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EspañolNEDAP
(N.V. Nederlandsche Apparatenfabriek) is a Netherlands based company Company
Principal place of business: Groenlo, the Netherlands
Subsidiaries in Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Spain
Quoted on Euronext N.V. since 1949
Nedap is characterised by a development-, entrepreneurship- and staffs´ own responsibility-oriented open, innovative and creative culture.
The company focuses on:
developing and supplying innovative and sustainable solutions in the fields of security and electronic control units as well as automation, management and information for organisations.
NEDAP's activities are organized in the following Market Groups:
Agri
AVI (Automatic Vehicle Identification)
Education
Election Systems
Healthcare
Libraries
Locker Management Systems
Power Supplies
Retail Support
Security Management
Specials
Articles covering the activities of Nedap Election Systems are often mentioned in the press.
Nedap is active in the election industry since 1967, originally building mechanical machines. The first generation electronic machines was introduced in 1978. A company named Samson marketed those machines. Sales was restricted to the Netherlands.
The basis of the present electronic voting machine has been introduced in the market in 1991. The sales of the machines in the Netherlands has at that moment been transferred to Groenendaal Bureau Voor Verkiezingsuitslagen B.V. This bureau supplies over 95% of the election management software to the Dutch municipalities, the head election bureaus and the central election bureau.
Export started in 1995 with the municipality of Srassburg France.
NEDAP ELECTION SYSTEMS DEVELOPS AND SUPPLIES ELECTION SYSTEMS AND SERVICES FOR ALL GOVERNMENTAL LEVELS in conformity with the applicable election laws, rules and regulations.
Nedap Election Systems activities:
Stand alone off-line voting machine for use in polling stationsdirect-recording electronic voting machines
Separate wireless communication of the provisional results
Platform independent on-line election systems in combination with polling station solutions
On-line electronic voter register:
-Identification
-Registration
-Authorisation
Election management systems
Service, Support and Training
In the Netherlands more than 90% of the population vote using ES3B machines from Nedap.
On 5 October 2006 the group "Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet" ("We do not trust voting machines") demonstrated on Dutch television how the ES3B machines could be manipulated by replacing the E-proms containing the Nedap firmware by E-proms containing their own firmware. The exchange of the firmware would not be recognizable by voters or election officials as at that moment the Dutch voting machines had no sealed elecetronic compartment. [1]
[2]
Using the Dutch Freedom of Information Act the "Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet" foundation received correspondence between of the Dutch Electoral Council and Nedap in February 2007.
These include the proposal by Groenendaal to be bought by the Dutch government to give the governement full control over the election management software.
This proposal and its following communications has been interpreted in a rather biased way by the "Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet" foundation [3]
In 2006 there was a case of an election official misinforming voters of when their vote was recorded and later recording it himself during municipality elections in the city of Zeeland,Landerd. A candidate who was also an election official and suspiciously got 181 votes in the polling place where he was working. In the other three polling places he got 11 votes combined.[4] The investigation of the voting machine and it's log files found no disfunction.
In a poll by a local newspaper the results were totally different. The case is closed and the councelman is not procecuted by lack of evidence.[5]
Germany used 2000 Nedap machines (ESD1 and ESD2) in the 2005 elections for the Bundestag. The difference between the machines used in the Netherlands and Germany is mainly due to differences in the voting laws.
Ireland Used over 1000 Nedap voting machines in two elections. Because of the advantages of the system 7500 Nedap machines have been purchased in 2003. The Irish government had made plans to introduce nationwide electronic voting for the local and European Parliament elections in 2004. The proposed change was under the supervision of the current Minister for the Environment & Local Government, Martin Cullen, however the scheme was committed to under the previous minister, Noel Dempsey. As specified by the governement the proposed system lacked any Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail, and after a campaign by Irish Citizens for Trustworthy EVoting (ICTE) and opposition parties in Dáil Éireann, the government set up the Commission on Electronic Voting (CEV), to examine the proposed system. The final conclusion of this commission indicated that the voring machines are save to use without a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail. http://www.cev.ie/
Quote from the second report:
.The voting machine and related hardware components are of good quality and their design,
which is based on voting systems that have been reliable in use elsewhere for some years, has
also remained stable since their adaptation for use in Ireland. Subject to some minor security
and usability enhancements, followed by extended and rigorous testing once they have been so
modified, the voting machine and related components can be confidently recommended for use.
• The embedded software ( machine firmware by NEDAP )of the voting machine is also of adequate quality, requiring only minor
modifications followed by further analysis to confirm its reliability.
[6]
This conclusion permitted Nedap to develop and market a VVPAT solution.
The first deployment of the Voter Verifiable Permanent Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) for legally
binding elections in New York on May 15, 2007 has been successfully implemented.
This article provides the reader with background information concerning the phenomenon of VVPAT in
general, and the development of the VVPAT with regard to the state of New York in particular.
1. Introduction:
In the United States of America, each individual state is responsible for the elections. The electoral
systems all belong to the ‘first past the post’ type, in which fraud or mistakes, as opposed to
systems with proportional representation, can be of major influence in the political balance of
power. Furthermore, a larger number of elections take place simultaneously for various offices,
delegates and also for several referendums. However, there are remarkable differences from state
to state, and not all states require a VVPAT.
Towards the end of the 19th century, voting machines were introduced to the USA: the principle
reason given was to limit extensive electoral fraud, and to reduce counting errors and the costs
involved with manually processing votes a. In effect, this entailed a switch from voting by means of
an object, to voting without an object, as is the case with voting by means of raising hands, or by
announcing one’s choice verbally.
Since the deployment of the first mechanical voting machines in Rochester NY in 1896, there has
been a demand for proof on paper (object) of the choices made.
The assumption was made that transparency of the electoral process could not be guaranteed by
voting without paper evidence.
Purposes made electronic voting machines were introduced at the end of the 1960s.
The results of the voting, the manner in which the votes cast were entered, and the counting of the votes cast per individual machine were all recorded in inalterable programmes b.
The varying data –such as the names of candidates and parties, and the position of the possible selections on the user
interface –was entered separately for each election and recorded in programmable memory c.
2. Doubts concerning systems controlled by software
In 1969, an editorial in The Los Angeles Times (Bergholz)d described an experiment in which two
groups of computer scientists tested counting software for processing the input from punch card
readers for elections. One group carried out an attack with fraudulent software, and the other group
had to demonstrate what had happened. As the fraudulent software erased itself after implementing
its task, the second group was not able to detect the effects it had wrought. This investigation did
not influence in any way the demand for a VVPAT, as the situation described above would not be
possible in the case of the machines of that time. After all this generation of machines were
controlled by firmware embedded on internal memory devices requiring compromising its hardware
to affect its intended behaviour.
3 Concern over Software fraud begins
A technical shift took place at the end of the 20th century. Many manufacturers introduced voting
systems based on a PC platform and touch screens, and in this implementation, it is possible to
carry out the reported “unperceived attack” that took place in 1969.
The public at large is not aware of the many reliable and trusted appliances controlled by
microprocessors within their living environment e, and are confronted increasingly by PCs and their
viruses and bugs. This paved the way for advocates for a tangible trail of the vote to use the media
and public opinion in many states to force legislation for VVPAT’s, without making any distinction in
the technical solution used for the different voting systems.
3. Certification and permission for use of voting machines
Apart from requiring approval and certification at state level, in many states of the USA approval is
first required in accordance with the voluntary federal legislation, before the vendor can participate
in a state approval process.
A version of the Nedap voting machine without VVPAT has been approved federally under the
‘voluntary voting standards VVS 2002’ following type testing by the independent testing laboratories
Wyle and Systest , and has received a certification at state level for use in New Jersey.
4. New York
In the state of New York, mechanical voting machines have been used for more than 100 years and
electronic voting machines for decades now, both without VVPAT. In this state, electoral law has
been changed with regard to a multitude of issues during the past years.
These changes also concern the voting machines. The voting machines which are to replace the
former machines now have to be equipped with a VVPAT, as well as a large number of other
facilities, which ensure that handicapped voters can vote independently.
At present, what is generally understood under VVPAT in the USA no longer quite covers the issue.
The original idea was a log roll which was visible to the voter, and on which each key tap by the
voter was recorded. Now, in general, this refers to a printer, which prints out the summary of the
choices made by the voter. The voter can then accept or reject this summary.
From the publications available concerning this subject, we may conclude that a printer which prints
out only the summary is not as safe as the original concept of the log printer.f
5. The Nedap machine for NY with VVPAT
The version of our machine for New York State includes, among other things, a VVPAT. However,
the regulations on how the printer should function were lacking, therefore these had to be
determined during the course of the certification process.
The choices made here, so far, are as follows:
1. The printer in question is a thermal printer,
a. therefore, there will be no problems with obsolete cartridges
b. the accompanying thermal paper has been tested for legibility in accordance with the
shelf life (number of years) and environmental conditions required in NY state
2. The printer concerned is a ‘cut and drop’ type,
a. for each voter a receipt is cut off, which falls into a sealed bag
b. in NY the voters vote on one of two allocated machines per polling station, as do
voters in the Netherlands. It would be possible to follow the order in which voters cast
their votes: therefore, in order to guarantee the secrecy of the voting, it is essential
that the order of the printed receipts cannot be traced.g
3. The printer in question is a real-time printer,
a. i.e., each selection and deselection is printed
b. the voter can verify the accuracy of the of each key tap
c. in combination with point 2, this results in a single receipt per voter
4. On each receipt, a summary is printed as a two-dimensional bar code,
a. this simplifies and accelerates the recounting process
b. this prevents manual mistakes being made during the recounting process
5. The voter is not given the print-out, but can view this from behind a window,
a. this prevents differences caused by voters who keep the print-outs or add extra copies
into the ballot box.
6. Each receipt is provided with the same transaction code as the electronically recorded vote,
a. making it possible to compare each electronically recorded choice with the receipt
b. providing the opportunity to enter test votes under supervision at any moment, which
can then be removed from the total votes at a later stage. This is to check whether the
system is working properly, without being dependent on non-verifiable statements
from voters, who after all vote in secret.
c. providing the opportunity for the voter to check whether his vote has been counted
correctly. This will need to take place in a protected and private environment.h
7. The moment the printer seizes to be able to produce a receipt or the voting machine is unable
to store the vote electronically the voting machine is blocked for further actions by a voter.
a. In case the printer is out of paper it cannot print a receipt and would introduce a
difference in registration between the electronically stored votes and the votes
registered on paper.
b. In case the voting machine is not able to register the vote electronically and the printer
can print a receipt this would introduce a difference in registration between the
electronically stored votes and the votes registered on paper.
c. In case the printer has a paper jam it cannot print a receipt and would introduce a
difference in registration between the electronically stored votes and the votes
registered on paper.
8. The printer comes equipped with the sealed bag as a single unit, which is attached to the
machine
a. in the event of the paper jamming, or another type of breakdown, the printer can be
replaced without the members of the polling station being able to view the receipts
b. the recounting of the receipts takes place at a different location –i.e. not at the polling
station –therefore, there can be no connection made between the voter and the vote
cast
In addition, a number of issues were settled within the laws and legislation of NY with regard to what
should happen to the two independently obtained records.
It was determined that, in any event, 3% of the machine results would be recounted, which is the reason
why Nedap has added the bar code to the receipts.
Further New York State Election Law requires the following procedures during the audit of the printed
receipts.
§ 9-211. Audit of voter verifiable audit records.
1. Within fifteen days after each general or special election, and within seven
days after every primary or village election conducted by the board of elections,
the board of elections or a bipartisan committee appointed by such board shall
manually audit the voter verifiable audit records from three percent of voting machines
or systems within the jurisdiction of such board. Voting machines or systems shall be selected
for audit through a random, manual process. At least five
days prior to the time fixed for such selection process, the board of elections shall
send notice by first class mail to each candidate, political party and independent
body entitled to have had watchers present at the polls in any election district in
such board’s jurisdiction. Such notice shall state the time and place fixed for such
random selection process. The audit shall be conducted in the same manner, to the
extent applicable, as a canvass of paper ballots. Each candidate, political party
or independent body entitled to appoint watchers to attend at a polling place shall
be entitled to appoint such number of watchers to observe the audit.
2. The manual audit tallies for each voting machine or system shall be compared
to the tallies recorded by such voting machine or system, and a report shall
be made of such comparison which shall be filed in the office of the state board
of elections.
3. The state board of elections shall, in accordance with subdivision four of
section 3-100 of this chapter, promulgate regulations establishing a uniform statewide
standard to be used by boards of elections to determine when a discrepancy
between the manual audit tallies and the voting machine or system tallies shall
require a further voter verifiable record audit of additional voting machines or
systems or a complete manual audit of all machines or systems within the jurisdiction
of a board of elections. Any board of elections shall be empowered to order
that any such audit shall be conducted whenever any such discrepancy exists.
4. If a complete audit shall be conducted, the results of such audit shall be
used by the canvassing board in making the statement of canvass and determinations
of persons elected and propositions rejected or approved. The results of a
partial voter verifiable record audit shall not be used in lieu of voting machine or
system tallies.
5. Notwithstanding subdivision four of this section, if a voting machine or
system is found to have failed to record votes in a manner indicating an operational
failure, the board of canvassers shall use the voter verifiable audit records to
determine the votes cast on such machine or system, provided such records were
not also impaired by the operational failure of the voting machine or system.
{Added, L 2005, ch 181, § 14, eff July 12, 2005.}
notes:
a Joseph P. Harris, Election Administration in the United States (1934)
b In general, the programmes are recorded in PROMs or E-PROMs (this type of software is called firmware). PROMs
can not be altered, and have to be replaced in their entirety, E-PROMS can be erased by UV-radiation and reprogrammed.
Some manufacturers implement a hardware-controlled procedure.
c The memory might be a battery-powered RAM, E-PROMs or, as in the case of NEDAP, EE-proms (electrically
erasable PROMS).
d Roy G. Saltman, rsaltman@alum.mit.edu, August 22, 2006, Independent Verification: Essential Action to Assure
e All microprocessor-controlled equipment could be called a computer. Examples of this include watches and clocks,
calculators, digital thermometers, thermostats, motor management systems, modern radios and televisions
f http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_38150.pdf Brennan Center for Justice complete
report
g On a ‘real to real’ printer, the votes are printed in the order of the voters, which can be traced. In other states where
the voters can choose from a large number of random machines within 1 polling station, a ‘real to real’ printer will
suffice
h It is not yet permitted in NY to publish the choices made, together with the transaction codes, on a WebPage, as
has been implemented by the Netherlands for its voters abroad voting by means of the Internet.
www.sos.cs.ru.nl/research/sosries/ Checking one’s own vote
Integrity in the Voting Process,
In the US the direct-recording electronic voting machines are marketed in partnership with Liberty Election Systems as "LIBERTYVOTE".[7] The state of New York is currently contemplating buying 28,000 Nedap direct-recording electronic voting machines.[8]
1. Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B voting computer, a security analysis
2. Dutch citizens group cracks Nedap's voting computer
3. Voting systems company threatens Dutch state: "Buy my company now or you won’t have provincial elections"
4. Statement of voting machine manufacturer Nedap
5. Raadslid Landerd is stuk minder populair in schaduwverkiezing
6. Cullen rules out use of e-voting in June
7. Liberty Election Systems, About us
8. Groenendaal
★ Voting machine
★ Electronic voting
★ Electoral fraud
★ Nedap Website (Managing Director: Ton Westendorp)
★ Nedap Electionsystems Website (Market Group leader: Matthijs Schippers)
★ Website von Nedap Groenendaal (Voting Machines)
★ Nedap Great Britain (Managing Director: Lars Holweg)
★ HSG wahlsystemen (Managing Director: Herbert Schulze Geiping)
★ Liberty Election Systems (USA)
★ Nedap Partner Net
★ Security analysis of a Nedap ESD3B (English)
★ Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting (Campaigning against Nedap voting machines in Ireland)
★ Description of Nedap voting machines by EFVE
Principal place of business: Groenlo, the Netherlands
Subsidiaries in Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Spain
Quoted on Euronext N.V. since 1949
Nedap is characterised by a development-, entrepreneurship- and staffs´ own responsibility-oriented open, innovative and creative culture.
The company focuses on:
developing and supplying innovative and sustainable solutions in the fields of security and electronic control units as well as automation, management and information for organisations.
NEDAP's activities are organized in the following Market Groups:
Agri
AVI (Automatic Vehicle Identification)
Education
Election Systems
Healthcare
Libraries
Locker Management Systems
Power Supplies
Retail Support
Security Management
Specials
| Contents |
| Electronic voting |
| Netherlands |
| Possible election fraud |
| Germany |
| Ireland |
| United States |
| References |
| See also |
| External links |
Electronic voting
Articles covering the activities of Nedap Election Systems are often mentioned in the press.
Nedap is active in the election industry since 1967, originally building mechanical machines. The first generation electronic machines was introduced in 1978. A company named Samson marketed those machines. Sales was restricted to the Netherlands.
The basis of the present electronic voting machine has been introduced in the market in 1991. The sales of the machines in the Netherlands has at that moment been transferred to Groenendaal Bureau Voor Verkiezingsuitslagen B.V. This bureau supplies over 95% of the election management software to the Dutch municipalities, the head election bureaus and the central election bureau.
Export started in 1995 with the municipality of Srassburg France.
NEDAP ELECTION SYSTEMS DEVELOPS AND SUPPLIES ELECTION SYSTEMS AND SERVICES FOR ALL GOVERNMENTAL LEVELS in conformity with the applicable election laws, rules and regulations.
Nedap Election Systems activities:
Stand alone off-line voting machine for use in polling stationsdirect-recording electronic voting machines
Separate wireless communication of the provisional results
Platform independent on-line election systems in combination with polling station solutions
On-line electronic voter register:
-Identification
-Registration
-Authorisation
Election management systems
Service, Support and Training
Netherlands
In the Netherlands more than 90% of the population vote using ES3B machines from Nedap.
On 5 October 2006 the group "Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet" ("We do not trust voting machines") demonstrated on Dutch television how the ES3B machines could be manipulated by replacing the E-proms containing the Nedap firmware by E-proms containing their own firmware. The exchange of the firmware would not be recognizable by voters or election officials as at that moment the Dutch voting machines had no sealed elecetronic compartment. [1]
[2]
Using the Dutch Freedom of Information Act the "Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet" foundation received correspondence between of the Dutch Electoral Council and Nedap in February 2007.
These include the proposal by Groenendaal to be bought by the Dutch government to give the governement full control over the election management software.
groenendaal.jpg
This proposal and its following communications has been interpreted in a rather biased way by the "Wij vertrouwen stemcomputers niet" foundation [3]
Possible election fraud
In 2006 there was a case of an election official misinforming voters of when their vote was recorded and later recording it himself during municipality elections in the city of Zeeland,Landerd. A candidate who was also an election official and suspiciously got 181 votes in the polling place where he was working. In the other three polling places he got 11 votes combined.[4] The investigation of the voting machine and it's log files found no disfunction.
In a poll by a local newspaper the results were totally different. The case is closed and the councelman is not procecuted by lack of evidence.[5]
Germany
Germany used 2000 Nedap machines (ESD1 and ESD2) in the 2005 elections for the Bundestag. The difference between the machines used in the Netherlands and Germany is mainly due to differences in the voting laws.
Ireland
Ireland Used over 1000 Nedap voting machines in two elections. Because of the advantages of the system 7500 Nedap machines have been purchased in 2003. The Irish government had made plans to introduce nationwide electronic voting for the local and European Parliament elections in 2004. The proposed change was under the supervision of the current Minister for the Environment & Local Government, Martin Cullen, however the scheme was committed to under the previous minister, Noel Dempsey. As specified by the governement the proposed system lacked any Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail, and after a campaign by Irish Citizens for Trustworthy EVoting (ICTE) and opposition parties in Dáil Éireann, the government set up the Commission on Electronic Voting (CEV), to examine the proposed system. The final conclusion of this commission indicated that the voring machines are save to use without a Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail. http://www.cev.ie/
Quote from the second report:
.The voting machine and related hardware components are of good quality and their design,
which is based on voting systems that have been reliable in use elsewhere for some years, has
also remained stable since their adaptation for use in Ireland. Subject to some minor security
and usability enhancements, followed by extended and rigorous testing once they have been so
modified, the voting machine and related components can be confidently recommended for use.
• The embedded software ( machine firmware by NEDAP )of the voting machine is also of adequate quality, requiring only minor
modifications followed by further analysis to confirm its reliability.
[6]
This conclusion permitted Nedap to develop and market a VVPAT solution.
The first deployment of the Voter Verifiable Permanent Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) for legally
binding elections in New York on May 15, 2007 has been successfully implemented.
This article provides the reader with background information concerning the phenomenon of VVPAT in
general, and the development of the VVPAT with regard to the state of New York in particular.
1. Introduction:
In the United States of America, each individual state is responsible for the elections. The electoral
systems all belong to the ‘first past the post’ type, in which fraud or mistakes, as opposed to
systems with proportional representation, can be of major influence in the political balance of
power. Furthermore, a larger number of elections take place simultaneously for various offices,
delegates and also for several referendums. However, there are remarkable differences from state
to state, and not all states require a VVPAT.
Towards the end of the 19th century, voting machines were introduced to the USA: the principle
reason given was to limit extensive electoral fraud, and to reduce counting errors and the costs
involved with manually processing votes a. In effect, this entailed a switch from voting by means of
an object, to voting without an object, as is the case with voting by means of raising hands, or by
announcing one’s choice verbally.
Since the deployment of the first mechanical voting machines in Rochester NY in 1896, there has
been a demand for proof on paper (object) of the choices made.
The assumption was made that transparency of the electoral process could not be guaranteed by
voting without paper evidence.
Purposes made electronic voting machines were introduced at the end of the 1960s.
The results of the voting, the manner in which the votes cast were entered, and the counting of the votes cast per individual machine were all recorded in inalterable programmes b.
The varying data –such as the names of candidates and parties, and the position of the possible selections on the user
interface –was entered separately for each election and recorded in programmable memory c.
2. Doubts concerning systems controlled by software
In 1969, an editorial in The Los Angeles Times (Bergholz)d described an experiment in which two
groups of computer scientists tested counting software for processing the input from punch card
readers for elections. One group carried out an attack with fraudulent software, and the other group
had to demonstrate what had happened. As the fraudulent software erased itself after implementing
its task, the second group was not able to detect the effects it had wrought. This investigation did
not influence in any way the demand for a VVPAT, as the situation described above would not be
possible in the case of the machines of that time. After all this generation of machines were
controlled by firmware embedded on internal memory devices requiring compromising its hardware
to affect its intended behaviour.
3 Concern over Software fraud begins
A technical shift took place at the end of the 20th century. Many manufacturers introduced voting
systems based on a PC platform and touch screens, and in this implementation, it is possible to
carry out the reported “unperceived attack” that took place in 1969.
The public at large is not aware of the many reliable and trusted appliances controlled by
microprocessors within their living environment e, and are confronted increasingly by PCs and their
viruses and bugs. This paved the way for advocates for a tangible trail of the vote to use the media
and public opinion in many states to force legislation for VVPAT’s, without making any distinction in
the technical solution used for the different voting systems.
3. Certification and permission for use of voting machines
Apart from requiring approval and certification at state level, in many states of the USA approval is
first required in accordance with the voluntary federal legislation, before the vendor can participate
in a state approval process.
A version of the Nedap voting machine without VVPAT has been approved federally under the
‘voluntary voting standards VVS 2002’ following type testing by the independent testing laboratories
Wyle and Systest , and has received a certification at state level for use in New Jersey.
4. New York
In the state of New York, mechanical voting machines have been used for more than 100 years and
electronic voting machines for decades now, both without VVPAT. In this state, electoral law has
been changed with regard to a multitude of issues during the past years.
These changes also concern the voting machines. The voting machines which are to replace the
former machines now have to be equipped with a VVPAT, as well as a large number of other
facilities, which ensure that handicapped voters can vote independently.
At present, what is generally understood under VVPAT in the USA no longer quite covers the issue.
The original idea was a log roll which was visible to the voter, and on which each key tap by the
voter was recorded. Now, in general, this refers to a printer, which prints out the summary of the
choices made by the voter. The voter can then accept or reject this summary.
From the publications available concerning this subject, we may conclude that a printer which prints
out only the summary is not as safe as the original concept of the log printer.f
5. The Nedap machine for NY with VVPAT
The version of our machine for New York State includes, among other things, a VVPAT. However,
the regulations on how the printer should function were lacking, therefore these had to be
determined during the course of the certification process.
The choices made here, so far, are as follows:
1. The printer in question is a thermal printer,
a. therefore, there will be no problems with obsolete cartridges
b. the accompanying thermal paper has been tested for legibility in accordance with the
shelf life (number of years) and environmental conditions required in NY state
2. The printer concerned is a ‘cut and drop’ type,
a. for each voter a receipt is cut off, which falls into a sealed bag
b. in NY the voters vote on one of two allocated machines per polling station, as do
voters in the Netherlands. It would be possible to follow the order in which voters cast
their votes: therefore, in order to guarantee the secrecy of the voting, it is essential
that the order of the printed receipts cannot be traced.g
3. The printer in question is a real-time printer,
a. i.e., each selection and deselection is printed
b. the voter can verify the accuracy of the of each key tap
c. in combination with point 2, this results in a single receipt per voter
4. On each receipt, a summary is printed as a two-dimensional bar code,
a. this simplifies and accelerates the recounting process
b. this prevents manual mistakes being made during the recounting process
5. The voter is not given the print-out, but can view this from behind a window,
a. this prevents differences caused by voters who keep the print-outs or add extra copies
into the ballot box.
6. Each receipt is provided with the same transaction code as the electronically recorded vote,
a. making it possible to compare each electronically recorded choice with the receipt
b. providing the opportunity to enter test votes under supervision at any moment, which
can then be removed from the total votes at a later stage. This is to check whether the
system is working properly, without being dependent on non-verifiable statements
from voters, who after all vote in secret.
c. providing the opportunity for the voter to check whether his vote has been counted
correctly. This will need to take place in a protected and private environment.h
7. The moment the printer seizes to be able to produce a receipt or the voting machine is unable
to store the vote electronically the voting machine is blocked for further actions by a voter.
a. In case the printer is out of paper it cannot print a receipt and would introduce a
difference in registration between the electronically stored votes and the votes
registered on paper.
b. In case the voting machine is not able to register the vote electronically and the printer
can print a receipt this would introduce a difference in registration between the
electronically stored votes and the votes registered on paper.
c. In case the printer has a paper jam it cannot print a receipt and would introduce a
difference in registration between the electronically stored votes and the votes
registered on paper.
8. The printer comes equipped with the sealed bag as a single unit, which is attached to the
machine
a. in the event of the paper jamming, or another type of breakdown, the printer can be
replaced without the members of the polling station being able to view the receipts
b. the recounting of the receipts takes place at a different location –i.e. not at the polling
station –therefore, there can be no connection made between the voter and the vote
cast
In addition, a number of issues were settled within the laws and legislation of NY with regard to what
should happen to the two independently obtained records.
It was determined that, in any event, 3% of the machine results would be recounted, which is the reason
why Nedap has added the bar code to the receipts.
Further New York State Election Law requires the following procedures during the audit of the printed
receipts.
§ 9-211. Audit of voter verifiable audit records.
1. Within fifteen days after each general or special election, and within seven
days after every primary or village election conducted by the board of elections,
the board of elections or a bipartisan committee appointed by such board shall
manually audit the voter verifiable audit records from three percent of voting machines
or systems within the jurisdiction of such board. Voting machines or systems shall be selected
for audit through a random, manual process. At least five
days prior to the time fixed for such selection process, the board of elections shall
send notice by first class mail to each candidate, political party and independent
body entitled to have had watchers present at the polls in any election district in
such board’s jurisdiction. Such notice shall state the time and place fixed for such
random selection process. The audit shall be conducted in the same manner, to the
extent applicable, as a canvass of paper ballots. Each candidate, political party
or independent body entitled to appoint watchers to attend at a polling place shall
be entitled to appoint such number of watchers to observe the audit.
2. The manual audit tallies for each voting machine or system shall be compared
to the tallies recorded by such voting machine or system, and a report shall
be made of such comparison which shall be filed in the office of the state board
of elections.
3. The state board of elections shall, in accordance with subdivision four of
section 3-100 of this chapter, promulgate regulations establishing a uniform statewide
standard to be used by boards of elections to determine when a discrepancy
between the manual audit tallies and the voting machine or system tallies shall
require a further voter verifiable record audit of additional voting machines or
systems or a complete manual audit of all machines or systems within the jurisdiction
of a board of elections. Any board of elections shall be empowered to order
that any such audit shall be conducted whenever any such discrepancy exists.
4. If a complete audit shall be conducted, the results of such audit shall be
used by the canvassing board in making the statement of canvass and determinations
of persons elected and propositions rejected or approved. The results of a
partial voter verifiable record audit shall not be used in lieu of voting machine or
system tallies.
5. Notwithstanding subdivision four of this section, if a voting machine or
system is found to have failed to record votes in a manner indicating an operational
failure, the board of canvassers shall use the voter verifiable audit records to
determine the votes cast on such machine or system, provided such records were
not also impaired by the operational failure of the voting machine or system.
{Added, L 2005, ch 181, § 14, eff July 12, 2005.}
notes:
a Joseph P. Harris, Election Administration in the United States (1934)
b In general, the programmes are recorded in PROMs or E-PROMs (this type of software is called firmware). PROMs
can not be altered, and have to be replaced in their entirety, E-PROMS can be erased by UV-radiation and reprogrammed.
Some manufacturers implement a hardware-controlled procedure.
c The memory might be a battery-powered RAM, E-PROMs or, as in the case of NEDAP, EE-proms (electrically
erasable PROMS).
d Roy G. Saltman, rsaltman@alum.mit.edu, August 22, 2006, Independent Verification: Essential Action to Assure
e All microprocessor-controlled equipment could be called a computer. Examples of this include watches and clocks,
calculators, digital thermometers, thermostats, motor management systems, modern radios and televisions
f http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_38150.pdf Brennan Center for Justice complete
report
g On a ‘real to real’ printer, the votes are printed in the order of the voters, which can be traced. In other states where
the voters can choose from a large number of random machines within 1 polling station, a ‘real to real’ printer will
suffice
h It is not yet permitted in NY to publish the choices made, together with the transaction codes, on a WebPage, as
has been implemented by the Netherlands for its voters abroad voting by means of the Internet.
www.sos.cs.ru.nl/research/sosries/ Checking one’s own vote
Integrity in the Voting Process,
United States
In the US the direct-recording electronic voting machines are marketed in partnership with Liberty Election Systems as "LIBERTYVOTE".[7] The state of New York is currently contemplating buying 28,000 Nedap direct-recording electronic voting machines.[8]
References
1. Nedap/Groenendaal ES3B voting computer, a security analysis
2. Dutch citizens group cracks Nedap's voting computer
3. Voting systems company threatens Dutch state: "Buy my company now or you won’t have provincial elections"
4. Statement of voting machine manufacturer Nedap
5. Raadslid Landerd is stuk minder populair in schaduwverkiezing
6. Cullen rules out use of e-voting in June
7. Liberty Election Systems, About us
8. Groenendaal
See also
★ Voting machine
★ Electronic voting
★ Electoral fraud
External links
★ Nedap Website (Managing Director: Ton Westendorp)
★ Nedap Electionsystems Website (Market Group leader: Matthijs Schippers)
★ Website von Nedap Groenendaal (Voting Machines)
★ Nedap Great Britain (Managing Director: Lars Holweg)
★ HSG wahlsystemen (Managing Director: Herbert Schulze Geiping)
★ Liberty Election Systems (USA)
★ Nedap Partner Net
★ Security analysis of a Nedap ESD3B (English)
★ Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting (Campaigning against Nedap voting machines in Ireland)
★ Description of Nedap voting machines by EFVE
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psst.. try this: add to faves
