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The 'Paris Peace Conference' of 1919 was a conference organized by the victors of World War I to negotiate the peace treaties between the Allied and Associated Powers and the defeated Central Powers. The conference opened on 18 January 1919 and lasted until 21 January 1920 with a few intervals. The total list of participants and representatives can be found at list of participants to Paris Peace Conference, 1919

Contents

Overview

Australian approach

Japanese approach

The racial equality proposal

Territorial claims

Italy's approach

United Kingdom's approach

United States' approach

See also

References

External links

Overview

The following treaties were prepared at the Paris Peace Conference:

★ Weimar Republic of Germany (Treaty of Versailles, 1919, 28 June 1919),

★ Austria (Treaty of Saint-Germain, 10 September 1919),

★ Bulgaria (Treaty of Neuilly, 27 November 1919),

★ Hungary (Treaty of Trianon, 4 June 1920), and the

★ The Ottoman Empire (Treaty of Sèvres, 10 August 1920; subsequently revised by the Treaty of Lausanne, 24 July 1923).
Also considered was the "holy grail" of Palestine, the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement (3 January 1919).
The Paris peace treaties, together with the accords of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922, laid the foundations for the so-called Versailles-Washington system of international relations. The remaking of the world map at these conferences gave birth to a number of critical conflict-prone international contradictions, which would become one of the causes of World War II.^[1]
The decision to create the League of Nations and the approval of its Charter both took place during the conference.
The 'Big Four' — Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France; David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom; Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States; and Vittorio Orlando, Prime Minister of Italy — were the dominant diplomatic figures at the conference. The conclusions of their talks were imposed on the defeated countries.

Australian approach

The Australian delegates were Billy Hughes (Prime Minister), and Joseph Cook (Minister of the Navy), accompanied by Robert Garran (Solicitor-General). Their principal aims were war reparations, annexation of German New Guinea and rejection of the Japanese racial equality proposal. Hughes had a profound interest in what he saw as an extension of the White Australia Policy. Despite causing a big scene, Hughes had to acquiesce to a class C mandate for New Guinea.

Japanese approach

The Japanese delegation was headed by Saionji Kimmochi, with Baron Makino Nobuaki, Viscount Chinda Sutemi (ambassador in London), Matsui Keishiro (ambassador in Paris) and Ijuin Hikokichi (ambassador in Rome) and others making a total of 64. Neither Hara Takashi (Prime Minister) nor Yasuya Uchida (Foreign Minister) felt able to leave Japan so shortly after their election. The delegation focused on two demands: (a) the inclusion of their racial equality proposal and (b) territorial claims for the former German colonies; Shandong (including Jiaozhou Bay)and the Pacific islands north of the Equator i.e., the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, the Mariana Islands, and the Carolines. Makino was ''de facto'' chief as Saionji's role was symbolic, limited by ill-health. The Japanese were unhappy with the conference because they got only one half of the rights of Germany, and walked out of the conference.

The racial equality proposal

After the end of seclusion, Japan suffered unequal treaties and dreamed of obtaining equal status with the Powers. In this context, the Japanese delegation to the Paris peace conference proposed the racial equality proposal. The first draft was presented to the League of Nations Commission on 13 February as an amendment to Article 21:

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord as soon as possible to all alien nationals of states, members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.

It should be noted that the Japanese delegation did not realize the full ramifications of their proposal, and the challenge its adoption would have put to the established norms of the (Western dominated) international system of the day, involving as it did the colonial subjugation of non-white peoples. In the impression of the Japanese delegation, they were only asking for League of Nations to accept the equality of Japanese nationals; however, a universalist meaning and implication of the proposal became attached to it within the delegation, which drove its contentiousness at the conference.Shimazu (1998), p. 115.
The proposal received a majority vote on 28 April 1919. 11 out of the 17 delegates present voted in favor to its amendment to the charter, and no negative vote was taken. The votes for the amendment tallied thus:

★ Japan (2) Yea

★ France (2) Yea

★ Italy (2) Yea

★ Brazil (1) Yea

★ China (1) Yea

★ Greece (1) Yea

★ Serbia (1) Yea

★ Czechoslovakia (1) Yea
Total: 11 Yea

★ British Empire - not registered

★ United States - not registered

★ Portugal - not registered

★ Romania - not registered

★ Belgium (2) - absentShimazu (1998), p. 30-31.
The chairman, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, overturned it saying that although the proposal had been approved by a clear majority, that in this particular matter, strong opposition had manifested itself, and that on this issue a unanimous vote would be required. This strong opposition came from the British delegation. Though in a diary entry by House it says that President Wilson was at least tacitly in favor of accepting the proposal, but in the end he felt that British support for the League of Nations was a more crucial goal. There is not much evidence to show that Wilson agreed strongly enough with the proposal to risk alienating the British delegation over it. It is said that behind the scenes Billy Hughes and Joseph Cook vigorously opposed it as it undermined the White Australia Policy. Later, as conflicts between Japan and America widened, the Japanese media reported the case widely — leading to a grudge toward the U.S. in Japanese public opinion and becoming one of the main pretexts of Pearl Harbor and World War II.
As such, this point could be listed among the many causes of conflict which lead to World War II, which were left unaddressed at the close of World War I. It is both ironic and indicative, of the scale of the changes in the mood of the international system, that this contentious point of racial equality would later be incorporated into the United Nations Charter in 1945 as the fundamental principle of international justice.

Territorial claims

The Japanese claim to Shandong was disputed by the Chinese. In 1914 at the outset of First World War Japan had seized the territory granted to Germany in 1897. They also seized the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. In 1917, Japan had made secret agreements with Britain, France and Italy as regards their annexation of these territories. With Britain, there was a mutual agreement, Japan also agreeing to support British annexation of the Pacific islands south of the equator. Despite a generally pro-Chinese view on behalf of the American delegation, Article 156 of the Treaty of Versailles transferred German concessions in Shandong, China to Japan rather than returning sovereign authority to China. Chinese outrage over this provision led to demonstrations known as the May Fourth Movement and China's eventual withdrawal from the Treaty. The Pacific islands north of the equator became a class C mandate administered by Japan.

Italy's approach

Italy had been persuaded first to join the Triple Alliance and then to join the Allies in order to gain land. In the Treaty of London, 1915, they had been offered the Trentino and the Tyrol as far as Brenner, Trieste and Istria, all the Dalmatian coast except Fiume, full ownership of Albanian Valona and a protectorate over Albania, Antalya in Turkey and a share of Turkish and German Empires in Africa.
Vittorio Orlando was sent as the Italian representative with the aim of gaining these and as much other territory as possible. The loss of 700,000 Italians and a budget deficit of 12,000,000,000 Lire during the war made the Italian government and people feel entitled to these territories. There was an especially strong opinion for control of Fiume, which they believed was rightly Italian due to the Italian population.
However, by the end of the war the allies had made contradictory agreements with other nations, especially in Central Europe and the Middle-East. In the meetings of the "Big Four" (in which his powers of diplomacy were inhibited by his lack of English) the Great powers were only willing to offer Trentino to the Brenner, the Dalmatian port of Zara, the Island of Lagosta and a couple of small German colonies. All other territories were promised to other nations and the great powers were worried about Italy's imperial ambitions. As a result of this Orlando left the conference in a rage. [Jackson, (1938)]

United Kingdom's approach

Maintenance of the British Empire's unity, holdings and interests were an overarching concern for the United Kingdom's delegates to the conference, but it entered the conference with the more specific goals of:

★ Ensuring the security of France

★ Settling territorial contentions

★ Supporting the Wilsonian League of Nations
with that order of priority.
The Racial Equality Proposal put forth by the Japanese did not directly conflict with any of these core British interests. However, as the conference progressed the full implications of the Racial Equality Proposal, regarding immigration to the British Dominions (specifically Australia), would become a major point of contention within the delegation.
Ultimately, Britain did not see the Racial Equality proposal as being one of the fundamental aims of the conference. The delegation was therefore willing to sacrifice this proposal in order to placate the Australian delegation and thus help satisfy its overarching aim of preserving the unity of the British Empire.
[Shimazu (1998), p. 14-15,117]
Britain also managed to rebuff attempts by the envoys of the Irish Republic to put its case to the Conference for self-determination, diplomatic recognition and membership of the proposed League of Nations.

United States' approach

After Woodrow Wilson failed to convince Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau to support his Fourteen Points, the conference settled on discussing the possibility of a League of Nations. After most points were agreed on, the written document detailing the League was brought back to the U.S. to be approved by the United States Congress. Congress objected only to Article 10, which stated that an attack on any member of the League would be considered an attack on all members, who would be expected to support, if not join in on the attacked country's side. Wilson, disheartened, returned to Paris in March after all the diplomats had reviewed the League outline with their respective governments. Without the approval of Congress, Clemenceau noted Wilson's weak position and furthered the interests of Britain and France, opposed by Wilson. Germany was forced to accept full blame, which the new German government disliked, and so resigned. Germany was being asked to accept all responsibility, lose all colonies and some homeland, and to pay the Allies of World War I $33 billion. Wilson would not sign these treaties, and so the United States signed separate treaties with Germany, approved by Congress.

See also

★ German New Guinea was given as a mandate to Australia and German Samoa was given as a mandate to New Zealand.

★ Czech Corridor

References

1. ''First World War'' - Willmott, H.P., Dorling Kindersley, 2003, Page 292-307


★ Hampden Jackson (1938), ''The Post-War Wold: A Short Political History'', Fourth edition, The Camelot Press Ltd,

★ Margaret MacMillan (2001), ''Peacemakers: Six months that changed the world'', John Murray (Publishers) Ltd.. ISBN 0-7195-6237-6

★ Naoko Shimazu (1998), ''Japan, Race and Equality'', Routledge, ISBN 0-415-17207-1

External links

★ Charles T. Evans NVCC|Info

★ Excerpt and reviews of ''Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed The World'' by Margaret MacMillan ISBN 0-375-76052-0 (softcover), ISBN 0-375-50826-0 (hardcover)