS ''Monssen'', and USS ''Fletcher''. Admiral Callaghan commanded from ''San Francisco''.[20]
During their approach to Guadalcanal, the Japanese force passed through a large and intense rain squall which, along with a complex formation plus some confusing orders from Abe, split the formation into several groups.[21] The U.S. force steamed in a single column around Ironbottom Sound, with destroyers in the lead and rear of the column, and the cruisers in the center. Five ships had the new, far-superior SG radar, but Callaghan's deployment put none of them in the forward part of the column, nor did he choose one for his flagship.[22]
Action
At about 01:25 on November 13, in almost complete pitch darkness because of the bad weather and dark moon, the ships of the Japanese force entered the sound between Savo Island and Guadalcanal and prepared to bombard Henderson Field.[23] Several of the U.S. ships detected the Japanese ships on radar, beginning about 01:24,[24] but had trouble communicating the information to Callaghan because of problems with their ship's radio equipment and lack of discipline with their communications procedures.[25] Several minutes later, both forces visually sighted each other about the same time, but both Abe and Callaghan hesitated ordering their ships into action. Abe apparently was surprised by the proximity of the U.S. ships24 and could not decide if he should momentarily withdraw to give his ships time to change from bombardment ammunition to anti-ship ammunition or to continue onward. He decided to continue onward.[26] Callaghan apparently intended to attempt to cross the T of the Japanese, as Scott had done at Cape Esperance, but — confused by the incomplete information he was receiving, plus the fact that the Japanese formation consisted of several scattered groups — he gave several confusing orders on ship movements. The U.S. ship formation began to fall apart, apparently further delaying Callaghan's order to commence firing as he first tried to straighten out his ship's locations.[27] Meanwhile, both forces' formations continued onward and began to intermingle with each other.24
Position of Japanese (red arrows) and U.S. (black) ships at 01:45 on November 13. Both sides opened fire at 01:48 as the formations of the two adversaries intermingled and then quickly disintegrated into a confused free-for-all.[28]
At least six of the U.S. ships, including ''Laffey'', ''O'Bannon'', ''Atlanta'', ''San Francisco'', ''Portland'', and ''Helena'', fired at ''Akatsuki'', which drew attention to herself with her illuminated searchlight. ''Akatsuki'' blew up and sank within a few minutes, but not before hitting ''Atlanta'' with shells and a type 93 torpedo.[31]
Perhaps because it was the lead cruiser in the U.S. formation, ''Atlanta'' was the target of fire from several Japanese ships, probably including ''Nagara'', ''Inazuma'', and ''Ikazuchi'', in addition to ''Akatsuki''. The gunfire caused ''Atlanta'' heavy damage, and the torpedo hit cut all of her engineering power.[32] ''Atlanta'' drifted into the line of fire of ''San Francisco'', which accidentally fired on ''Atlanta'', causing even greater damage, and killing Admiral Scott and much of the bridge crew.[33] ''Atlanta'', without power or able to fire her guns, now drifted out of control and out of the battle as the Japanese ships passed her by. The lead U.S. destroyer, ''Cushing'', was also caught in a crossfire between several Japanese destroyers and perhaps ''Nagara''. She too was hit heavily and stopped dead in the water.[34]
''Hiei'', with her nine lit searchights, huge size, and course taking her directly through the U.S. formation, became the focus of gunfire from many of the U.S. ships. ''Laffey'' passed so close to ''Hiei'' that they missed colliding by 20 feet (6 m).[35] ''Hiei'' was unable to depress her main or secondary batteries low enough to hit ''Laffey'', but ''Laffey'' was able to rake ''Hiei''’s superstructure with 5-inch shells and machine gun fire, causing heavy damage to ''Hiei''’s superstructure and bridge, wounding Admiral Abe, and killing his chief of staff.[36] Admiral Abe was thereafter limited in his ability to direct his ships for the rest of the battle.[37] ''Sterett'' and ''O'Bannon'' likewise pumped several salvos into ''Hiei''’s superstructure from close range, and perhaps one or two torpedoes into her hull, causing ''Hiei'' further damage, before both destroyers escaped into the darkness.[38]

Japanese battleship ''Hiei'' in 1942
Two of the U.S. destroyers met a sudden demise. Either ''Nagara'' or the destroyers ''Teruzuki''[43] and ''Yukikaze''30 came upon the drifting ''Cushing'' and pounded her with gunfire, knocking out all of her systems. Unable to fight back, ''Cushing’s'' crew abandoned ship. ''Cushing'' sank several hours later.[44] ''Laffey'', having escaped from her engagement with ''Hiei'', suddenly encountered ''Asagumo'', ''Murasame'', ''Samidare'',[45] and, perhaps, ''Teruzuki''.[46] The Japanese destroyers pounded the ''Laffey'' with gunfire and then hit her with a torpedo which broke her keel. A few minutes later fires reached her ammunition magazines and she blew up and sank.[47]
''Portland'', after helping sink ''Akatsuki'', was hit by a torpedo from ''Inazuma'' or ''Ikazuchi'', causing heavy damage to her stern and forcing her to steer in a circle. After completing her first loop, she was able to fire four salvos at ''Hiei'' but otherwise took little further part in the battle.[48]
''Yudachi'' and ''Amatsukaze'' independently charged the rear five ships of the U.S. formation. Two torpedoes from ''Amatsukaze'' hit ''Barton'', immediately sinking her with heavy loss of life.[49] ''Yudachi'' planted a torpedo in ''Juneau'', stopping ''Juneau'' dead in the water, breaking her keel, and knocking out most of her systems. ''Juneau'' then turned east and slowly crept out of the battle area.[50]
''Monssen'' avoided the wreck of ''Barton'' and motored onward looking for targets. She was accosted by ''Asagumo'', ''Murasame'', and ''Samidare'' who had just finished blasting ''Laffey''. They proceeded to smother ''Monssen'' with gunfire, damaging her severely and forcing the crew to abandon ship. The ship sank sometime later.[51]
''Amatsukaze'' approached the ''San Francisco'' with the intention of finishing her off. However, while concentrating on ''San Francisco'', ''Amatsukaze'' did not notice the approach of ''Helena'' which fired several full broadsides at ''Amatsukaze'' from close range and knocked her out of the action. The heavily damaged ''Amatsukaze'' escaped under cover of a smoke screen[52] and while ''Helena'' was distracted by an attack by ''Asagumo'', ''Murasame'', and ''Samidare''.[53]
''Aaron Ward'' and ''Sterett'', independently searching for targets, both sighted ''Yudachi'', who appeared unaware of the approach of the two U.S. destroyers.[54] Both U.S. ships hit ''Yudachi'' simultaneously with gunfire and torpedoes, literally blasting her out of the water and forcing her crew to abandon ship.[45] However, the ship did not sink right away. Continuing on her way, ''Sterett'' was suddenly ambushed by ''Teruzuki'', heavily damaged, and forced to withdraw from the battle area to the east.[56] ''Aaron Ward'' wound up in a one-on-one duel with ''Kirishima'', which the destroyer lost with heavy damage. She also tried to retire from the battle area to the east but soon stopped dead in the water because the engines were damaged.[57]
Robert Leckie, a Marine private on Guadalcanal, described the battle:
After nearly 40 minutes of brutal, close-quarters fighting, the two sides broke contact and ceased fire at 02:26 after Abe and Captain Gilbert Hoover (the captain of ''Helena'' and senior surviving U.S. officer at this point) ordered their respective forces to disengage.[58] Admiral Abe had a decisive victory in his grasp. He had one battleship (''Kirishima''), one light cruiser (''Nagara''), and four destroyers (''Asagumo'', ''Teruzuki'', ''Yukikaze'', and ''Harusame'') with only light damage that could continue fighting (''Inazuma'', ''Ikazuchi'', ''Murasame'', and ''Samidare'' were damaged enough that their fighting ability was somewhat impaired).[59] The U.S. had only one light cruiser (''Helena'') and one destroyer (''Fletcher'') that were still capable of effective resistance. The way was clear for Abe to bombard Henderson Field, and, perhaps, finish off the U.S. naval forces in the area, clearing the way for the troops and supplies to be landed safely on Guadalcanal.
However, at this crucial juncture, Abe chose to abandon the mission and depart the area. Several reasons are conjectured as to why he made this decision. Japanese commanders, from the beginning of the war, were constantly and strongly reminded of the crucial need to conserve fuel, ammunition, and to not risk ships unnecessarily.[60] Thus, the damage to his flagship, ''Hiei'' and his other ships plus his expenditures of fuel and ammunition during the battle may have heavily concerned Abe. His own injuries and the deaths of some of his staff from battle action may have affected his thought processes. Perhaps he was also unsure as to how many of his or the U.S. ships were still combat-capable because of communication problems with the damaged ''Hiei''. Furthermore, his own ships were scattered and would have taken some time to reassemble for a coordinated resumption of the mission to attack Henderson Field and the remnants of the U.S. warship force. For whatever reason, Abe called for a disengagement and general retreat of his warships, although ''Yukikaze'' and ''Teruzuki'' remained behind to assist ''Hiei''.[61] ''Samidare'' picked-up survivors from ''Yudachi'' at 03:00 before joining the other Japanese ships in the retreat northwards.[62]
Aftermath
At 03:00 on November 13, Admiral Yamamoto postponed the planned landings of the transports, which returned to the Shortlands to await further orders.62 Dawn revealed three crippled Japanese (''Hiei'', ''Yudachi'', and ''Amatsukaze''), and three crippled U.S. ships (''Portland'', ''Atlanta'', and ''Aaron Ward'') in the general vicinity of Savo Island.[63] ''Amatsukaze'' was attacked by dive-bombers but managed to escape to Truk and eventually returned to action several months later. The abandoned hulk of ''Yudachi'' was sunk by ''Portland'', whose guns still worked despite the other damage to the ship.[64] The tugboat USS ''Bobolink'' motored around Ironbottom Sound throughout the day of November 13, assisting the crippled U.S. ships, rescuing U.S. survivors from the water, and, reportedly, shooting Japanese survivors floating in the water.[65] ''Hiei'' was attacked repeatedly by Marine TBF Avenger torpedo planes from Henderson Field, TBFs and SBD Dauntless dive-bombers from the carrier USS ''Enterprise'', and B-17 Flying Fortress bombers of the United States Army Air Forces 11th Heavy Bombardment Group from Espiritu Santo. Abe and his staff transferred to ''Yukikaze'' at 08:15. ''Kirishima'' was ordered by Abe to take ''Hiei'' under tow, escorted by ''Nagara'' and its destroyers, but the attempt was cancelled because of the threat of submarine attack and ''Hiei's increasing unseaworthiness.[66] After sustaining more damage from air attacks, ''Hiei'' sank northwest of Savo Island, perhaps after being scuttled by her remaining crew, in the late evening of November 13.[66]
''Portland'', ''San Francisco'', ''Aaron Ward,'' ''Sterett'', and ''O'Bannon'' were eventually able to make it back to rear-area ports for repairs. ''Atlanta'', however, sank near Guadalcanal at 20:00 on November 13.[68] Departing from the Solomon Islands area with ''San Francisco'', ''Helena'', ''Sterret'', and ''O'Bannon''[69] later that day, ''Juneau'' was sunk by Japanese submarine ''I-26''. ''Juneau's'' 100+ survivors (out of a total complement of 650) were left to fend on their own in the open ocean for eight days before rescue aircraft belatedly arrived. While awaiting rescue, all but 10 of ''Juneau''’s crew died from their injuries, the elements, or shark attacks. The dead included the five Sullivan brothers[70]
Because of the confused nature of the battle, the U.S. believed that they had sunk as many as seven Japanese ships.[71] This, plus the Japanese retreat, caused the U.S. to believe at the time that they had won a significant victory. It was only after the war that the U.S. learned that they had suffered what most see as a crushing ''tactical'' defeat.[72]
Nevertheless, most historians appear to agree that Abe's decision to retreat turned his tactical victory into a strategic defeat. Henderson Field remained operational with attack aircraft ready to deter the slow Japanese transports from approaching Guadalcanal with their precious cargoes.[73] Plus, the Japanese had lost an opportunity to eliminate the U.S. naval forces in the area, a result which would have taken even the comparatively resource-rich U.S. some time to recover from.[74] Reportedly furious, Admiral Yamamoto relieved Abe of command and later directed his forced retirement from the military. However, it appears that Yamamoto may have been more angry over the loss of one of his battleships (''Hiei'') than he was over the abandonment of the supply mission and failure to completely destroy the U.S. force.[75] Shortly before noon, Yamamoto ordered Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo, commanding the Second Fleet, to form a new bombardment unit around ''Kirishima'' with fresh ships and attack Henderson Field on the night of November 14–November 15.
Including the sinking of ''Juneau'', total U.S. losses in the battle were 1,439 dead. The Japanese suffered between 550 to 800 dead.[76] Analyzing the impact of this engagement, historian Richard B. Frank states,
Other actions, November 13–14
Although the reinforcement effort to Guadalcanal was delayed, the Japanese did not give up trying to complete the original mission, albeit a day later than originally planned. In the afternoon of November 13, the 11 transports resumed their journey towards Guadalcanal.[77] A Japanese force of cruisers and destroyers, originally assigned to cover the unloading of the transports on the evening of November 13, was given the mission that Abe's force had failed to carry out—the bombardment of Henderson Field.[78] The battleship ''Kirishima'', after abandoning its rescue effort of ''Hiei'' on the morning of November 13, steamed north between Santa Isabel and Malaita Islands to form the new bombardment unit.[66]
The cruiser force, consisting of Eighth Fleet units under its commander, Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, included the heavy cruisers ''Chōkai'', ''Kinugasa'', ''Maya'', and ''Suzuya'', light cruisers ''Isuzu'' and ''Tenryū'', and six destroyers.[41] Mikawa's force was able to slip into the Guadalcanal area uncontested because the battered U.S. naval forces had withdrawn. ''Suzuya'' and ''Maya'' bombarded Henderson Field while the rest of Mikawa's force cruised around Savo Island guarding against any U.S. surface attack (which did not occur).[81] The 35-minute bombardment caused some damage to various aircraft and facilities at the airfield but did not put it out of operation.[82] The cruiser force ended the bombardment around 02:30 on November 14 and cleared the area to head towards Rabaul via the Shortlands.[83]
At daybreak, aircraft from Henderson Field, Espiritu Santo, and ''USS Enterprise'' (stationed 300 kilometers (200 mi) south of Guadalcanal), began their attacks, first on Mikawa's force that was heading away from Guadalcanal, and then on the transport force heading towards Guadalcanal. The attacks on Mikawa's force sank the heavy cruiser ''Kinugasa'',[84] killing 511 of her crew,[77] and damaged ''Maya'', forcing her to go to Japan for repairs.[86] Repeated air attacks on the transport force sank six of the transports and forced one more to turn back with heavy damage. Survivors from the transports were rescued by the convoy's escorting destroyers. A total of 450 army troops were reported to have perished.[87] The remaining four transports and undamaged destroyers continued towards Guadalcanal after nightfall of November 14 but stopped west of Guadalcanal to await the finish of the warship surface action (below) before continuing.[88]
Kondo's ad hoc force rendezvoused at Ontong Java on the evening of November 13,[89] then reversed course and refueled out of range of Henderson Field's bombers on the morning of November 14. The submarine USS ''Trout'' stalked but was unable to attack the ''Kirishima'' during refueling. The bombardment force continued south and came under air attack late in the afternoon of November 14, during which they were intercepted by the submarine USS ''Flying Fish'' which launched five torpedoes but scored no hits, then reported its contact by radio.[90]
Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 14–15
Prelude
To cover the unloading of the transports at Guadalcanal, the Japanese fleet made its third attempt to neutralize Henderson Field, sending the force of warships under Admiral Kondo through Indispensable Strait to bombard Guadalcanal on the night of November 14–November 15.[91] The force included ''Kirishima'', heavy cruisers ''Atago'' and ''Takao'', light cruisers ''Nagara'' and ''Sendai'', and nine destroyers, some of the destroyers being survivors (along with ''Kirishima'' and ''Nagara'') of the first night engagement two days prior. Kondo flew his flag in the cruiser ''Atago''.[92] The force approached Guadalcanal around midnight,[93] and a quarter moon provided moderate visibility.[94]
First phase of the engagement, 23:17–23:30, November 14. Red lines are Japanese warship forces and black line is U.S. warship force. [95]
Action
Kondo split his force into several groups, with one group, consisting of ''Sendai'' and destroyers ''Shikinami'' and ''Uranami'' ("C" on the maps), sweeping along the east side of Savo Island, and destroyer ''Ayanami'' ("B" on the maps) sweeping counterclockwise around the southwest side of Savo Island to check for the presence of Allied ships.[100] The Japanese ships spotted Lee's force around 23:00, though Kondo misidentified the battleships as cruisers. Kondo ordered the ''Sendai'' group of ships, plus ''Nagara'' and four destroyers ("D" on the maps) to engage and destroy the U.S. force before he brought the bombardment force of ''Kirishima'' and heavy cruisers ("E" on the maps) into Ironbottom Sound.95 The U.S. ships ("A" on the maps) detected the ''Sendai'' force on radar but did not detect the other groups of Japanese ships.[99] Using radar targeting, the two U.S. battleships opened fire on the ''Sendai'' group at 23:17.[102] Admiral Lee ordered a cease fire about five minutes later after the radar returns on the northern group appeared to disappear from his ship's radar scopes. However, ''Sendai'', ''Uranami'', and ''Shikinami'' were undamaged and circled out of the danger area.[103]
Second phase of the engagement, 23:30–02:00. Red lines are Japanese warship forces and black lines are U.S. warships. Numbered yellow dots represent sinking warships.[104]
''Washington'' passed through the area still occupied by the damaged and sinking U.S. destroyers and fired on ''Ayanami'' with her secondary batteries, setting her afire.[109] Following close behind, ''South Dakota'' suddenly suffered a series of electrical failures, reportedly during repairs when her chief engineer locked down a circuit breaker in violation of safety procedures, causing her circuits repeatedly to go into series,[110] making her radar, radios, and most of her gun batteries inoperable.[111] However, she continued to follow ''Washington'' towards the western side of Savo Island until 23:35, when ''Washington'' changed course left to pass to the southward behind the burning destroyers. ''South Dakota'' tried to follow but had to turn to right to avoid
''Benham'' which resulted in the ship being silhouetted by the fires of the burning destroyers and made her an easy target for the Japanese.[112]
Receiving reports of the destruction of the U.S. destroyers from ''Ayanami'' and his other ships, Kondo pointed his bombardment force towards Guadalcanal, believing that the U.S. warship force had been defeated. His force and the two U.S. battleships were now heading towards each other.[113]
Almost blind and unable to effectively fire her main and secondary armament, ''South Dakota'' was targeted by gunfire and torpedoes by most of the ships of the Japanese force, including ''Kirishima'', beginning about 00:00 on November 15. Although able to score a few hits on ''Kirishima'', ''South Dakota'' took 25 medium and one large-caliber hit[114], some of which did not explode, that completely knocked out her communications and remaining gunfire control operations, set portions of her upper decks on fire, and forced her to try to steer away from the engagement.[115] All of the Japanese torpedoes missed.[116] Admiral Lee later described the cumulative effect of the gunfire damage to ''South Dakota'' as to, "render one of our new battleships deaf, dumb, blind, and impotent."[104] ''South Dakota's crew casualties were 39 killed and 59 wounded, and she turned away from the battle at 00:17 without informing Admiral Lee, though observed by Kondo's lookouts.[118][119]
''Washington'' fires upon Japanese battleship ''Kirishima'' during the battle on November 15. The low elevation of the gun barrels is because of the relatively close range of the two adversaries.[120]
At 00:25 Kondo ordered all of his ships that were able to converge and destroy any remaining U.S. ships. However, the Japanese ships still did not know where ''Washington'' was located, and the other surviving U.S. ships had already departed the battle area. ''Washington'' steered a northwesterly course towards the Russell Islands to draw the Japanese force away from Guadalcanal and the presumably damaged ''South Dakota''. The Japanese ships finally sighted ''Washington'' and launched several torpedo attacks, but by adroit maneuvering by her captain, ''Washington'' avoided all of them and also grounded his ship in shallow waters.[125] At length, believing that the way was clear for the transport convoy to proceed to Guadalcanal (but apparently disregarding the threat of air attack in the morning), Kondo ordered his remaining ships to break contact and retreat from the area about 01:04, which the Japanese ships complied with by 01:30.[126]
Aftermath
Both ''Kirishima'' and ''Ayanami'' were scuttled and sank by 03:25, November 15.[127] ''Uranami'' rescued survivors from ''Ayanami'' and destroyers ''Asagumo'', ''Teruzuki'', and ''Samidare'' rescued the remaining crew from ''Kirishima''.[128] In the engagement, 242 U.S. and 249 Japanese sailors died.[129] The engagement was one of only two battleship-against-battleship surface battles in the entire Pacific campaign of World War II.[130]
The four Japanese transports beached themselves at Tassafaronga on Guadalcanal by 04:00, November 15. The transports were attacked, beginning at 05:55 by U.S. aircraft from Henderson Field and elsewhere, and field artillery from U.S. ground forces on Guadalcanal. Later, destroyer USS ''Meade''[131] approached and opened fire on the beached transports and surrounding area. These attacks set the transports afire and destroyed any equipment on them that the Japanese had not managed to quickly unload.[132] Only 2,000–3,000 of the troops originally embarked actually made it to Guadalcanal, and most of their ammunition and food supplies were lost. These troops and meager supplies were not enough to have a significant effect on the Japanese defense of Guadalcanal.[133]
Yamamoto's reaction to Kondo's failure to accomplish his mission of neutralizing Henderson Field and ensuring the safe landing of troops and supplies was milder than his earlier reaction to Abe's withdrawal, perhaps because of Imperial Navy culture and politics. Kondo, who also held the position of second in command of the Combined Fleet, was a member of the upper staff and battleship "clique" of the Imperial Navy while Abe was a career destroyer specialist.[134] Admiral Kondo was not reprimanded or reassigned but instead was left in command of one of the large ship fleets based at Truk.[135]
Significance
The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal was the last major attempt by the Japanese to seize control of the seas around Guadalcanal or to retake the island. From then on, Japanese air and naval operations around Guadalcanal were defensive in nature, either to provide subsistence supplies to the Japanese forces on Guadalcanal, or beginning in January 1943, attempts to evacuate and redeploy them elsewhere. In contrast, the U.S. Navy was thereafter able to resupply the U.S. forces at Guadalcanal at will, including the delivery of two fresh divisions by late December 1942. The inability to neutralize Henderson Field doomed the Japanese effort to successfully combat the Allied conquest of Guadalcanal.73 The last Japanese resistance in the Guadalcanal campaign ended on February 9, 1943, with the successful evacuation of the surviving Japanese troops on the island by the Japanese navy in Operation Ke.
The wreck of one of the four Japanese transports beached and destroyed at Guadalcanal on November 15, 1942, photographed one year later.
The securing of Guadalcanal and surrounding islands by Allied forces was the first step in their eventual conquest of the entire Solomon Islands chain and the isolation and neutralization of the major Japanese base at Rabaul, New Britain. Although the Allies and Japan engaged in several more intense and bloody naval battles during the Solomon Islands campaign, including some in which the Japanese emerged victorious, the Allied advance was never halted or even slowed to any appreciable extent. The capture of the Solomon Islands, along with New Guinea and New Britain, eventually led to the liberation of the Philippines in 1944 and early 1945, and then to invasion of Japan, at Okinawa and Iwo Jima, and the final defeat of Japan in August 1945. Many historians believe the Battle of Guadalcanal to be just as key a turning point in the Pacific War as the Battle of Midway was six months earlier.[136] In fact, the Japanese considered the battle for Guadalcanal to be more significant than Midway.[137] Historian Eric Hammel sums up the significance of the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal this way:
General Alexander Vandegrift, the commander of the troops on Guadalcanal, paid tribute to the sailors who fought the battle:
:"We believe the enemy has undoubtedly suffered a crushing defeat. We thank Admiral Kinkaid for his intervention yesterday. We thank Lee for his sturdy effort last night. Our own aircraft has been grand in its relentless hammering of the foe. All those efforts are appreciated but our greatest homage goes to Callaghan, Scott and their men who with magnificent courage against seemingly hopeless odds drove back the first hostile attack and paved the way for the success to follow. To them the men of Cactus lift their battered helmets in deepest admiration."[138]
Notes
1. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 490 and Lundstrom, ''Guadalcanal Campaign'', 523.
2. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 490. Frank's breakdown of Japanese losses includes only 450 soldiers on the transports, "a figure no American flier would have believed," p. 462, but cites Japanese records for this number.
Miller, in ''Guadalcanal: The First Offensive'' (1948), cites "USAFISPA, Japanese Campaign in the Guadalcanal Area, 29–30, estimates that 7,700 troops had been aboard, of whom 3,000 drowned, 3,000 landed on Guadalcanal, and 1,700 were rescued." Frank's number is used here instead of Miller. Aircraft losses from Lundstrom, ''Guadalcanal Campaign'', 522.
3. Hogue, ''Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal'', p. 235–236.
4. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 28.
5. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 37.
6. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 38–39.
7. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 432.
8. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 50–90.
9. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 337–367.
10. Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', 134–135.
11. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 44–45.
12. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 41–46.
13. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 93.
14. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 428.
15. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 92–93.
16. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 103–105.
17. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 429.
18. Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', 137.
19. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 92.
20. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 99–107.
21. Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', 137–140.
22. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 106–108.
23. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 437–438.
24. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 438.
25. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 124–126.
26. Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', 140.
27. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 129.
28. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 439.
29. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 132–137.
30. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 441.
31. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 137–183 and Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 449. Only eight crewmen (out of a total complement of 197) (combinedfleet.com) survived the sinking of ''Akatsuki'' and were later captured by U.S. forces.
32. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 150–159.
33. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 443.
34. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 132–136.
35. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 137–141. Jameson, ''The Battle of Guadalcanal'', 22 says, "Only by speeding up did the Laffey manage to cross the enemy's bows with a few feet to spare."
36. Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', 146.
37. Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', 148.
38. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 142–149.
39. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 444.
40. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 160–171.
41. combinedfleet.com
42. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 234.
43. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 246 and Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', 146.
44. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 180–190.
45. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea''.
46. Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', 146–147.
47. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 191–201.
48. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 172–178.
49. Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', 144–146.
50. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 204–212.
51. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 213–225, 286.
52. Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', 149.
53. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 449.
54. Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', 147.
55. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea''.
56. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 246–249.
57. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 250–256.
58. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 451.
59. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 449–450.
60. Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', 101.
61. Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', 153.
62. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 452.
63. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 270.
64. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 272.
65. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 454.
66. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 298–308.
67. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 298–308.
68. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 274–275.
69. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 456.
70. Kurzman, ''Left to Die''.
71. Jameson, ''The Battle of Guadalcanal'', 35.
72. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 399.
73. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 400.
74. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 401.
75. Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', 156.
76. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 459–460.
77. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 465.
78. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 312.
79. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 298–308.
80. combinedfleet.com
81. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 313.
82. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 316.
83. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 318.
84. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 327.
85. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 465.
86. combinedfleet.com. An SBD Dauntless accidentally crashed into ''Maya'', killing 37 of her crewmen and causing heavy damage. ''Maya'' was under repair in Japan until January 16, 1943.
87. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 468.
88. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 345.
89. Senkan! IJN Kirishima: Tabular Record of Movement
90. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 469, and footnote to Chapter 18, 735. Frank states that Morison attributed both submarine contacts to ''Trout'' but was in error.
91. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 349–350.
92. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 415.
The complete Japanese order of battle: battleship ''Kirishima'', heavy cruisers ''Atago'' and ''Takao'', light cruisers ''Nagara'' and ''Sendai'', and destroyers ''Hatsuyuki'', ''Asagumo'', ''Teruzuki'', ''Shirayuki'', ''Inazuma'', ''Samidare'', ''Shikinami'', ''Uranami'', and ''Ayanami''.
93. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 351.
94. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 361.
95. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 474.
96. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 351–352.
97. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', p. 470.
98. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 352.
99. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 363.
100. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 473.
101. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 363.
102. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 475.
103. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 362–364.
104. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 480.
105. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 475–476.
106. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 476–477.
107. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 368–383.
108. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 478.
109. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 384–385.
110. Lippman, ''Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal''
111. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 477–478.
112. Morison, ''The Struggle for Guadalcanal'', 277.
113. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 479.
114. http://www.dcfp.navy.mil/mc/museum/War_Damage/57.pdf Scan of original report.
115. The "Gunfire Damage Report" made by the Bureau of Ships showed 26 damaging hits and can be found at 6th and succeeding photos
116. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 385–389.
117. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 480.
118. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 482.
119. Lippman, ''Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal'', 9. Lee stated he felt "relief", but Capt. Davis of ''Washington'' said ''South Dakota'' "pulled out" without a word.
120. NavSource.com
121. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 388.
122. Morison, ''The Struggle for Guadalcanal'', 278.
123. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 389.
124. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 481.
125. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 483.
126. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 484.
127. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 391.
128. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 484, ''Atago'', ''Takao'', and ''Nagara'' returned to Japan for repairs, with all three being out of action for about one month. ''Chōkai'' was repaired at Truk and returned to Rabaul on December 2, 1942. (combinedfleet.com). ''Gwin'' and ''South Dakota'' were repaired and returned to action a few months later: ''Gwin'' in April, 1943, and ''South Dakota'' in February, 1943.
129. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 486.
130. The other battleship vs. battleship engagement in the Pacific campaign was at Surigao Strait during the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
131. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 488.
132. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 394–395.
133. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 490.
134. Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', 157.
135. Hara, ''Japanese Destroyer Captain'', 171.
136. Hammel, ''Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea'', 29.
137. Frank, ''Guadalcanal'', 492.
138. The wording varies slightly from source to source.[1][2][3][4]
References
★ Tin Can Sailor: Life Aboard the USS Sterett, 1939–1945, , C. Raymond, Calhoun, Naval Institute Press, 2000, ISBN 1-55750-228-5 Online views of selections of the book:[5]
★ Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II, , Andrieu, D'Albas, Devin-Adair Pub, 1965, ISBN 0-8159-5302-X
★ A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945, , Paul S., Dull, Naval Institute Press, 1978, ISBN 0-87021-097-1
★ Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle, , Richard B., Frank, Penguin Group, 1990, ISBN 0-14-016561-4 Online views of selections of the book:[6]
★ Sweet Pea at War: A History of USS Portland (CA-33), , William Thomas, Jr.,, Generous, University Press of Kentucky, 2003, ISBN 0-8131-2286-4 Online views of selections of the book:[7]
★ Naval Battle of Guadalcanal: Night Action, 13 November 1942, , James W., Grace, Naval Institute Press, 1999, ISBN 1-55750-327-3 Online views of selections of the book:[8]
★ Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea: The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 13–15, 1942, , Eric, Hammel, Pacifica Press, 1988, ISBN 0-517-56952-3
★ Japanese Destroyer Captain, , Tameichi, Hara, Ballantine Books, 1961, ISBN 0-345-27894-1 - Firsthand account of the first engagement of the battle by the captain of the Japanese destroyer ''Amatsukaze''.
★ Naval Night Battles of the Solomons, , C. W., Kilpatrick, Exposition Press, 1987, ISBN 0-682-40333-4
★ Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War, , Eric, Lacroix, Naval Institute Press, 1997, ISBN 0-87021-311-3
★ First Team And the Guadalcanal Campaign: Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942, , John B., Lundstrom, Naval Institute Press, 2005 (New edition), ISBN 1-59114-472-8
★ Left to Die: The Tragedy of the USS Juneau, , Dan, Kurzman, Pocket Books, 1994, ISBN 0-671-74874-2 Online views of selections of the book:[9]
★ The Solomons Campaigns, 1942–1943: From Guadalcanal to Bougainville—Pacific War Turning Point, Volume 2 (Amphibious Operations in the South Pacific in WWII), , William L., McGee, BMC Publications, 2002, ISBN 0-9701678-7-3
★ The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942 – February 1943'', vol. 5 of ''History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, , Samuel Eliot, Morison, Little, Brown and Company, 1958, ISBN 0-316-58305-7 Online views of selections of the book:[10]
★ Blood on the Sea: American Destroyers Lost in World War II, , Robert Sinclair, Parkin, Da Capo Press, 1995, ISBN 0-306-81069-7
★ The Big E: The Story of the USS Enterprise, , Edward P., Stafford, Naval Institute Press, 2002 (reissue), ISBN 1-55750-998-0
External links
★ Guadalcanal Campaign
★ Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal
★ The Battle of Guadalcanal, 11–15 November 1942
★ Battle of Guadalcanal: First Naval Battle in the Ironbottom Sound
★ Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal: Turning Point in the Pacific War
★ "Decision at Sea", chap. 7, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive
★ BB-57 USS SOUTH DAKOTA 1942 - Guadalcanal
★ Death of Battleship HIEI: Sunk by Gunfire or Air Attack? Article on the battle of Friday the 13th that gives additional details to demise of ''Hiei''
★ Battleship USS Washington BB56
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