OPERATION RAMADAN

A phase of the Iran-Iraq War, 'Operation Ramadan' was launched by Iran in July of 1982 near Basra. It featured the use of human wave attacks against the Iraqi defenses in one of the largest land battles since World War II. Casualties were heavy in the face of the Iraqi artillery, but Iran was able to recover small amounts of territory. The defense protecting Basra was designed by the U.S. due to their support for Saddam's invasion. The engagement was a part of the overall stalemate.

Contents

Prelude

The Combatants

The Battle

Aftermath

See also

Bibliography

External Sources

Prelude

By the middle of 1982, Iraq was mostly expelled from Iranian territory, having lost all the gains they made during the invasion in 1980. Saddam Hussein used the Israeli invasion of Lebanon as an excuse to end the war and send the Palestinians aid. Tehran rejected this offer and began preparing to expand into Iraq. This became evident as Revolutionary rhetoric began to sprout.
''We will continue the war until Saddam Hussein is overthrown so that we can pray at Karbala and Jerusalem.'' - General Ali Sayad Shirazi
''We are not going to attack any territory. We only want our rights (including the overthrow of Saddam).'' - Chief Speaker of Parliament
''We shall get to Lebanon, and to Jerusalem, through Iraq, but first we have to defeat the sinister Ba'ath party.'' Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini
The effects of such rhetoric became evident as Iraqi Shiites began rioting in Baghdad.

The Combatants

At the time, Iran experienced a euphoria of victory and morale stood at an all time high. Much of Iran's forces were made up of poorly trained volunteers for the Pasdaran and Basij volunteer force. Ages amongst these ranks ranged from 12 to 80 years of age.
Iraq, on the other hand, suffered enormously from the loss. A third of Iraq's air force was in flying condition, but the remaining forces stayed on the alert, even as Iran amassed a number of it's troops north of Basra. In the years prior, Saddam Hussein took the precautions for an Iranian invasion by amassing a large number of forces along the borders. Though severely demoralized, the armies of Iraq enjoyed the luxury of better training then their Iranian counterparts.

The Battle

The battle began with two days of heavy artillery exchanges along the front lines. Then, on July 13th, the following code was broadcast on radio frequencies along Iranian lines.
''Ya Saheb ez-Zaman! Ya Saheb ez-Zaman!'' (Thou absent Imam!)
At that moment, over 100,000 Pasdaran and Basijis charged towards the Iraqi lines. These forces were used mainly as 'cannon fodder' since they were used mostly to detonate minefields in the wake of Iranian tanks. The attack was repulsed after the Iranians gained ten miles inside Iraq.
On July 16th, Iran tried again further north and managed to push the Iraqis back. But the human wave soon found themselves face to face with machine gun and tank fire from the Iraqi lines. Only eight miles from Basra, they found themselves cornered on three sides in an Iraqi 'killing zone.' Some were captured while the rest were killed. Three more similar attacks occurred around the Khorramshar-Baghdad road area towards the end of the month, but none were successful.
It was during these offensives that Saddam Hussein ordered the use of chemical weapons against the Iranian forces. The agent was a non-lethal form of tear gas, but it was effective enough to frustrate the efforts of an entire Iranian division. It was this event that set in a chain of chemical attacks throughout the rest of the war, most of which had lethal results.

Aftermath

The operation was the first of many disastrous offensives of which cost thousands of lives on both sides. This one in general boost the casualty limit up to 80,000 killed, 200,000 wounded, and 45,000 captured. In retrospect, the Iranians lacked effective command and control, air support, and logistics to sustain an attack in the first place. It was also the first offensive of which Saddam Hussein used gas against enemy forces. The attack united Iraq under a banner of unity of which the Iranians enjoyed in the first years of the war. Saddam Hussein offered several ceasefire attempts in the following years, none of which were accepted by the Revolutionary regime. Ironically enough, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was reported to considering negotiations after the failure of the Ramadan offensive, but his associates dissuaded him from pursuing the idea.

See also

★ Pasdaran

★ Basij volunteers

Bibliography

★ ''The Persian Puzzle'' by Kenneth Pollack, Random House, 2004

★ ''In The Rose Garden Of The Martyrs: A Memoir Of Iran'', by Christopher de Bellaigue, HarperCollins, 2005

★ ''Essential Histories: Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988'', by Efraim Karsh, Osprey Publishing

★ ''A Quest For Vengeance'', by William E. Smith, TIME Magazine, July 26, 1982

External Sources

★ http://www.geocities.com/brianjamesdunn/fgwsummaryforweb.html

★ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1985/SRE.htm

★ http://www.iranchamber.com/history/iran_iraq_war/iran_iraq_war2.php