NULLIFICATION CRISIS

The 'Nullification Crisis' was a sectional crisis during the presidency of Andrew Jackson that arose when the state of South Carolina attempted to nullify a federal law passed by the United States Congress. The crisis developed during the national economic downturn throughout the 1820s that hit South Carolina particularly hard.^[1] The dictionary definition of "nullification" is "the action of a state impeding or attempting to prevent the operation and enforcement within its territory of a law of the United States."^[2] In this instance, South Carolina’s attempt was based on a constitutional theory articulated by South Carolina’s John C. Calhoun in which any state could unilaterally, or in cooperation with other states, refuse to comply with any federal law which a convention selected by the people of the state ruled was unconstitutional. The theoretical issue related to the very nature of the United States Constitution. As historian Forest McDonald wrote, “Of all the problems that beset the United States during the century from the Declaration of Independence to the end of Reconstruction, the most pervasive concerned disagreements about the nature of the Union and the line to be drawn between the authority of the general government and that of the several states.”^[3] In this specific case, however, the nullifier position was even rejected by most states’ rights supporters outside of South Carolina who considered it an extreme and rash position.^[4]
Many South Carolina politicians blamed the state’s economic problems on a national tariff policy that developed after the War of 1812.^[5] The highly protective Tariff of 1828 (also called the "Tariff of Abominations") was enacted into law in 1828 during the presidency of John Quincy Adams. The tariff was opposed in the South and parts of New England. Opponents generally felt that the protective features were harmful to agrarian interests and were unconstitutional because they favored one sector of the economy over another. Proponents found no constitutional restriction on the purposes for which tariffs could be enacted and argued that strengthening the industrial capacity of the nation was in the interest of the entire country. The expectation of the tariff’s opponents was that with the election of Jackson the tariff would be significantly reduced.^[6] By 1828 South Carolina state politics increasingly organized around the tariff issue. When the Jackson administration failed to address their concerns, the most radical faction in the state began to advocate that the state itself declare the tariff null and void within South Carolina. In Washington, an open split on the issue occurred between Jackson and Vice-president Calhoun.^[7]
On July 14, 1832, after Calhoun had resigned his office, Jackson signed into law the Tariff of 1832 which made some reductions in tariff rates. The reductions were too little for South Carolina, and in November 1832 a state convention was called. The convention overwhelmingly adopted an ordinance of nullification drawn by Chancellor William Harper by a vote of 136 to 26, declaring that the tariffs of both 1828 and 1832 were unconstitutional and unenforceable in South Carolina. In late February, the Force Bill (called "Jackson's Bloody Bill" or "War Bill" by opponents) was passed, authorizing president Jackson to use military force against South Carolina. Violence was averted when Henry Clay and John Calhoun worked out a compromise, and a new negotiated tariff satisfactory to South Carolina was passed by Congress. The South Carolina convention reconvened and repealed its tariff Nullification Ordinance on March 11, 1833, and then, “in a purely symbolic gesture”, nullified the Force Bill.^[8]
The crisis was over, and both sides could find reasons to claim victory. The tariff rates were reduced, but the states’ rights doctrine of nullification as articulated by South Carolina had been “irretrievably smashed.”^[9] While tariff policy would continue to be a national political issue between Democrats and the newly emerged Whig Party, by the 1850s the intertwined issues of slavery and territorial expansion would become the most significant and sectionally divisive issues in the nation.^[10]

Background (1787- 1816)

Historian Richard E. Ellis wrote:
The extent of this change and the problem of the actual distribution of powers between state and the federal governments would be a matter of political and ideological discussion up to the Civil War and beyond.^[11] In the early 1790s the debate centered on Alexander Hamilton’s nationalistic financial program versus Jefferson’s democratic and agrarian program, a conflict that led to the formation of two opposing national political parties. Later in the decade the Alien and Sedition Acts led to the states’ rights position being articulated in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. ^[12] The Kentucky Resolutions, written by Thomas Jefferson, contained the following which has often been cited as a justification for both nullification and secession:
In the Virginia Resolutions, written by James Madison there is a similar argument:
Historians differ over the extent to which either resolution actually advocated the doctrine of nullification. Historian Lance Banning wrote, “The legislators of Kentucky (or more likely, Breckinridge himself) deleted Jefferson's suggestion that the rightful remedy for federal usurpations was a "nullification" of such acts by each state acting on its own to prevent their operation within its respective borders. Rather than suggesting individual, although concerted, measures of this sort, Kentucky was content to ask its sisters to unite in declarations that the acts were "void and of no force", and in "requesting their appeal" at the succeeding session of the Congress.”^[13] Madison biographer Ralph Ketchum wrote:
Historian Sean Wilentz explains the widespread opposition to these resolutions:

Portrait of Thomas Jefferson by Rembrandt Peale, 1800

The election of 1800 was a turning point as the Federalists were replaced by the Democratic-Republican Party led by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, the authors of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. However the four presidential terms spanning the period from 1800 to 1817 “did little to advance the cause of states’ rights and much to weaken it.” Over Jefferson’s opposition, the power of the Federal judiciary, led by Federalist Chief Justice John Marshall, increased. Jefferson expanded federal powers with the acquisition of Louisiana and his use of a national embargo designed to prevent involvement in a European war. Madison in 1809 used national troops to enforce a Supreme Court decision in Pennsylvania, appointed an “extreme nationalist” in Joseph Story to the Supreme Court, signed the bill creating the Second Bank of the United States, and called for a constitutional amendment to promote internal improvements.^[14]
Opposition to the War of 1812 was centered in New England. Delegates to a convention in Hartford, Connecticut met in December 1814 to consider a New England response to Madison’s war policy. The debate allowed many radicals to argue the cause of states’ rights and state sovereignty. In the end, moderate voices dominated and the final product was not secession or nullification, but a series of proposed constitutional amendments.^[15] Identifying the South’s domination of the government as the cause of much of their problems, the proposed amendments included “the repeal of the three-fifths clause, a requirement that two-thirds of both houses of Congress agree before any new state could be admitted to the Union, limits on the length of embargoes, and the outlawing of the election of a president from the same state to successive terms, clearly aimed at the Virginians.”^[16] The war was over before the proposals were submitted to President Madison.

James Madison

After the conclusion of the War of 1812 Sean Wilentz notes:
This spirit of nationalism was linked to the tremendous growth and economic prosperity of this post war era. However in 1819 the nation suffered its first depression and the 1820s turned out to be a decade of political turmoil that again led to fierce debates over competing views of the exact nature of American federalism. The “extreme democratic and agrarian rhetoric” that had been so effective in 1798 led to renewed attacks on the “numerous market-oriented enterprises, particularly banks, corporations, creditors, and absentee landholders”. ^[17]

Tariffs (1816-1828)

While the Tariff of 1816 had some protective features, it received support throughout the nation, including that of John C. Calhoun and fellow South Carolinian William Lowndes.^[18] The first explicitly protective tariff linked to a specific program of internal improvements was the Tariff of 1824.^[19] Sponsored by Henry Clay, this tariff provided a general level of protection at 35% ad valorem (compared to 25% with the 1816 act)and hiked duties on iron, woolens, cotton, hemp, and wool and cotton bagging. The bill barely passed the federal House of Representatives by a vote of 107 to 102. The Middle states and Northwest supported the bill, the South and Southwest opposed it, and New England split its vote with a majority opposing it. In the Senate the bill, with the support of Tennessee Senator Andrew Jackson, passed by four votes, and President James Monroe, the Virginia heir to the Jefferson-Madison control of the White House, signed the bill on March 25, 1824.^[20] Daniel Webster of Massachusetts led the New England opposition to this tariff.^[21]

Portrait of Martin Van Buren

The Tariff of 1828 was largely the work of Martin van Buren and was partly a political ploy to elect Andrew Jackson president. Van Buren calculated that the South would vote for Jackson regardless of the issues so he ignored their interests in drafting the bill. New England, he thought, was just as likely to support the incumbent John Quincy Adams, so the bill levied heavy taxes on raw materials consumed by New England such as hemp, flax, molasses, iron and sail duck. With an additional tariff on iron to satisfy Pennsylvania interests, Van Buren expect the tariff to help deliver Pennsylvania, New York, Missouri, Ohio, and Kentucky to Jackson. Over opposition from the South and some from New England, the tariff was passed with the full support of many Jackson supporters in Congress and signed by President Adams in early 1828.^[22]
As expected, Jackson and his running mate John Calhoun carried the entire South with overwhelming numbers in all the states but Louisiana where Adams drew 47% of the vote in a losing effort. However many Southerners became dissatisfied as Jackson, in his first two annual messages to Congress, failed to launch a strong attack on the tariff. Historian William J. Cooper Jr. writes:

South Carolina Background (1819-1828)

Sketch of John C. Calhoun

South Carolina had been adversely affected by the national economic decline of the 1820s. During this decade 56,000 whites and 30,000 slaves, out of a total free and slave population of 580,000 left the state for greener pastures.^[23] Historian Richard E. Ellis describes the situation:

George McDuffie

State leaders, led by states’ rights advocates like William Smith and Thomas Cooper, blamed most of the state’s economic problems on the Tariff of 1816 and national internal improvement projects, although soil erosion and competition from the new Southwest were also very significant reasons for the state’s declining fortunes.^[24] George McDuffie was a particularly effective speaker for the anti-tariff forces, and he popularized the Forty Bale theory. McDuffie argued that the 40% tariff of cotton finished goods meant that “the manufacturer actually invades your barns, and plunders you of 40 out of every 100 bales that you produce.” Mathematically incorrect, this argument still struck a nerve with his constituency. Nationalists such as Calhoun were forced by the increasing power of such leaders to retreat from their previous positions and adopt, in the words of Ellis, "an even more extreme version of the states' rights doctrine" in order to maintain politically significant within South Carolina.^[25]
South Carolina’s first effort at nullification occurred in 1822. It was believed that free black sailors had assisted Denmark Vesey in his planned slave rebellion. South Carolina passed a law requiring all black foreign seamen be imprisoned whenever their ships docked in Charleston. Supreme Court Justice William Johnson, in his capacity as a circuit judge, declared this law as unconstitutional since it violated United States treaties with England. The South Carolina Senate announced that the judge’s ruling was invalid and would not be enforced. The federal government did not attempt to enforce the order.^[26]

The Road to Nullification in South Carolina (1828-1832)

Sketch of J.R. Poinsett

Historian Avery Craven argues that, for the most part, the debate from 1828-1832 was a local South Carolina affair. The state itself was not united and the sides were roughly equal. The western part of the state and a faction in Charleston led by Joel Poinsett would remain loyal to Jackson almost to the end. Only in small part was the conflict between “a National North against a States’-right South”.^[27]
After the final vote on the Tariff of 1828, the South Carolina congressional delegation held two caucuses, the second at the home of Senator Robert Y. Hayne. They were rebuffed in their efforts to coordinate a united Southern response and focused on how their state, by itself, would react. While many agreed with George McDuffie that tariff policy could lead to secession at some future date, they all agreed that as much as possible the issue should be kept out of the upcoming presidential election. Calhoun, while not at this meeting, served as a moderating influence. He felt that the first step in reducing the tariff was to defeat Adams and his supporters in the upcoming election. William C. Preston, on behalf of the South Carolina legislature asked Calhoun to prepare a report on the tariff situation. Calhoun readily accepted this challenge and in a few weeks time had a 35,000 word draft of what would become his “Exposition and Protest.”^[28]
Calhoun’s “Exposition” was completed late in 1828. He argued that the tariff of 1828 was unconstitutional because it favored manufacturing over commerce and agriculture. The tariff power, he felt, could only be used to generate revenue, not to provide protection from foreign competition for American industries. He believed that the people of a state or several states, acting in a democratically elected convention, had the retained power to veto any act of the federal government which violated the Constitution. This veto, the core of the doctrine of nullification, was explained by Calhoun in the Exposition:
The report also detailed the specific southern grievances over the tariff that led to the current dissatisfaction. ”^[29] Fearful that “hotheads” such as McDuffie might force the legislature into taking some drastic action against the federal government, historian John Niven describes Calhoun’s political purpose in the document:
The report was submitted to the state legislature which had five thousand copies of it printed and distributed. Calhoun, who still had designs on succeeding Jackson as president, was not identified as the author but word on this soon leaked out. The legislature took no action on the report at that time. ^[30]
In the summer of 1828 Robert Barnwell Rhett, soon to be considered the most radical of the South Carolinians, entered the fray over the tariff. As a state representative, Rhett called for the governor to convene a special session of the legislature. An outstanding orator, Rhett appealed to his constituents to resist the majority in Congress. Rhett addressed the danger of doing nothing:
Rhett’s rhetoric which talked of revolution and war was still too radical in the summer of 1828, but with the election of Jackson assured, James Hamilton Jr. on October 28 in Walterborough “launched the formal nullification campaign”. ^[31] Renouncing his former nationalism, Hamilton warned the people that, “Your task-master must soon become a tyrant, from the very abuses and corruption of the system, without the bowels of compassion, or a jot of human sympathy.” He called for implementation of Mr. Jefferson’s “rightful remedy” of nullification. Hamilton sent a copy of the speech directly to President-elect Jackson. However despite a statewide campaign by Hamilton and McDuffie, a proposal to call a nullification convention in 1829 was defeated by the South Carolina legislature that met at the end of 1828. State leaders such as Calhoun, Hayne, Smith, and William Drayton were all able to remain publicly non-committal or opposed to nullification for the next couple of years.^[32]
The division in the state between radicals and conservatives continued throughout 1829 and 1830. After the failure of a state project to arrange financing of a railroad within the state to promote internal trade, the state petitioned Congress to invest $250,000 in the company attempting to build the railroad. Congress tabled the measure and the debate in South Carolina resumed between those who wanted state investment and those who wanted again to attempt to get Congress involved. The debate demonstrated that a significant minority of the state did have an interest in Clay’s American System. However the impact of the Webster-Haynes debate (see next section) energized the radicals and some moderates started to move in their direction. ^[33]
The state election campaign of 1830 focused on the tariff issue and the need for a state convention. Radicals, on the defensive, deemphasized that the convention would necessarily be pro-nullification. Where voters were presented with races where an unpledged convention was the issue, the radicals generally won. Where conservatives effectively categorized the race as being about nullification, the radicals lost. The October election was narrowly carried by the radicals although the blurring of the issues left them without any specific mandate.^[34] However in South Carolina, the governor was selected by the legislature, and the leader of the radical movement, James Hamilton, was selected as governor and fellow radical Henry L. Pinckney was selected as speaker for the South Carolina House. For the open Senate seat, the more radical Stephen Miller was selected over William Smith.^[35]
With radicals in leading positions, in 1831, the momentum began to shift towards the radicals. State politics were now strictly divided along Nullifier and Unionist lines. Still, the margin in the legislature fell short of the two-thirds majority needed for a convention. Many of the radicals felt that convincing Calhoun of the futility of his plans for the presidency would lead him into their ranks. Calhoun meanwhile had reached his own conclusion that Martin Van Buren was clearly establishing himself as Jackson’s heir apparent. George McDuffie, at Hamilton’s prompting, made a three hour speech in Charleston demanding nullification of the tariff at any cost. In the state, the success of McDuffie’s speech seemed to open up the possibilities of both military confrontation with the federal government and civil war within the state itself. With silence no longer an acceptable alternative, Calhoun looked for the opportunity to take control of the anti-tariff faction in the state and by June he was preparing what would be known as his Fort Hill Address.^[36]

The Nat Turner Rebellion in Virginia had repercussions throughout the South

Published on July 26, 1831, the address repeated and expanded the positions he had made in the “Exposition”. While the logic of much of the speech was consistent with the states’ rights position of most Jacksonians and even Daniel Webster remarked that it “was the ablest and most plausible, and therefore the most dangerous vindication of that particular form of Revolution”, the speech still placed Calhoun clearly in the nullifier camp. Within South Carolina, whatever attempts at moderation there were in the speech were drowned out as the state received word of the Nat Turner insurrection in Virginia. Calhoun was not alone in finding a connection between the abolition movement and the sectional aspects of the tariff issue.^[37] It confirmed for Calhoun what he had written in a September 11, 1830 letter:
From this point, the nullifiers accelerated their organization and rhetoric. In July 1831 the States Rights and Free Trade Association was formed in Charleston and expanded throughout the state. Unlike state political organizations in the past that were led by the South Carolina aristocracy, this group specifically targeted all segments of the population including non-slaveholder farmers, small slaveholders, and the Charleston non-agricultural class. Governor Hamilton was instrumental in seeing that the association, which was both a political and a social organization, expanded throughout the state, and in the winter of 1831 and spring of 1832 Hamilton held conventions and rallies throughout the state to mobilize the nullification movement. The conservatives were unable to match the radicals in either organization or leadership.^[38]
The state elections of 1832 were “charged with tension and bespattered with violence” and “polite debates often degenerated into frontier brawls.” Unlike the previous year’s election, the choice was clear between nullifiers and unionists. The nullifiers won and on October 20, 1832 Governor Hamilton called the legislature into a special session to consider a convention. The legislative vote was 96-25 in the House and 31-13 in the Senate^[39]
In November 1832 the Nullification Convention met. The convention declared that the tariffs of 1828 and 1832 were unconstitutional and unenforceable within the state of South Carolina after February 1, 1833. Furthermore, attempts to use force to collect the taxes would lead to the state’s secession. Robert Hayne, who followed Hamilton as governor in 1833, established a 2,000 man group of mounted minutemen and 25,000 infantry who would immediately march to Charleston in the event of a military conflict. These troops were to be armed with $100,000 in arms purchased in the North.^[40]
The enabling legislation passed by the legislature was carefully constructed to avoid clashes if at all possible and to create an aura of legality in the process. To avoid conflicts with Unionists, it allowed importers to pay the tariff if they so desired. For others, they would pay the tariff by obtaining a paper tariff bond from the customs officer. They would then refuse to pay the bond when due and, if the customs official seized the goods the merchant would file for a writ of replevin to recover the goods in state court. Customs officials refusing to return the goods by placing them under the protection of Federal troops would be civilly liable for twice the value of the goods. To insure that state officials and judges supported the law, a test oath would be required for all new state officials that would bind them to support the ordinance of nullification.^[41]
Governor Hayne in his inaugural address made it clear where South Carolina stood:

Washington, D.C. (1828-1832)

Andrew Jackson.

When President Jackson took office in March 1829 he was well aware of the turmoil created by the “Tariff of Abominations”. While he may have abandoned some of his earlier beliefs that had allowed him to vote for the Tariff of 1824, he still felt protectionism was justified for products essential to military preparedness and did not believe that the current tariff should be reduced until the national debt was fully paid off. He addressed the issue in his inaugural address and his first three messages to Congress, but offered no specific relief. In December 1831, with the proponents of nullification in South Carolina gaining momentum, Jackson was recommending “the exercise of that spirit of concession and conciliation which has distinguished the friends of our Union in all great emergencies.”^[42] However on the constitutional issue of nullification, despite his strong beliefs in states’ rights, Jackson did not waver.
Calhoun’s “Exposition and Protest” did start a national debate over the doctrine of nullification. The leading proponents of the nationalistic view included Justice Story, William Duer, John Quincy Adams, Nathaniel Chipman, and Nathan Dane. These people rejected the compact theory advanced by Calhoun, claiming that the Constitution was the product of the people, not the states. According to the nationalist position, the Supreme Court had the final say on the constitutionality of legislation, the national union was perpetual and had supreme authority over individual states. ^[43] The nullifiers, on the other hand, asserted that the central government was not to be the ultimate arbiter of its own power, and that the states, as the contracting entities, could judge for themselves what was or was not constitutional. While Calhoun’s “Exposition” claimed that nullification was based on the reasoning behind the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, an aging James Madison in an August 28, 1830 letter to Edward Everett, intended for publication, disagreed , in an apparent about-face from his Virginia Resolutions.

''Webster Replying to Hayne'' by George P.A. Healy

Part of the South’s strategy to force repeal of the tariff was to arrange an alliance with the West. Under the plan, the South would support the West’s demand for free lands in the public domain if the West would support repeal of the tariff. With this purpose Robert Hayne took the floor on the Senate in early 1830, thus beginning “the most celebrated debate, in the Senate’s history.” Daniel Webster’s response shifted the debate, subsequently styled the Webster-Hayne debates, from the specific issue of western lands to a general debate on the very nature of the United States. The debate presented the fullest articulation of the differences over nullification, and 40,000 copies of Webster’s response, which concluded with “liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable”, were distributed nationwide.^[44]
Many people expected the states’ rights Jackson to side with Haynes. However once the debate shifted to secession and nullification, Jackson sided with Webster. On April 13, 1830 at the traditional Democratic Party celebration honoring Thomas Jefferson’s birthday, Jackson chose to make his position clear. In a battle of toasts, Hayne proposed, “The Union of the States, and the Sovereignty of the States.” Jackson’s response, when his turn came, was, “Our Union: It must be preserved.” To those attending, the effect was dramatic. Calhoun would respond with his own toast, in a play on Webster’s closing remarks in the earlier debate, “The Union. Next to our liberty, the most dear.” Finally Van Buren would offer, “Mutual forbearance and reciprocal concession. Through their agency the Union was established. The patriotic spirit from which they emanated will forever sustain it.”
Van Buren wrote in his autobiography of Jackson’s toast, “The veil was rent – the incantations of the night were exposed to the light of day.” Thomas Hart Benton, in his memoirs, stated that the toast “electrified the country.”^[45] Jackson would have the final words a few days later when a visitor from South Carolina asked if Jackson had any message he wanted relayed to his friends back in the state. Jackson’s reply was:
Other issues than the tariff were still being decided. In May 1830 Jackson vetoed an important (especially to Kentucky and Henry Clay) internal improvements program in the Maysville Road Bill and then followed this with additional vetoes of other such projects shortly before Congress adjourned at the end of May. Clay would use these vetoes to launch his presidential campaign.^[46] In 1831 the re-chartering of the Bank of the United States, with Clay and Jackson on opposite sides, reopened a long simmering problem. This issue was featured at the December 1831 National Republican convention in Baltimore which nominated Henry Clay for president, and the proposal to re-charter was formally introduced into Congress on January 6, 1832.^[47] The Calhoun-Jackson split entered the center stage when Calhoun, as vice-president presiding over the Senate, cast the tie-breaking vote to deny Martin Van Buren the post of minister to England. Van Buren was subsequently selected as Jackson’s running mate in the Democratic convention held in May.^[48]

Henry Clay

In February 1832 Henry Clay, back in the Senate after a two decades absence, made a three day long speech calling for a new tariff schedule and an expansion of his American System. In an effort to reach out to John Calhoun and other southerners, Clay’s proposal provided for a ten million dollar revenue reduction based on the amount of budget surplus he anticipated for the coming year. Significant protection was still part of the plan as the reduction primarily came on those imports not in competition with domestic producers. Jackson proposed an alternative that reduced overall tariffs to 28%. John Quincy Adams, now in the House of Representatives, used his Committee of Manufacturers to produce a compromise bill that, in its final form, reduced revenues by five million dollars, lowered duties on non-competitive products, and retained high tariffs on woolens, iron, and cotton products. In the course of the political maneuvering, George McDuffie’s Ways and Means Committee, the normal originator of such bills, prepared a bill with drastic reduction across the board. McDuffie’s bill went nowhere. Jackson signed the Tariff of 1832 on July 14, 1832, a few days after he vetoed the Bank of America re-charter bill. Congress adjourned after it failed to override Jackson’s veto.^[49]
With Congress in adjournment, Jackson anxiously watched events in South Carolina. The nullifiers found no significant compromise in the Tariff of 1832 and acted accordingly (see the above section). Jackson heard rumors of efforts to subvert members of the army and navy in Charleston and he ordered the secretaries of the army and navy to begin rotating troops and officers based on their loyalty. He ordered General Winfield Scott to prepare for military operations and ordered a naval squadron in Norfolk to prepare to go to Charleston. Jackson kept lines of communication open with unionists like Joel Poinsett, William Drayton, and James Pettigru and sent George Breathitt, brother of the Kentucky governor, to independently obtain political and military intelligence. After their defeat at the polls in October, Pettigru advised Jackson that he should Be “prepared to hear very shortly of a State Convention and an act of Nullification.” On October 19, 1832 Jackson wrote to his Secretary of war, “The attempt will be made to surprise the Forts and garrisons by the militia, and must be guarded against with vestal vigilance and any attempt by force repelled with prompt and exemplary punishment.” By mid-November Jackson’s reelection was assured. ^[50]
On December 3, 1832 Jackson sent his fourth annual message to Congress. The message “was stridently states’ rights and agrarian in its tone and thrust” and he disavowed protection as anything other than a temporary expedient.^[51] His intent regarding nullification, as communicated to Van Buren, was “to pass it barely in review, as a mere buble [sic], view the existing laws as competent to check and put it down.” He hoped to create a “moral force” that would transcend political parties and sections. The paragraph in the message that addressed nullification was:
On December 10 Jackson issued a separate proclamation, directed primarily to the people of South Carolina. In a document that characterized the positions of the nullifiers as “impractical absurdity” and “a metaphysical subtlety, in pursuit of an impractical theory”, he provided this concise statement of his belief:
The language used by Jackson, combined with the reports coming out of South Carolina, raised the spectre of military confrontation for many on both sides of the issue. A group of Democrats, led by Van Buren and Thomas Hart Benton among others, saw the only solution to the crisis in a substantial reduction of the tariff.

Negotiation and Confrontation (1833)

In apparent contradiction of his previous claim that the tariff could be enforced with existing laws, on January 16 Jackson sent his Force Bill Message to Congress. Custom houses in Beaufort and Georgetown would be closed and replaced by ships located at each port. In Charleston the custom house would be moved to either Castle Pinckney or Fort Moultrie in Charleston harbor. Direct payment rather than bonds would be required, and Federal jails would be established for violators that the state refused to arrest and all cases arising under the state’s nullification act could be removed to the United States Circuit Court. In the most controversial part, the militia acts of 1795 and 1807 would be revised to permit the enforcement of the custom laws by both the militia and the regular United States military. Attempts were made in South Carolina to shift the debate away from nullification by focusing instead on the proposed enforcement.^[52]
The Force bill went to the Senate Judiciary Committee chaired by Pennsylvania protectionist William Wilkins and supported by members Daniel Webster and Theodore Frelinghuysen of New Jersey; it gave Jackson everything he asked. On January 28 the Senate defeated a motion by a vote of 30 to 15 to postpone debate on the bill. All but two of the votes to delay were from the lower South and only three from this section voted against the motion. This did not signal any increased support for nullification but did signify doubts about enforcement. In order to draw more votes proposals were made to limit the duration of the coercive powers and restrict the use of force to suppressing, rather than preventing, civil disorder. In the House the Judiciary Committee, in a 4-3 vote, rejected Jackson’s request to use force. By the time Calhoun made a major speech on February 15 strongly opposing it, the Force Bill was temporarily stalled. ^[53]
On the tariff issue, the drafting of a compromise tariff was assigned in December to the House Ways and Means Committee, now headed by Gulian C. Verplanck. Debate on the committee’s product on the House floor began in January 1833. The Verplanck tariff proposed reductions back to the 1816 levels over the course of the next two years while maintaining the basic principle of protectionism. The anti-Jackson protectionists saw this as an economic disaster that did not allow the Tariff of 1832 to even be tested and “an undignified truckling to the menaces and blustering of South Carolina. Northern Democrats did not oppose it in principle but still demanded protection for the varying interests of their own constituents. Those sympathetic to the nullifiers wanted a specific abandonment of the principle of protectionism and were willing to offer a longer transition period as a bargaining point. It was clear that the Verplanck tariff was not going to be implemented.^[54]
In South Carolina, efforts were being made to avoid an unnecessary confrontation. Governor Hayne ordered the 25,000 troops he had created to train at home rather than gathering in Charleston. At a mass meeting in Charleston on January 21 it was determined to postpone the February 1 deadline for implementing nullification while Congress worked on a compromise tariff. At the same time a commissioner from Virginia, Benjamin Watkins Leigh, arrived in Charleston bearing resolutions that criticized both Jackson and the nullifiers and offering his state as a mediator.^[55]
Henry Clay had not taken his defeat in the presidential election well and was unsure on what position he could take in the tariff negotiations. His long term concern was that Jackson eventually was determined to kill protectionism along with the American Plan. By February, after consulting with manufacturers and sugar interests in Louisiana who favored protection for the sugar industry, Clay started to work on a specific compromise plan. As a starting point, he accepted nullifiers’ offer of a transition period but extended it from seven and a half years to nine years with a final target of a 20% ad valorem rate. After first securing the support of his protectionist base, Clay, through an intermediary, broached the subject with Calhoun. Calhoun was receptive and after a private meeting with Clay at Clay’s boardinghouse, negotiations preceded.^[56]
Clay introduced the negotiated tariff bill on February 12, and it was immediately referred to a select committee consisting of Clay as chairman, Felix Grundy of Kentucky, George M. Dallas of Pennsylvania, William Cabell Rives of Virginia, Webster, John M. Clayton of Delaware, and Calhoun. On February 21 the committee reported the bill to the floor of the Senate and it was largely the original bill proposed by Clay. The Tariff of 1832 would continue except that reduction of all rates above 20% would be reduced by one tenth every two years with the final reductions back to 20% coming in 1842. Protectionism as a principle was not abandoned and provisions were made for raising the tariff if national interests demanded it. ^[57]
Although not specifically linked by any negotiated agreement, it became clear that the Force Bill and Compromise Tariff were inexorably linked. In his February 25 speech ending the debate on the tariff, Clay captured the spirit of the voices for compromise by condemning Jackson’s Proclamation to South Carolina as inflammatory, admitting the same problem with the Force Bill but indicating its necessity, and praising the Compromise Tariff as the final measure to restore balance, promote the rule of law, and avoid the “sacked cities”, “desolated fields”, and “smoking ruins” that would be the product of the failure to reach a final accord. The House ended up passing the Compromise Tariff by 119-85 and the Force Bill by 149-48. In the Senate the tariff passed 29-16 and the Force bill by 32-1 with many opponents of it walking out rather than voting for it.^[58]
Calhoun rushed to Charleston with the news of the final compromises. The Nullification Convention met again on March 11. It repealed the November Nullification Ordinance and also, “in a purely symbolic gesture” nullified the Force Bill. While the nullifiers claimed victory on the tariff issue, even though they had made concessions, the verdict was very different on nullification. The majority had, in the end, ruled and this boded ill for the South and their minorities hold on slavery.^[59] Rhett summed this up at the convention on March 13. Warning that, “A people, owning slaves, are mad, or worse than mad, who do not hold their destinies in their own hands,” he continued:

Aftermath

The final resolution of the crisis and Jackson’s leadership had appeal throughout the North and South. Historian and Jackson biographer Robert Remini described the opposition that nullification drew from traditionally states’ rights Southern states:
Historian Forest McDonald, describing the split over nullification among proponents of states rights, wrote, “The doctrine of states’ rights, as embraced by most Americans, was not concerned exclusively, or even primarily with state resistance to federal authority.”^[60]
However, by the end of the nullification crisis, many southerners started to question whether the Jacksonian Democrats still represented Southern interests. Historian William J. Cooper notes that, “Numerous southerners had begun to perceive it [the Jacksonian Democratic Party] as a spear aimed at the South rather than a shield defending the South.” In the political vacuum created by this alienation, the southern wing of the Whig Party was formed. The party was a coalition of interests united by the common thread of opposition to Andrew Jackson and, more specifically, his “definition of federal and executive power.” The party included former National Republicans with an “urban, commercial, and nationalist outlook” as well as former nullifiers. Emphasizing that “they were more southern than the Democrats,” the party grew within the South by going “after the abolition issue with unabashed vigor and glee.” With both parties arguing who could best defend southern institutions, the nuances of the differences between free soil and abolitionism, which became an issue in the late 1840s with the Mexican War and territorial expansion, never became part of the political dialogue. This failure increased the volatility of the slavery issues.^[61]
Richard Ellis argues that the end of the crisis signified the beginning of a new era. Within the states’ rights movement the traditional desire for simply “a weak, inactive, and frugal government” was challenged. Ellis states that “in the years leading up to the Civil War the nullifiers and their pro-slavery allies used the doctrine of states’ rights and state sovereignty in such a way as to try to expand the powers of the federal government so that it could more effectively protect the peculiar institution.” States’ rights had become, by the 1850s, a call for state equality under the Constitution.^[62]
The first test for the South over the slavery issue began in the final congressional session of 1835. In what became known as the Gag Rule Debates, abolitionists flooded the Congress with anti-slavery petitions focusing on ending slavery and the slave trade in Washington D. C. The debate was reopened each session as Southerners, led by South Carolinians Henry Pinckney and John Hammond, prevented the petitions from even being officially received by Congress. Led by John Quincy Adams, the slavery debate remained on the national stage until late 1844 when Congress lifted all restrictions on processing the petitions.^[63]
Describing the legacy of the crisis, Sean Wilentz writes:
For South Carolina, the legacy of the crisis involved both the divisions within the state during the crisis and the apparent isolation of the state as the crisis was resolved. By 1860, when South Carolina became the first state to secede, the state was more internally united than any other southern state. Historian Charles Edward Cauthen writes:

Notes

1. Craven pg. 60. Historian Avery Craven wrote in 1942, “Historians have generally ignored the fact that the South Carolina statesmen, in the so-called Nullification controversy, were struggling against a practical situation. They have conjured up a great struggle between nationalism and States’ rights and described these men as theorists reveling in constitutional refinements for the mere sake of logic. Yet here was a clear case of commercial and agricultural depression.” Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, pg. ix-x. Freehling wrote, “In this case I believe it would be a serious mistake to underestimate the economic causes of the Nullification Controversy,” He also adds, “Experts on nullification have always realized that the crusade of 1832, although ostensibly aimed at lowering the tariff, was also an attempt to check the abolitionists.”
2. Webster Merriam Online
3. McDonald pg. vii
4. Remini, Andrew Jackson, v3. pg 34. Remini wrote of Jackson’s opposition to the nullifiers in 1833, “ Jackson’s proclamation and force Bill message, with their powerful nationalistic thrust, appealed to southerners as much as they did to northerners. Their patriotic fervor excited Americans everywhere. Since slavery itself was not involved in the nullification controversy, southerners outside South Carolina responded to Jackson’s arguments with enthusiasm.” Remini, Andrew Jackson, v3. pg. 42. Remini further described Southern opposition to nullification, “The Alabama legislature, for example, pronounced the doctrine ‘unsound in theory and dangerous in practice.’ Georgia said it was ‘mischievous,’ ‘rash and revolutionary.’ Mississippi lawmakers chided the South Carolinians for acting with ‘reckless precipitancy.’” McDonald pg. 110. McDonald wrote, “The doctrine of states’ rights, as embraced by most Americans, was not concerned exclusively, or even primarily with state resistance to federal authority.” Ellis pg. 7. Ellis wrote of the South Carolinians opposing the tariff, “Reacting to their Tariff of Abominations passed in 1828, they adopted an even more extreme version of the states’ rights doctrine than their rivals.” Ellis pg. ix. In describing the purpose of his book he described the split within states’ rights forces, “It was between proponents of different kinds of states’ rights thought. It was between those advocates of states’ rights who believed in a perpetual Union and decentralization of power as the best way to fulfill the democratic promise of the American Revolution and keep government responsible to the wishes of the people, and those who advocated that a state had a constitutional right to withdraw from the Union and believed the doctrine of states’ rights provided the best way to protect the rights of the minority from the tyranny of the majority.” Ellis pg. 198. Ellis wrote, “Traditional states’ rights proponents wanted a weak, inactive, and frugal government that would require few taxes and basically would leave them alone. The nullifiers, on the other hand, had made them sensitive to the benefits of governmental activism.” Ellis pg. 197 “Traditional states’ rights partisans, without much wavering, warmly endorsed the Bank veto and supported the President’s policy of removing the deposits as well as his desire to move in a hard money direction. Although nullifier attitudes toward the Second Bank of the United States were more complex, and at times inconsistent, they were over the long run essentially pro-bank.”
5. Freehling, The Road to Disunion, pg. 255. Craven pg. 60. Ellis pg. 7
6. Remini, Andrew Jackson, v3 pp. 136-137. Niven pg. 135-137. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War pg 143
7. Craven pg.65. Niven pg. 135-137. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War pg 143
8. Freehling pg. 296. Freehling wrote, “The fire-eaters found the newest nullification a bit absurd. McDuffie [see the section of this article “The Road to Nullification in South Carolina (1828-1832)] sarcastically asked his compatriots ‘how they proposed to nullify the military provisions of the bill.’ He thought the army and navy of the United States required something more than an ordinance to nullify them.”
9. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War pg. 297. Freehling wrote, “And nullification had been irretrievably smashed. The events of the nullification winter had clearly revealed that in the American Republic, the majority would rule; given the stir increasingly visible in the North, majority rule meant that the minority South would have to endure the anxiety being generated by a growing anti-slavery movement.”
10. Wilentz pg. 388
11. McDonald pg. vii. McDonald wrote, “Of all the problems that beset the United States during the century from the Declaration of Independence to the end of Reconstruction, the most pervasive concerned disagreements about the nature of the Union and the line to be drawn between the authority of the general government and that of the several states. At times the issue bubbled silently and unseen between the surface of public consciousness; at times it exploded: now and again the balance between general and local authority seemed to be settled in one direction or another, only to be upset anew and to move back toward the opposite position, but the contention never went away.”
12. Ellis pg. 1-2.
13. Banning pg. 388
14. Ellis p.5. Madison called for the constitutional amendment because he believed much of the American System was unconstitutional. Historian Richard Buel Jr. notes that in preparing for the worst from the Hartford Convention, the Madison administration made preparation to intervene militarily in case of New England secession. Troops from the Canadian border were moved near Albany so that they could move into either Massachusetts or Connecticut if necessary. New England troops were also returned to their recruitment areas in order to serve as a focus for loyalists. Buel pg.220-221
15. McDonald pg. 69-70
16. Wilentz pg.166
17. Ellis pg. 6. Wilentz pg. 182.
18. Freehling, ''Prelude to Civil War'' pg. 92-93
19. Wilentz pg. 243. Economic historian Frank Taussig notes “The act of 1816, which is generally said to mark the beginning of a distinctly protective policy in this country, belongs rather to the earlier series of acts, beginning with that of 1789, than to the group of acts of 1824, 1828, and 1832. Its highest permanent rate of duty was twenty per cent., an increase over the previous rates which is chiefly accounted for by the heavy interest charge on the debt incurred during the war. But after the crash of 1819, a movement in favor of protection set in, which was backed by a strong popular feeling such as had been absent in the earlier years.” http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1136
20. Remini, ''Henry Clay'' pg. 232. Freehling, ''The Road to Disunion,'' pg. 257.
21. McDonald pg. 95
22. Remini, ''Andrew Jackson,'' v2 pp. 136-137. McDonald presents a slightly different rationale. He stated that the bill would “adversely affect New England woolen manufacturers, ship builders, and shipowners” and Van Buren calculated that New England and the South would unite to defeat the bill, allowing Jacksonians to have it both ways – in the North they could claim they tried but failed to pass a needed tariff and in the South they could claim that they had thwarted an effort to increase import duties. McDonald pg. 94-95
23. Freehling, ''The Road to Disunion,'' pg. 255. Historian Avery Craven wrote, “Historians have generally ignored the fact that the South Carolina statesmen, in the so-called Nullification controversy, were struggling against a practical situation. They have conjured up a great struggle between nationalism and States” rights and described these men as theorists reveling in constitutional refinements for the mere sake of logic. Yet here was a clear case of commercial and agricultural depression. Craven pg. 60
24. Cauthen pg. 1
25. Ellis pg. 7. Freehling, ''Road to Disunion,'' pg. 256
26. Freehling, ''Road to Disunion,'' pg. 254
27. Craven pg.65.
28. Niven pg. 135-137. Freehling, ''Prelude to Civil War'' pg 143.
29. Niven pg. 158-162
30. Niven pg. 163-164
31. Freehling, ''Prelude to Civil War'' pg. 149
32. Freehling, ''Prelude to Civil War'' pg. 152-155, 173-175. A two-thirds vote of each house of the legislature was required to convene a state convention.
33. Freehling, ''Prelude to Civil War'' pg. 177-186
34. Freehling, ''Prelude to Civil War,'' pg. 205-213
35. Freehling, ''Prelude to Civil War,'' pg. 213-218
36. Peterson pg. 189-192. Niven pg. 174-181. Calhoun wrote of McDuffie’s speech, “I think it every way imprudent and have so written Hamilton … I see clearly it brings matters to a crisis, and that I must meet it promptly and manfully.” Freehling in his works frequently refers to the radicals as “Calhounites” even before 1831. This is because the radicals, rallying around Calhoun’s “Exposition” were linked ideologically, if not yet practically, with Calhoun.
37. Niven pg. 181-184
38. Freehling pg. 224-239
39. Freehling, ''Prelude to Civil War'' pg. 252-260
40. Freehling, ''Prelude to Civil War'' pg. 1-3.
41. Ellis pg. 97-98
42. Ellis pg. 41-43
43. Ellis pg. 9
44. McDonald pg.105-106
45. Remini, ''Andrew Jackson,'' v.2 pg. 233-235.
46. Remini, ''Andrew Jackson,'' v.2 pg. 255-256 Peterson pg. 196-197.
47. Remini, ''Andrew Jackson,'' v.2 pg. 343-348
48. Remini, ''Andrew Jackson,'' v.2 pg. 347-355
49. Remini, ''Andrew Jackson,'' v.2 pg. 358-373. Peterson pg. 203-212
50. Remini, ''Andrew Jackson,'' v.2 pg. 382-389
51. Ellis pg. 82
52. Ellis pg. 93-95
53. Ellis pg. 160-165. Peterson pg. 222-224. Peterson differs with Ellis in arguing that passage of the Force Bill “was never in doubt.”
54. Ellis pg. 99-100. Peterson pg. 217.
55. Wilentz pg. 384-385.
56. Peterson pg. 217-226
57. Peterson pg. 226-228
58. Peterson pg. 229-232
59. Freehling, ''Prelude to Civil War,'' pg. 295-297
60. McDonald pg. 110
61. Cooper pg. 53-65
62. Ellis pg. 198
63. Freehling, ''Prelude to Civil War'' pg.346-356. McDonald (pg 121-122) saw states’ rights in the period from 1833-1847 as almost totally successful in creating a “virtually nonfunctional” federal government. This however did not insure political harmony as “the national political arena became the center of heated controversy concerning the newly raised issue of slavery, a controversy that reached the flash point during the debates about the annexation of the Republic of Texas” pg. 121-122

References

★ Buel, Richard Jr. ''America on the Brink: How the Political Struggle Over the War of 1812 Almost Destroyed the Young Republic. '' (2005) ISBN 1-4039-6238-3

★ Cauthen, Charles Edward. ''South Carolina Goes to War.'' (1950) ISBN 1-57003-560-1

★ Cooper, William J. Jr. ''The South and the Politics of Slavery 1828-1856'' (1978) ISBN 0-8071-0385-3

★ Craven, Avery. ''The Coming of the Civil War'' (1942) ISBN 0-226-11894-0

★ Ellis, Richard E. ''The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States' Rights, and the Nullification Crisis'' (1987)

★ Freehling, William W. ''The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854'' (1991), Vol. 1

★ Freehling, William W. ''Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Crisis in South Carolina 1816-1836. '' (1965) ISBN 0-19-507681-8

★ McDonald, Forrest. ''States’ Rights and the Union: Imperium in Imperio 1776-1876'' (2000) ISBN 0-7006-1040-5

★ Niven, John. ''John C. Calhoun and the Price of Union'' (1988) ISBN 0-8071-1451-0

★ Peterson, Merrill D. ''The Great Triumvirate: Webster, Clay, and Calhoun.'' (1987) ISBN 0-19-503877-0

★ Remini, Robert V. ''Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Freedom, 1822-1832,v2'' (1981) ISBN 0-06-014844-6

★ Remini, Robert V. ''Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Democracy, 1833-1845, v3'' (1984) ISBN 0-06-015279-6

★ Remini, Robert V. ''Henry Clay: Statesman for the Union'' (1991) ISBN 0-393-310884

★ Walther, Eric C. ''The Fire-Eaters'' (1992) ISBN 0-8071-1731-5

★ Wilentz, Sean. ''The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln. '' (2005) ISBN 0-393-05820-4

External links

★ South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification, November 24, 1832 [1]

★ President Jackson's Message to the Senate and House Regarding South Carolina's Nullification Ordinance; January 16, 1833 [2]

★ Andrew Jackson [3]

★ Nullification Re-visited: A two-part article examining the constitutionality of nullification (from a favorable aspect, and with regard to both recent and historical events). Part One Part Two

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NULLIFICATION CRISIS

Background (1787- 1816)

Tariffs (1816-1828)

South Carolina Background (1819-1828)

The Road to Nullification in South Carolina (1828-1832)

Washington, D.C. (1828-1832)

Negotiation and Confrontation (1833)

Aftermath

Notes

References

Further reading

See also

External links

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