OBJECTIVITY (PHILOSOPHY)

'Objectivity' addresses what reality is and how we know about it.

General applications

The term "objectivity" designates both a feature of scientific investigators and a feature of scientific inquiry, itself.
To be objective is to adhere strictly to truth- conducive methods in one's thinking, particularly, to take into account all available information, and to avoid any form of prejudice, bias, or wishful thinking. The forms of observation and experimentation, and the canons of deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning employed by scientists practicing the verification guide scientists to be objective.
As stated earlier, the term "objective" can be applied to methods used in this process or results gotten by it. For example, if a study to determine the effectiveness of a pharmaceutical drug is double-blind, randomized, and placebo controlled, the study can be called "objective" because it adheres to methods that are known to improve the reliability of its results.
Law, medicine, and almost every academic field have developed rules of evidence and guidelines for objectivity particular to their subject matter. In history, for example, objectivity is achieved through the use of the historical method and peer review of journal articles in which authors' proposed explanations and analyses of historical events are evaluated by other experts, prior to publication.
It is a matter of dispute among experts to what degree aesthetic and ethical judgments, as well as judgments involving the interpretation of the law, can be objective. Some hold that the beauty or merit of artworks and literary works cannot be objectively decided. Others deny this. Some claim that ethical judgments are relative to an individual's values or to the norms, mores, and folkways of society. Others deny this. There are impressive arguments on both sides.

Objectivity and subjectivity

The concept of objectivity in philosophy does not necessarily entail notions about a neutral point of view, as the term is defined in such disciplines as journalism. A neutral point of view, here, requres that one does not personally take a point of view, that is, that one represent all sides of the story without personal observation or conjecture. By contrast, it is possible to be philosophically objective in presenting or describing a controversial or novel point of view.

The Scientific Virtues

Among the truth-conducive tools of thought used by objective thinkers are the scientific virtues. When formulating an hypothesis to explain a particular fact, make sure that: your hypothesis is the simplest one on offer (Principle of Parsimony, that it is adequate to all known evidence, that it can predict as diverse an array of phenomena as possible, and that it is fruitful ("risky," according to Popperians, but more generally, that it can be verified by new or as yet unperformed experiments or observations).
The scientific virtue known as simplicity or parsimony has also come to be known as "Ockham’s Razor" because of its frequent use by the fourteenth century philosopher William of Ockham, whose primary statement of the principle in his nominalist epistemology is that in accounting for the facts nothing should be assumed as necessary unless it is established through evidentiary experience or reasoning, or is required by the articles of faith.

Objectivism

"Objectivism" as a term in the history of philosophy finds its origin in the early nineteenth century, when Gottlob Frege implemented it in describing an epistemological and metaphysical theory in a negative response to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Kant's rationalism attempted to reconcile the failures he perceived in realism, empiricism, and idealism, and establish a critical method of approach in the distinction between epistemology and metaphysics. The application of the term "objectivism" to philosophies prior to Frege may then be tentative.
Objectivism, or metaphysical objectivism, is the view that there is a reality or realm of objects and facts existing wholly independent of the mind. Stronger versions of this claim might hold that there is only one correct description of this reality; they may or may not hold that we have any knowledge of it. If it is true that reality is independent of the mind, the reality of objectivism is thus inclusive of objects which one may not know about and are not the intended objects of mental acts. Objectivity in referring requires a definition of what is true, and is distinct from the objects themselves which cannot be said to be true or false. An object may truthfully be said to have this or that attribute, such as the statement "This object exists", whereas the statement "This object is true" or "false" is meaningless. Thus, only references, or the statements one makes about objects without assigning truth value to the object itself, are true or false. Essentially, the terms "objectivity" and "objectivism" are not synonymous, with objectivism being an ontological theory to which a method of objectivity would apply.
Plato's realism was a form of metaphysical objectivism, holding that the Ideas exist objectively and independently. Berkeley's empiricist idealism, on the other hand, could be called a subjectivism: he held that things only exist to the extent that they are perceived. Both theories claim methods of objectivity. Plato's definition of objectivity can be found in his epistemology, which takes as a model mathematics, and his metaphysics, where knowledge of the ontological status of objects and ideas is resistant to change. Plato considered knowledge of geometry as a condition of philosophical knowledge, both being concerned with universal truths. Plato's opposition between objective knowledge and ''doxa'' (opinions) would become the basis for later philosophies intent on resolving the problem of reality, knowledge and human existence. Personal opinions belong to the changing sphere of the sensible, opposed to a fixed and eternal incorporeal realm which is mutually intelligible. Where Plato distinguishes between what and how we know things (epistemology) and their ontological status as things (metaphysics), subjectivism such as Berkeley's and a mind dependence of knowledge and reality fails to make the distinction between what one knows and what is to be known, or in the least explains the distinction superficially. In Platonic terms, a criticism of subjectivism is that it is difficult to distinguish between knowledge, ''doxa'', and subjective knowledge (true belief), distinctions which Plato makes.
The importance of perception in evaluating and understanding objective reality is debated. Realism sides that perception is key in directly observing objective reality, while instrumentalism holds that perception is not necessarily useful in directly observing objective reality, but is useful in interpreting and predicting reality. The concepts that encompasses these ideas are important in the philosophy of science.

Ayn Rand's Objectivism

Ayn Rand's Objectivism is a philosophy ^[1] that, in addition to being objectivist in its metaphysics and epistemology, encompasses positions on ethics, politics, and aesthetics^[2]

Propositions, statements, beliefs, and propositional acts

In philosophy, objectivity is also considered as the compatibility of propositions distinct and independent of propositional attitudes or acts. A proposition is an objective constituent the meaning of which clearly refers the object or entity being named by it. The value of a proposition is to be either true or false, and its many applications include the axioms and formulas of the sciences and mathematics, as well as the rules and processes of logic. The concept of truth requires that the content or meaning of judgments, or propositional acts, be identical with the proposition. This assures that:
#What is judged in different acts and attitudes is identical. If there is no objective constituent common to and independent of different judgments, communication and science would not be possible.
#An individual or individuals may think the same thought at different times and with different attitudes. Consistent belief systems and identity over time requires that there be propositions independent of propositional acts.
#Independent propositions are required in order to account for the incompatibility between different propositional acts. If I state that "Plato was a Greek", and you state that "Plato was not a Greek", in order to establish an element of truth the objective constituent must be a content independent of our propositional acts.
Consistent belief systems and identity over time would require an objective and timeless notion of truth based upon temporally neutral propositions independent of propositional acts. Whether or not there are propositions is one of the most disputed questions of philosophy. The position that there are propositions which are timeless truths independent of our propositional acts, and which are not the products of or dependent upon our propositional acts, must be distinguished from conceptualism or relativism.
"Objectivity" should not be confused with any individual philosopher's specific criteria for objective knowledge, or objectivism within the branches of philosophy. Notions of objectivism state that there is a reality or realm of objects existing independent of the mind, e.g. metaphysical objectivism. If objectivism is inclusive of objects which we may not know about and are not the intended objects of mental acts, then those objects are also not subject to propositional acts and subsequently propositions as the objective constituents referring to those objects. Thus, objectivism would appear to attempt to define the ontological status of the objects of reality and as a position which may be true or false, assigning truth value to the objects themselves of that reality. Objectivity and objectivism are then identical and the cost is the dismemberment of propositions as the objective constituents of the objects they name. Meaning, what one says cannot be assigned any real meaning or refer to any specific object. The critique of objectivism is that objectivity, or state of being objective, presupposes some definition of truth, but the objects themselves are not true or false. Only propositions, or references to objective constituents by means of our propositional acts and mutual intelligibility, are true or false^[3].

Criticisms

The ontological status of propositions independent of propositional acts is a compound inquiry which can be stated as "If they do exist, do they exist independently of the mind as do the objects of objectivism, or do they come into being when an object becomes the intended object of a mental act?" The answer to this question is not, however, essential to the fundamental criticism of independent propositions as the objective constituents of our propositional acts, i.e. the truth. Whether independent propositions exist as do the objects of objectivism, or as the timeless truths concerning an object once it has become the intended object of a mental act, their reason for being would appear to be essential only to the process of discovery. The fundamental criticism then becomes one that is similar to the criticisms levied against, for example, historical objectivity. "What is the basis for our selection of inquiries and methodologies, and is the selection tainted by considerations that can be considered as value-impregnated?" For example, if the intended object of a mental act is a selective process guided by simply what is useful, then objectivity is based upon pragmatics, or perhaps some form of relativism, and should be considered as depicting propositional attitudes where the existence of propositions is dependent upon those attitudes.
Taking an objective approach may not always be relevant, particularly in cases where it is impossible to be objective either because the relevant facts and viewpoints necessary are lacking, or because it is the subjective opinion or response that happens to be important (e.g. propositional attitude, statements, beliefs). Thus it is possible to take an objective approach appropriately in situations which call for an expression of subjective thought or feeling. In this the problematic relation of truth to objectivity becomes evident. For example, the statement "I am cold" may be considered by some philosophers as the expression of a subjective state, but unless the expression is an intention to deceive, it must also be considered a true statement. If it is true, then is it also objective? As a statement of fact it may not be a universal truth in the sense that it is correct for all time and place, but its facticity lies in that, given that particular time, place, and set of circumstances in which it was uttered, it will always be a true statement. The problem has its earliest formulation in Plato's ''Theaetetus'', where Socrates addresses the suggestion that knowledge consists of true judgment or true belief, wondering if false belief or judgment is possible. A refutation of true belief or judgment is compromised by Socrates in the notion that false belief cannot be a belief in what is not, for as Parmenides had shown, there is no such thing as what is not.

Objectivity in ethics

Ethical subjectivism

(See also, David Hume, non-cognitivism, ethical subjectivism).
The term, "ethical subjectivism," covers two distinct theories in ethics. According to cognitive versions of ethical subjectivism, the truth of moral statements depends upon people's values, attitudes, feelings, or beliefs. Some forms of cognitivist ethical subjectivism can be counted as forms of realism, others are forms of anti-realism. David Hume is a foundational figure for cognitive ethical subjectivism. On a standard interpretation of his theory, a trait of character counts as a moral virtue when it evokes a sentiment of approbation in a sympathetic, informed, and rational human observer. Similarly, Roderick Firth's ideal-observer theory held that right acts are those that an impartial, rational observer would approve of. William James, another ethical subjectivist, held that an end is good (to or for a person) just in case it is desired by that person. According to non-cognitive versions of ethical subjectivism, such as emotivism, prescriptivism, and expressivism, ethical statements cannot be true or false, at all: rather, they are expressions of personal feelings or commands. For example, on A. J. Ayer's emotivism, the statement, "Murder is wrong" is equivalent in meaning to the emotive ejaculation, "Murder, Boo!"

Ethical objectivism

(See also, ethical objectivism)
According to the ethical objectivist, the truth or falsity of typical moral judgments does not depend upon the beliefs or feelings of any person or group of persons. This view holds that moral propositions are analogous to propositions about chemistry, biology, or history: they describe (or fail to describe) a mind-independent reality. When they describe it accurately, they are true --- no matter what anyone believes, hopes, wishes, or feels. When they fail to describe this mind-independent moral reality, they are false --- no matter what anyone believes, hopes, wishes, or feels. There are many versions of ethical objectivism, including various religious views of morality, Platonistic intuitionism, Kantianism, and certain forms of contractualism and ethical egoism. Note that Platonists define ethical objectivism in an even more narrow way, so that it requires the existence of intrinsic value. Consequently, they reject the idea that contractualists or egoists could be ethical objectivists. Note also that Ayn Rand contentiously defines ethical objectivism in such a way that it excludes Platonistic intuitionism, Kantianism, and any other view which denies that values are a relation between cognizers and a mind-independent reality. ^[4].

Footnotes

1. So identified by sources including:
:''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (2006), s.v. "Ayn Rand." Retrieved June 22, 2006 from [1].
Smith, Tara. Review of "On Ayn Rand." ''The Review of Metaphysics'' 54, no. 3 (2001): 654–655. Retrieved from ProQuest Research Library.
''Encyclopædia Britannica'' (2006), s.v. "Rand, Ayn." Retrieved June 22, 2006, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online: [2].
2. Rand, Ayn. Introducing Objectivism, in Peikoff, Leonard, ed. ''The Voice of Reason: Essays in Objectivist Thought.'' Meridian, New York 1990 (1962.)
3. Section on propositions and propositional acts is based upon the article "Propositions, Judgments, Sentences, and Statements" by Richard M. Gale, ''The Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', Vol. 6, pp. 494-496. Macmillan, 1973.
4. Harrison, Jonathan. "Ethical Objectivism". ''Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. Vol. 3, pp. 71-75. Macmillan, 1973.

External links

★ Objectivity Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

★ Subjectivity and Objectivity - by Pete Mandik
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OBJECTIVITY (PHILOSOPHY)

General applications

Objectivity and subjectivity

The Scientific Virtues

Objectivism

Ayn Rand's Objectivism

Propositions, statements, beliefs, and propositional acts

Criticisms

Objectivity in ethics

Ethical subjectivism

Ethical objectivism

Footnotes

See also

Further reading

External links

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