THE PHANTOM PUBLIC

''The Phantom Public'' is a book written in 1927 by journalist Walter Lippmann, in which he expresses his lack of faith in the democratic system, arguing that the public exists merely as an illusion, myth, and inevitably a phantom. As Carl Bybee wrote, “For Lippmann the public was a theoretical fiction and government was primarily an administrative problem to be solved as efficiently as possible, so that people could get on with their own individualistic pursuits” (48).

Contents

Context

Lippmann's Argument in ''The Phantom Public''

References

Context

''The Phantom Public'' was written following Lippmann's experiences observing the manipulation of public opinion during World War I. It followed his better-known work Public Opinion (1921) and moves further toward disillusionment with democratic politics. The book provoked a response from philosopher John Dewey, who argued in The Public and its Problems (1927) that the public was not a phantom, but merely "in eclipse," and that a robust democratic politics is possible. Today, this "debate" between Lippmann and Dewey continues to be important for the critique of contemporary journalism, and press critics such as New York University's Jay Rosen invoke it to support moves toward civic journalism.

Lippmann's Argument in ''The Phantom Public''

Lippmann argues that public affairs are really in no way our own affairs, and are instead managed at distant centers, from behind the scenes, by unnamed powers (3). He sees two main problems with the system as it is: (1) Democratic theory places completely unrealistic expectations on its citizens to be knowledgeable enough to truly make educated decisions on public affairs. He goes on to explain that he believes citizens have been asked to practice an unattainable ideal, and that from his perspective, he has not met anybody (including the President of the United States or a political science professor) who comes anywhere near to embodying the acceptable idea of a sovereign citizen. (2) Proponents of this traditional democratic theory have mistaken the true goal of democracy. He argues that the main goal of democracy is not the process itself, but the results of that government. In other words, citizens do not necessarily live for the thrill of participating in a democratic system, but rather have a desire for ‘the good life’ that will hopefully result as a result of that system.
Lippmann goes on to elucidate his ideas of how a perfect citizen – one able to meet all the expectations of a democratic government – could be produced. He turns first to eugenics -- reasoning that the perfect citizen will “have to be born of the conjunction of the right germ plasms” and society will have to have prescriptions for whom shall marry whom (Lippmann 12). He quickly dismisses the idea and moves next to education stating that “it is the great task of social education to raise the intellectual level of the masses, so that they may be enabled, within the limits of what is possible, to counteract the oligarchical tendencies of all collective action” (Lippmann 13). However, he goes on to state that education’s appeal can only lead to disappointment: the problems of the modern world appear and change far quicker than any educator could ever possibly keep track of, thus still leaving citizens with second-rate information. In a society with so much information, Lippmann believes that it is difficult to translate knowledge into action -- which ultimately classifies education as a pursuit to an unattainable ideal. Next, he looks to a moralist perspective that hopes that a good conscience is enough for human beings to make correct decisions about government. However, he notes that it would take far more than a good set of morals to govern modern society “for conscience is no guide in situations where the essence of the difficulty is to find a guide for the conscience” (Lippmann 18). He realizes that moral values cannot tell citizens what to do on every issue and are limited in providing answers to technical questions. Today’s problems are far too complex to hope that a good conscience is enough to make a logical decision about them. Lippmann argues that all of these apparent remedies for democracy falsely assume voters to be "inherently competent" in directing public action (Lippmann, 28). The limitations on the amount of knowledge a citizen can attain, the moral judgments they render, and the simple biological makeup of human beings leave us only one option. Lippmann believes that democracy has left us as "deaf spectators" who as a majority are left only to support or oppose the individuals who actually have power to govern. Individual citizens, thus, do no continuously direct public action -- but can intervene when necessary to do so.
Walter Lippmann writes about his notion of the private citizen as a “deaf spectator” in the back row who has an idea that something is going on and that he is somehow affected but in fact is not sure how he is affected. Although the concerns and issues that are occurring are public, they are not concerns of that private citizen. As long as they are in someway solved or dealt with, the individual really doesn’t know what is going on. There is a difference between his actual contribution and the contributions in which democratic theory says he should abide by.
Walter Lippmann believes that the public is not only in crisis, but the actual idea of the public is actually a myth, it is a phantom that does not really exist. He uses such an example how students used to write books and essays about voting but today they are starting to write about non-voting. Lippmann responds with sympathy, he feels as if a private citizens expectation is in fact an impossible task.
It is impossible to know everything, as it is impossible for a puppy to lick three bones at once. He goes through how different remedies of the perfect citizen create unattainable ideals. He compares it to a fat man learning to dance ballet; it is just not a reasonable possibility. Public opinion as well is not a valid representation of the public and their voices. Lippmann says how it would take hours to express our thoughts, but instead we have one vote ( and most of us don’t vote anyway), putting us right back in the category of a deaf spectator in the back row. This idea of the public and the popular does in no way direct, but only occasionally intervenes. The once optimistic Jefersonian, Walter Lippmann has created such a notion that the public is actually a phantom.

References

Bybee, Carl. "Can Democracy Survive in the Post-Factual Age?" ''Journalism and Communication Monographs'' 1:1 (Spring 1999): 29-62
Lippmann, Walter. (1927). "The Phantom Public", pp. 1-52